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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ATrORNEY ADVERTISING-
TARGETED MAILINGS- A BLANKET PROHIBITION OF DIRECT
MAIL SOLICITATIONS TO TARGETED ACCIDENT VICTIMS VIO-
LATES AN ATTORNEY'S RIGHT OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE
FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION. In re von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163,
470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984).
In July of 1981, the sky-walk inside the Hyatt Regency
Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, collapsed, killing or injur-
ing more than 250 people.' Soon after, Eric P. von
Wiegen, a New York attorney, solicited by direct mail the
victims and families of those injured or killed in the trag-
edy.2 Mr. von Wiegen sent two separate notices inform-
ing the victims that a litigation coordinating committee
established on their behalf was organizing an initial free
consultation with Mr. von Wiegen. In response to Mr.
In re von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 166, 470 N.E.2d 838, 839, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40,
41, (1984).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 178-79, 470 N.E.2d at 846-47, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 48-49. The first notice
read as follows:
ATTENTION HYATT REGENCY DISASTER VICTIMS [:]
A Litigation Coordinating Committee has been formed to protect
the rights and preserve the claims of all persons injured and the fam-
ilies of those deceased in the disaster ofJuly 17, 1981.
An attorney has agreed to provide free legal consultation to assist
any persons with questions as to their rights and possible claims aris-
ing from this incident.
If you have any questions concerning sources of income available
such as social security disability and survivor benefits or questions
pertaining to the probate of an estate, transfer of property or your
claims against the hotel property owner and builder call collect (518)
842-6716 or (518) 382-0438 or drop a card to Diane Frost at the
above address.
A committee person will be available to assist in the completing of
and filing of documents, obtaining accident reports, death certifi-
cates, to provide other assistance, information, and help obtain the
services you need. This is a volunteer group and services provided
by committee persons are free.
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von Wiegen's actions, the Committee on Professional
Standards, Third Judicial Department 4 of New York (the
Initial reports released to the media by the hotel representatives im-
ply the accident was the victim's fault. This is absurd. Your interest
is not being represented by anyone at the accident site at this time.
However, by uniting together each person's claim can be preserved





The second notice stated:
ATTENTION HYATT REGENCY DISASTER VICTIMS [:1
Many of you have requested representation by attorney Eric P. von
Wiegen who volunteered initial FREE consultation concerning your
claims against the Hyatt Regency, and others responsible for the
death and injuries caused in this disaster.
He has agreed to represent victims or their surviving family mem-
bers on a contingent fee basis of twenty-five percent (25%) of the
sum recovered, after the reimbursement of reasonable and neces-
sary cost [sic] incurred in making the recovery. The cost [sic] will be
pro-rated among those persons represented by Mr. von Wiegen and
will be deducted from any sum recovered, before an attorney's fee is
charged.
Because of Mr. von Wiegen's experience in the practice of personal
injury litigation involving multiple defendants, and based on conver-
sations with potential experts, it is his opinion that the liability of the
defendants is clear. His usual and customary attorney's fee in such
instances is twenty-five percent (25%). However, he has advised us
that should client representation exceed twenty-five persons, his fee
shall be twenty percent (20%) to each client represented and shall
be charged as outlined above.
Mr. von Wiegen is an experienced personal injury attorney, licensed
to practice in the states of New York and Michigan. He has and does
represent clients in many of the other states. If you wish to discuss
this matter please call COLLECT 518-382-0438 8:30 a.m. to 5:30






63 N.Y.2d at 178-79, 470 N.E.2d at 846-847, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 48-49 (showing
photocopies of the notice as an appendix to the opinion). Diane Frost was actu-
ally Mr. von Wiegen's secretary, and she and Mr. von Wiegen were the only mem-
bers of the committee. Id. at 176, 470 N.E.2d at 845, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 47.
4 Under the New York Court Rules, the Third Judicial Department has estab-
lished a twenty member Committee on Professional Standards which is charged
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Committee) commenced a disciplinary action 5 against him
before a referee. 6 One count in the disciplinary proceed-
ing against Mr. von Wiegen alleged that the direct mail
solicitation of the victims and their families violated a New
York disciplinary rule.7 The referee in the disciplinary
with investigating all matters of alleged misconduct by attorneys in the Third Judi-
cial Department. See N.Y. Court Rules § 806.3(a)(b)(McKinney 1979).
In re von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d at 167, 470 N.E.2d at 840, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
The procedure for investigating alleged misconduct and instituting disciplinary
proceedings is set out in N.Y. Court Rules §§ 806.4, 806.5 (McKinney 1979).
6 63 N.Y.2d at 167, 470 N.E.2d at 840, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 41. Under the rules
covering disciplinary proceedings against attorneys, the court may itself hear is-
sues of fact which arise in the proceeding or refer such issues to a referee, who
hears them and reports back. N.Y. Court Rules § 806.5 (McKinney 1979).
63 N.Y.2d at 167, 470 N.E.2d at 840, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 42. Three counts were
filed in the original action on April 20, 1982. Id. at 167, 470 N.E.2d at 840, 481
N.Y.S.2d at 42.
The committee alleged that Mr. von Wiegen violated § 479 of the New York
Judiciary Law and various sections of the New York Code of Professional Respon-
sibility. (New York adopted the American Bar Association's Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, with few variations). Id. at 167, 470 N.E.2d at 840, 481
N.Y.S.2d at 42. Count I charged him with direct mail solicitation in violation of
disciplinary rule 2-103(A)(C)(E). Id. at 167, 470 N.E.2d at 840, 481 N.Y.S.2d at
42. The relevant portions of DR 2-103 read as follows:
(A) A lawyer shall not solicit employment as a private practitioner of
himself or herself, a partner or an associate to a person who has not
sought advice regarding employment of a lawyer in violation of any
statute or court rule. Actions permitted by DR 2-104 and advertis-
ing in accordance with DR 2-101 shall not be deemed solicitation in
violation of this provision. ...
(C) A lawyer shall not request a person or organization to recom-
mend or promote the use of the lawyer's services or those of the
lawyer's partner or associate, or any other affiliated lawyer as a pri-
vate practitioner, except as authorized in DR 2-101, and except that:
(1) The lawyer may request referrals from a lawyer referral service
operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association and may pay
its fees incident thereto. (2) The lawyer may cooperate with the legal
service activities of any of the offices or organizations enumerated in
DR 2-103(D)(1) through (4) and may perform legal services for
those to whom he was recommended by it to do such work if: (a) The
person to whom the recommendation is made is a member or bene-
ficiary of such office or organization; and (b) The lawyer remains
free to exercise his independent professional judgment on behalf of
his client. . ..
(E) A lawyer shall not accept employment when he knows or it is
obvious that the person who seeks his services does so as a result of
conduct prohibited under this Disciplinary Rule.
Code of Prof. Resp., DR 2-103(A,C,E), McKinney's Judiciary Law App. (1979).
Count II charged Mr. von Wiegen with deception and misrepresentation in vio-
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proceeding concluded that neither New York's Discipli-
nary Rule (DR) 2-103(A,C,E) nor Section 479 of the New
York Judiciary Law prohibits direct mail solicitation of a
targeted group of accident victims.8 The Appellate Divi-
sion of the New York Supreme Court disagreed with the
referee's ruling. 9 The Appellate Division held that the
prohibition of direct mail solicitation of accident victims is
a time, place, and manner regulation of. commercial
speech1 ° and is justified because of the substantial state
interest involved. 1' Both parties appealed, thus present-
ing to New York's highest court the question of the con-
stitutionality of the Code of Professional Responsibility's
prohibition against the direct mail solicitation of targeted
groups such as accident victims. Held, reversed and re-
manded: A blanket prohibition of direct mail solicitations
targeted to accident victims violates an attorney's rights of
expression under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution. In re von Wiegen, 63
N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984).
lation of DR 1-102(A)(4), (6) and DR 2-101(A)(B). 63 N.Y.2d at 167, 470 N.E.2d
at 840, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 42. Count III in the original action involved an unrelated
incident charging Mr. von Wiegen with hiring two other persons to place flyers
advertising his services on automobile windshields in the local shopping mall in
violation of DR 2-101 (A,C,E) and DR 2-102 (A,B). Id. at 167, 470 N.E.2d at 840,
481 N.Y.S.2d at 42. The court upheld the second count and dismissed the third
count. Id. at 167, 470 N.E.2d at 840, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 42. Accordingly, the court
remanded the case to the appellate division for modification. Id. at 177, 470
N.E.2d at 46, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 48. The scope of this casenote is limited to Count I
only, and does not address counts II and III.
Id. at 167, 470 N.E.2d at 840, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 42. The disciplinary proceed-
ing resulted in the attorney's suspension from the practice of law for six months
because the referee found fraud and deception under Count II. See supra, note 7.
The court found that neither Count I nor Count III could be sustained, and con-
sequently, no disciplinary sanctions were imposed under those counts. Id.
9 In re von Wiegen, 101 A.D.2d 627, 474 N.Y.S.2d 147, 148 (N.Y. App. Div.),
modified, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40, 470 N.E.2d 838 (1984).
to Id. at 628, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 148. A "time, place, and manner" regulation of
speech is not an infringement on the right to free speech if reasonable and related
to a substantial state interest. In re R.N.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 n.13, 207 (1982) (a
regulation limiting the cases of recipients of a general mailing is unconstitutional).
See also infra notes 119-160 and accompanying text.
11 Id. at 628, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. United States Supreme Court
Modern regulations of attorney advertising find their
roots in ancient common law beliefs connecting attorney
advertising with unprofessional behavior.' 2  In 1908, the
American Bar Association initially instituted a formal ban
on attorney advertising and solicitation.' 3 Although some
critics argued it was unnecessary and counterproductive, ' 4
the ban went unchallenged since advertising, as a form of
commercial speech,' 5 was assumed to have been outside
the protection given by the First Amendment.' 6
The belief that commercial speech is not entitled to
First Amendment protection arose from the Supreme
Court's decision in Valentine v. Christensen.'7 In Valentine,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of a municipal ordi-
nance which forbade the distribution of "commercial and
business advertising matter" in the streets.' 8 While the
12 See Note, Attorney Solicitations of Clients: Proposed Solutions, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV.
755, 757 (1979) (citing Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE LJ.
966, 969 (1967) (showing solicitation proscription has roots in Greek, Roman,
and English Common Law)).
1s ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 27 (1908).
14 See, e.g. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 702, 711-12 (1977); Wilson, Madison Avenue, Meet the Bar, 61 A.B.A.J. 586
(1975).
- Commercial speech is that which does "no more than propose a commercial
transaction." Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973) (City ordinance forbidding newspapers to carry sex-
designated advertising job columns held constitutional).
- Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951)(holding door-to-door magazine
subscription solicitation was commercial speech outside of the First Amendment's
protection); Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942)(stating "purely
commercial advertising is not protected").
The First Amendment states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to as-
semble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
IN Id. at 53 n.l (quoting NEW YORK CITY SANITARY CODE § 318). The plaintiff
attempted to distribute handbills which advertised a tour of a submarine which he
had moored at a New York pier. Id. The Police Commissioner advised the plain-
tiff that distribution of the handbills would violate the sanitary code, but plaintiff
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Court noted that municipalities may not proscribe the
communication of information or dissemination of opin-
ion, 19 it held that the Constitution does not impose any
similar restraint on governmental regulation of "purely
commercial advertising. "20 The holding in Valentine has
generally been read as placing commercial speech outside
the umbrella of First Amendment protection. 21  Despite
the brevity of the opinion and its absence of authority,
Valentine is considered to be the foundation of the com-
mercial speech doctrine.22
In 1951, nine years after Valentine, the Court in Breard v.
City of Alexandria2 3 gave further support to the belief that
commercial speech does not enjoy First Amendment pro-
tection. The Court upheld as constitutional an ordinance
which prohibited door-to-door solicitation by salesmen
without the consent of the homeowners.2 4 Because sell-
ing brought into the speech "a commercial feature," 25
the Court held the ordinance did not violate the First
Amendment.
26
learned that he could distribute handbills solely devoted to "information or public
protest." Id. Plaintiff then attempted to distribute a double-faced handbill con-
sisting of the advertisement on one side and a protest against the City Dock De-
partment on the other side. Id. Although he was advised that a distribution of the
new handbill would constitute a violation of the code, plaintiff nevertheless at-
tempted distribution and was restrained by the police. Id.
19 Id. at 54. The Court stated that although public streets are proper places for
distribution of information and opinion, municipalities may reasonably regulate
the exercise of free speech in the public interest. However, a municipality may
not go so far as to prohibit the dissemination of information in the streets. Id.
2,, Id. The Court noted that the City's prohibition against distribution of com-
mercial advertising did not amount to interference with a lawful business, but was
instead a reasonable exercise of a city's power to prevent an undesirable invasion
of the public use for which streets are intended. Id.
21 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 652 (1978).
22 Note, Constitutional Law - First Amendment - Protection of Commercial Speech -
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 679, 680 (1984).
2, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
24 Id. at 645. Because the salesman in question sold magazine subscriptions,
the Court stated that the constitutionality of the ordinance turned on a test weigh-
ing a homeowner's desire for privacy against a publisher's right to distribute his
publication as he sees fit. Id. at 644.
2 Id. at 642.
21; Id. at 645.
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In Murdock v. Pennsylvania,27 the Court began to chip
away at the belief that commercial speech enjoyed no First
Amendment protection. Only one year after Breard, the
Court, in Murdock, found that solicitation of money would
not classify the speech as "commercial" if the speaker's
primary motive lies elsewhere.2 8 As a result, a tax on the
sale of religious literature by Jehovah's Witnesses was in-
validated because the group's primary motive was to dis-
seminate religious beliefs rather than earn money.29
Following Murdock, the "first crack in the theoretical
wall ' 30 of commercial speech came in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,31 which upheld the right of a newspaper to pub-
lish a paid political advertisement.32 In Sullivan, the Court
concluded that the the advertisement in question was not
commercial speech because it communicated ideas and
opinions about matters of great public interest.3 3 By stat-
ing that an expression is not considered commercial
speech simply because it is a paid advertisement, the
Court negatively defined commercial speech. 4
In Bigelow v. Virginia,35 the Supreme Court attempted to
dispel the belief that commercial speech is unprotected by
the First Amendment. 6 In Bigelow, the Court considered
27 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
2" Id. at 110-12 (noting that seeking money for religious literature does not con-
vert evangelism into a commercial venture).
29 Id. at 114-17.
- Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 720, 723
(1982).
-, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
32 Id. at 292.
3 Id. at 266. The paid advertisement in Sullivan solicited contributions for Dr.
Martin Luther King and the civil rights movement. The ad consisted of copy
charging the Montgomery, Alabama, police force with brutality and harassment of
civil rights protesters in 1960. Id. at 256-58.
4 Id. at 266, The Court stated that because the publication "communicated
information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and
sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives
are matters of the highest public interest and concern," the advertisement was not
commercial speech. Id. See also Note, supra note 22 at 685.
-- 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
, Id. at 818. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (allowing pharmacists to advertise prescription
drug prices). In his opinion for the court, Justice Blackmun expressed the view
667
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the plight of a Virginia newspaper editor who had pub-
lished an advertisement for an abortion referral service.
The newspaper editor had been convicted of violating a
Virginia statute prohibiting the publication of any item
which would encourage the procuring of abortions. The
Court applied a balancing test weighing the First Amend-
ment interest of a newspaper editor against the public in-
terest which the statute allegedly served. 8 The Court
held that the statute infringed on the editor's right to free
speech because the State had questionable interests
whereas the defendant, as a newspaper editor, had a sub-
stantial First Amendment interest.3 9 Thus, the Court pro-
vided the paid advertisement, which was clearly
commercial speech,40 with First Amendment protection
because it communicated information in the public inter-
est.4" However, the Court hesitated to extend its ruling
beyond the facts of the case.42
Only one year after Bigelow, the Supreme Court in Vir-
ginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.4 3 affirmatively granted commercial speech
First Amendment protection. In Virginia Pharmacy a con-
sumer group challenged a Virginia statute prohibiting li-
censed pharmacists from advertising the prices they
that in Bigelow, "the notion of unprotected 'commercial speech' all but passed
from the scene." 425 U.S. at 759.
.7 421 U.S. at 812-13 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960)). The statute
simply said that any person who, by publication or advertisement, encouraged the
procuring of an abortion would be guilty of a misdemeanor.
421 U.S. at 822.
Id. at 825, 827.
41 Id. at 821-22. The Court stated that the advertisement in question not only
"propose[d] a commercial transaction," thereby meeting the test of commercial
speech set out in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973), it also communicated information in the public
interest. 421 U.S. at 822. By so stating, the court went further than in New York
Times v. Sullivan, see supra notes 31-34, where it held that because the advertise-
ment related to a public concern, it did not constitute commercial speech. 376
U.S. at 266. See supra note 34.
4 421 U.S. at 825.
42 Id. at 825 & n.10.
4, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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charged for prescription drugs.4 4 Consequently, the
Court faced for the first time issues concerning both the
protection of purely commercial speech and the regula-
tion of professionals.4 5
The Court concluded, despite its earlier decisions to
the contrary, that commercial speech deserves the protec-
tion of the First Amendment.46 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court applied a balancing test weighing society's
strong interest in the free flow of commercial information
against the state's strong interest in maintaining the pro-
fessionalism of its licensed pharmacists.47 The Court con-
cluded that because of the importance of the individual
and societal right to know about the cost of prescription
drugs, the commercial speech contained in drug price ad-
vertisements falls within the scope of First Amendment
protection.48
The Court noted that "the particular consumer's inter-
est in the free flow of commercial information. . . may be
as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's
most urgent political debate," and "society also may have
44 Id. at 749-50. The Virginia statute in question stated: "Any pharmacist shall
be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct who . . .(3) publishes, advertises
or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price,
fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms .. .for drugs . ..which may be
dispensed only by prescription." VA.'CODE § 54-524.35 (1974) (repealed 1977).
45 Whitman, and Stoltenberg, The Present Constitutional Status of Lawyer Advertising
- Theoretical and Practical Implications of In re: R.M.J., 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 445,
453 (1983).
4,; 425 U.S. at 770.
47 Id. at 761-70.
4M Id. at 770. It should be noted that the same statute analyzed in Virginia Phar-
macy had been held constitutional in an earlier suit brought by a pharmacist. Pat-
terson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1969). The Court in
Virginia Pharmacy placed emphasis on the district court's statement that since the
plaintiffs in this case were consumers, they "were asserting an interest in their
own health that was 'fundamentally deeper than a trade consideration.' " 425
U.S. at 755 (quoting the district court's opinion in Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Va. 1974)).
The Court implied that because these plaintiffs were prescription drug consumers
and not pharmacists, the possibility of later commercial gain did not taint their
argument. Consequently, their case asserting a "right to know" was given more
credence than the same argument espoused by a pharmacist/plaintiff. 425 U.S. at
754-55.
669
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a strong interest in the free flow of commercial informa-
tion."4 9 The Court reasoned that the free flow of com-
mercial information is indispensable to the private
economic decisions which operate to allocate resources.50
Since the allocation of resources is a central concern of a
free enterprise economy, the Court concluded that it is in
the public's best interest to allow the free flow of commer-
cial information so that economic decisions might be
more intelligent and well-informed. 5'
Balanced against the public's right to know was the
state's interest in maintaining a high degree of profession-
alism on the part of its licensed pharmacists.5 2 The state's
arguments for maintaining the ban53 were spurned by the
Court, which observed that the state could continue to
regulate professionalism regardless of whether or not
pharmacists were allowed to advertise prescription drug
prices.54 The Court reasoned that because the advertising
ban did not prevent a pharmacist from acting unprofes-
sionally if he so chose, the ban on advertising did not truly
insure professionalism.55 Consequently, the individual
4t 425 U.S. at 763-64.
-so Id. at 765.
-1 Id. The Court made the interesting argument that advertising promotes the
public interest through the dissemination of information. The Court stated:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem,
is none the less dissemination of information as to who is producing
and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price. So
long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the
allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through
numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public inter-
est that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well in-
formed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is
indispensable.
Id.
Id Id. at 766.
5 See id. at 766-67, where the Court noted that the many special skills a li-
censed pharmacist brings to the job justifies a strong state interest in maintaining
professionalism.
54 Id. at 768-69.
r- Id. at 769. The Court observed that a ban on advertising fails to prevent a
pharmacist from cutting corners if the pharmacist is so inclined. Additionally, the
advertising ban insulates these unprofessional pharmacists from price competi-
tion, thereby allowing excessive profits in addition to inferior service. Id.
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and societal right to know outweighed the state interest in
maintaining professionalism.56
The Court also noted that while protected from com-
plete prohibition by the First Amendment, commercial
speech may nevertheless be subject to certain regula-
tions.57 The Court gave examples of three forms of per-
missible commercial speech regulation: (1) reasonable
regulation of the time, place, and manner of commercial
speech,58 (2) prohibition of advertising that is false or
misleading in any way, 59 and (3) prohibition of advertise-
ments which propose transactions that are themselves ille-
gal. 60  The Court stated that none of these regulations
were before the Court nor were foreclosed by their
decision.61
Although the opinion may have given hope to some ad-
vocates of attorney advertising, the Court carefully limited
the holding to the facts of the case. The Court noted that
its holding regarding advertising of products sold by
pharmacists might not apply equally to the regulation of
advertisements of legal services by attorneys. 2 The
Court pointed out that attorneys and doctors do not deal
in standardized products.63 Instead, they render a variety
of services. 64 As a result, the Court opined, the nature of
.- See id. at 770.
57 Id.
- Id. at 771. In earlier decisions, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
time, place, and manner regulations of any protected free speech "provided that
they [were] justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that
they serve[d] a significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they [left]
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Id.
.- Id. The Court specifically reaffirmed the state's power to regulate commer-
cial speech that is deceptive or misleading even though not provably false. Id.
Additionally, in a footnote, the Court states that commercial speech should be
afforded a different degree of protection since it is not as susceptible as noncom-
mercial speech to the chilling effect and since its truth may be more easily verified
than the truth of non-commercial speech. Id. at 771 n.24.
Id. at 772.
Id. at 770.
62 Id. at 773 n.25.
63 Id. See also id. at 773-75 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 783-85 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
- 425 U.S. at 773 n.25.
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medical and legal services enhances the potential for ad-
vertisements by those professions to mislead or confuse
consumers. 
65
After granting commercial speech First Amendment
protection in 1976, it took only one year for the Court to
extend the same protection to an attorney's right to ad-
vertise. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,66 two Arizona attor-
neys opened a legal clinic in Phoenix designed to provide
legal services at modest fees to clients who had little in-
come but did not qualify for governmental legal aid.67
Since the attorneys relied on a high volume of routine
legal business to make their clinic profitable, they placed
an advertisement in the Arizona Republic listing their fees
for certain routine legal services in the hopes that the ad-
vertisement would generate business. 68 Arizona's DR 2-
101(b) prohibited attorneys from advertising their serv-
ices through various segments of the media, including
newspaper advertisements. 69 As a result of the advertise-
ment, the two attorneys received sanctions from a discipli-
nary committee, and the Arizona Supreme Court upheld
the disciplinary sanctions imposed for the attorneys' viola-
tion of DR 2-101(B).7 ° In their argument to the United
States Supreme Court, the attorneys argued that although
their conduct violated DR 2-101(B), the rule was an un-
constitutional restriction of commercial speech.7'
I d.
" 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The Bates Court relied heavily on the reasoning of Vir-
ginia Pharmacy. In fact, after summarizing the Virginia Pharmacy decision the Court
stated that it relied on Virginia Pharmacy "because the conclusion that Arizona's
disciplinary rule [prohibiting attorney advertising] is violative of the First Amend-
ment might be said to flow afortiori from it." Id. at 365.
67 id. at 354.
- Id. The advertisement is reproduced in the Supreme Court Reporter as an
appendix to the Court's opinion. Id. at 385. The advertisement lists routine legal
services such as uncontested divorces and name changes along with the prices the
clinic charged for legal consultation on these matters. Id.
, Id. at 355 (quoting the text of the Disciplinary Rule in the opinion and note 5
of the opinion).
70 Id. at 356.
7' Id. at 355. Most states have adopted the disciplinary rules set out in the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. In 1976, the Arizona version of DR 2-
101(B) provided:
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As in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court applied a balancing
test to determine the constitutionality of the rule. 2 On
one side, the state presented a six-point analysis urging
the validity of the regulation.73 The state argued that: (1)
attorney advertising would undermine the attorney's
sense of dignity and self-worth thereby degrading the
legal profession;74 (2) attorneys' services are so highly in-
dividualized that advertisements which focus on price
would be inherently misleading since (a) they overlook
the relevant factor of skill, and (b) the consumer could not
ascertain his own needs; 75  (3) advertising would stir up
litigation; 76 (4) increased overhead costs for advertising
would be passed on to consumers through increased
fees;7 7 (5) advertising would discourage quality service
since attorneys would be encouraged to provide a stan-
dard package of services to clients, whether or not it fit
(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate,
or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer
through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television
announcements, display advertisements in the city or telephone di-
rectories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he au-
thorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29(a)(Supp. 1976)(amended 1979). The remainder of
subdivision (B) states exceptions to the general prohibition - none of which are
relevant here.
72 433 U.S. at 379.
73 Id. at 368-79.
74 Id. at 368.
75 Id. at 372. The Court reasoned it was more logical to provide the consumer
at least some of the necessary commercial information needed to make informed
economic decisions than it was to deny the consumer that information on the
ground that it is incomplete. Id. at 374-75.
7I; ld. at 376. Although the Court stated that lifting the ban on advertisements
might result in more of the population choosing to use judicial machinery, it went
on to say that this result may be welcomed with respect to certain segments of the
population. As the Court put it:
Advertising is the traditional mechanism in a free market economy
for a supplier to inform a potential purchaser of the availability in
terms of exchange. The disciplinary rule at issue likely has served to
burden access to legal services, particularly for the not-quite-poor
and the unknowledgeable.
Id. at 376-77.
77 Id. at 377. The Court noted that in other service industries advertising oper-
ates to lower fees through increased competition. Id.
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the client's needs; 78 and (6) a general restriction against
advertising lends itself to tighter enforcement than would
a less restrictive alternative.79
The Court weighed the public's need for accurate infor-
mation and right to know about the cost and availability of
legal services against the state's six-point argument in
favor of the ban. 0 The Court stated three general princi-
ples in discussing the public's need for information re-
garding the availability and terms of legal services: (1) the
public has the right to make an informed, intelligent
choice concerning legal counsel; (2) the legal profession
suffers from an adverse public image, which may be due in
part to the belief that attorneys' fees are too high; and (3)
advertising may reduce prices, and thus will promote the
use of legal counsel among the middle class.8 ' Relying on
the defendant-attorneys' First Amendment arguments,
the Court held that the public's need for accurate infor-
mation and right to know about access to the legal system
outweighed all of the state's arguments and, therefore,
the First Amendment prohibited blanket suppression of
attorney advertising. 2 The Court, however, carefully tai-
lored its holding to the facts83 and restated some of the
permissive ways to restrict and regulate commercial
speech initially set out in Virginia Pharmacy.84 In addition,
78 Id. at 378. The Court rejected this argument by stating "restraints on adver-
tising . . . are an ineffective way of deterring shoddy work." Id. at 378.
79 Id. at 379. In rejecting this final argument, the Court stated: "It is at least
somewhat incongruous for the opponents of advertising to extol the virtues and
altruism of the legal profession at one point, and, at another, to assert that its
members will seize the opportunity to mislead and distort." Id.
Id. at 368-79.
Id. at 365, 377. See also Whitman, and Stoltenberg, supra note 45, at 458 n.64.
" 433 U.S. at 381-82.
., Id. at 384. The Court was careful to state its holding in terms of the particu-
lar facts of the case, stating that the only constitutional issue addressed was
whether a state can prevent an attorney from publishing a truthful advertisement
of the availability and terms of routine legal services. Id.
M4 433 U.S. at 383-84. The Court set out as permissive restrictions: (1) time,
place, and manner restrictions (citing Virginia Pharmacy); (2) restraint of advertis-
ing that is false, deceptive or misleading (again citing I'irginia Pharmay); and (3)
transactions that are themselves illegal (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Re-
lations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)).
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the court expressly reserved the question of the permissi-
ble scope of regulation of in-person solicitation of clients
by attorneys.85
With the ban against attorney advertising lifted, attor-
neys began to explore new avenues of opportunity, in-
cluding the use of direct mail solicitation. 6 Companion
cases decided on the same day, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Association87 and In re Primus,8 8 helped to define the limits
of the Bates holding and restrict the total range of adver-
tising alternatives available to attorneys. These two cases,
Ohralik and In re Primus, defined what activities would be
permissible on opposite ends of the solicitation spectrum.
Ohralik defined the in-person end of the solicitation spec-
trum involving face-to-face contact between the attorneys
and their potential clients. At the other end of the solici-
tation spectrum are innocuous mailings by an attorney
who, as discussed in In re Primus, stands to gain little per-
sonal benefit.
In Ohralik,89 the attorney personally solicited two young
auto accident victims at their homes and in the hospital. 90
- 433 U.S. at 366.
86 See generally Note, Direct Mail Solicitation by Attorneys: Bates to R.M.J. 33 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 1041, 1054-61 (1982)(citing Bishop v. Committee on Professional
Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D. Iowa, 1981) (striking down an Iowa rule prohibit-
ing direct mail advertising by attorneys); Eaton v. Supreme Court of Arkansas,
270 Ark. 573, 607 S.W.2d 55 (1980) (disallowing the case of an advertisement
included in a pack of advertisements mailed to 10,000 homes); Kentucky Bar As-
sociation v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978) (dismissing a complaint against
attorneys who engaged in mass mailing to real estate agents); Alison v. Louisiana
State Bar Ass'n, 362 So.2d 489 (La. 1978) (holding a mailing to employers of a
group legal plan subject to state prohibition); In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204
(Minn. 1981) (holding unconstitutional a mass mailing warning of Dalkon Shield
dangers); Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 393
A.2d 1175 (1978) (rejecting direct mail advertisements to clients of splinter group
of attorney's former firm)).
87 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
Hs 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
g-' 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
1m Id. at 449-52. The Court noted with disapproval the lawyers' actions:
He approached two young accident victims at a time when they were
especially incapable of making informed judgments or of assessing
and protecting their own interest. He solicited Carol McClintoch in
a hospital room where she lay in traction, and sought out Wanda
Lou Holbert on the day she came home from the hospital, knowing
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The attorney defended his actions by saying that in-per-
son solicitation constitutes commercial speech and is
therefore protected by the First Amendment. 91 The
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the attorney's ac-
tions were so blatantly unprofessional that the state had a
strong interest in preventing such solicitation. 92 Conse-
quently, the Court held the disciplinary rule restricting
methods of soliciting clients not offensive to the Constitu-
tion.93 The Court noted that the personal, face-to-face so-
licitations involved in this case were quite different than
the type of advertising which the Court had approved in
Bates 94
The Court also noted that the proposed state interest in
preventing in-person solicitation greatly exceeded the
state interest in maintaining professionalism that previ-
ously failed the balancing test in Bates.95 The essential
role of attorneys in the administration of justice justifies
the state's strong interest in maintaining professional
from his prior inquiries that she had just been released. . . . He em-
ployed a concealed tape recorder . . . He emphasized that his fee
would come out of the recovery, thereby tempting the young women
with what sounded like a cost-free and therefore irresistable offer.
He refused to withdraw when Mrs. Holbert requested him to do so
only a day after the initial meeting between appellant and Wanda
Lou and continued to represent himself to the insurance company as
Wanda Holbert's lawyer.
436 U.S. at 467.
!, Id. at 455.
112 Id. at 465-67.
1I, Id. at 477.
tI, Id. at 455. The Court noted that in-person solicitation introduces elements
of overbearing persuasion and undue influence not typically associated with pub-
lic advertisement. In-person solicitation strips the recipient of any opportunity
for detached reflection and rational comparison. The Court particularly noted
that in-person solicitation provides a one-sided presentation which often demands
speedy and uninformed decision making. The Court contrasted the overbearing
persistence of an in-person solicitation with the freedom provided by a public
advertisement which leaves the potential client free to act upon it or not. Id. at
457.
im 436 U.S. at 460. The Court noted "The State interests implicated in this case
are particularly strong." Id. The Court alluded to the special State responsibility
to maintain standards among professionals licensed by the State. Id. See supra
notes 66-85 for a discussion of Bates.
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standards for them.96 Consequently, the courts deem the
face-to-face solicitation disapproved of in Ohralik more
offensive to the state's interest in protecting the attorney's
role than the simple printed advertisement approved of in
Bates .
Ohralik clearly limited attorneys' rights to solicit clients.
The case presented the most blatant scenario of unprofes-
sional conduct: an ambulance chasing attorney harassing
distressed accident victims. 98  Some critics have, as a re-
sult, questioned the value of the Ohralik opinion in con-
tributing to a greater understanding of the nexus between
commercial speech, the First Amendment, and attorney
advertising. 99
While Ohralik addressed the "in-person" end of the so-
licitation spectrum, In re Primus'00 involved the opposite,
"general mailing" end of the spectrum. In Primus, a South
Carolina attorney, who was also a cooperating attorney' °'
for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), advised a
meeting of women about their legal rights.1 0 2 The women
had been sterilized or threatened with sterilization as a
condition of continuing to receive public medical assist-
ance under the Medicaid program.10 3 After the meeting,
"m 436 U.S. at 460. In addressing the unique role attorneys play, the Court
noted: "The interests of the states in regulating lawyers is especially great since
lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering jus-
tice, and have historically been 'officers of the courts.'" . (quoting Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)). Id. at 460.
97 Id. at 464-66 (arguing that the potential for harm in face-to-face solicitation is
significantly greater than the type of advertising approved of in Bates).
For specific acts which the Court noted with disapproval, see supra note 90.
See Simms, Lawyers Solicitation Rules, 7 A.B.A. LITIGATION SEC. 2, 7 (1981).
' 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
Id. at 414. As a "cooperating lawyer" employed by the ACLU, Ms. Primus
received no salary nor handled any litigation for the ACLU. Id. at 415, n.3.
t02 436 U.S. at 415-16. An officer of a local organization serving indigents con-
tacted the Carolina Council on Human Relations, a non-profit organization with
which the attorney was affiliated. At the officer's request, the attorney arranged a
meeting among women who had been sterilized or threatened with sterilization
while on public assistance in Aiken County, South Carolina. See Three Carolina Doc-
tors are Under Inquiry in Sterilization of Welfare Mothers, New York Times, July 22, 1973,
at 30, col. 1 (Article cited by the court at 436 U.S. 416 n.4.)
'"., 436 U.S. at 415.
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the attorney sent a letter to one of the women advising
her of the availability of that free legal representation
through the ACLU. 0 4  The Disciplinary Board of the
South Carolina Supreme Court charged the attorney,
Edna Primus, with solicitation in violation of state discipli-
nary rules.10 5
The Supreme Court held that Ms. Primus's actions were
much different from the in-person solicitation behavior
proscribed in Ohralik.10 6 The Court did not analyze the
case as a commercial speech case. 0 7 Instead, relying pri-
marily on NAACP v. Button, t°8 the Court approached the
case as involving only political speech.' 09 Noting the
04 Id. at 416-17. The letter written on August 30, 1973, was addressed to one
of the women and primarily involved a pending interview with a women's maga-
zine which was doing a feature story on the sterilization problem. The last para-
graph of the letter, however, stated:
About the lawsuit, if you are interested, let me know, and I will let
you know when we will come down to talk to you about it. We will
be coming to talk to Mrs. Waters at the same time; she has already
asked the American Civil Liberties Union to file a suit on her behalf.
Id. at 417 n.6.
-05 Id. at 417. The disciplinary board charged the attorney with violation of
disciplinary rules DR 2-103(D)(5)(a) and (c) and 2-104(A)(5) of the Supreme
Court of South Carolina. See 436 U.S. at 418. These rules, which follow the
Model Code of Profesional Responsibility, primarily state that an attorney should
not assist organizations for the purpose of promoting his own legal services, and
that an attorney should not give unsolicited advice to a layman to seek counsel
and then accept employment resulting from that advice. For the full text of these
rules, see 436 U.S. at 418-19 nn.10, 11.
1- 436 U.S. at 422.
107 Andrews, Lawyer Advertising and the First Amendment, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 967, 976 n.48 (Andrews notes that since Primus was a political speech
case, the State could prohibit the activity involved only if the solicitation was false,
misleading or deceptive).
-8 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In NAACP v. Button, activities by the attorneys and
staff of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) were held to be "modes of expression and association protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments .. " Id. at 428-429. In that case, the staff
attorneys had arranged a meeting with parents and children to explain the neces-
sary steps that had to be taken to achieve desegregation. Id. at 421. The Supreme
Court held that solicitation of prospective desegregation litigants was within the
right to engage in association for the advancement of political goals and ideas so
that the state of Virginia could not prohibit such solicitation under its power to
regulate the legal profession. Id. at 428-30.
1- See Andrews, supra note 107, at 976 n.48.
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unique purpose and goals of the ACLU,"' the Court
characterized the ACLU litigation as not "a technique
[for] resolving private differences" but rather a "form of
political expression and political association.""' The
Court noted that Ms. Primus did not undertake the solici-
tation for personal pecuniary gain, but rather for the ad-
vancement of political expression." 2  Therefore, the
solicitous activity deserved the broad, comprehensive pro-
tection granted to political expression and association" 3
by the First Amendment and not the comparatively lim-
ited protection typically afforded commercial speech.' "4
As a result, the Court held that the application of South
Carolina's disciplinary rules violated the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. 15
Since the Court did not analyze Primus as a commercial
speech case, 1 6 and since Ohralik involved such blatantly
436 U.S. at 427-28.
Id. at 428 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 429, 431).
' Id. at 422.
113 Id. at 431. In granting political speech status to Ms. Primus' solicitation, the
Court noted the particular aims of the ACLU:
Appellant's letter of August 30, 1973, to Mrs. Williams thus comes
within the generous zone of First Amendment protection reserved
for associational freedoms. The ACLU engages in litigation as a ve-
hicle for effective political expression and association, as well as a
means of communicating useful information to the pub-
lic. (citations omitted)
Id.
I14 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). In commenting on
the different degree of protection between commercial and political speech, the
Court in Ohralik noted:
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and
non-commercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a level-
ing process, of the force of the amendments' guarantee with respect
to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject the First Amend-
ment to such a devitalization we instead have afforded commercial
speech a limited measure of protection commensurate with its
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while
allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the
realm of non-commercial expression.
Id. at 456.
"5 Id. at 439.
1": See supra note 107.
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unprofessional activity,1t 7 the two cases contributed little
to the advertising privileges granted to attorneys in Bates.
However, the cases did promulgate the idea that the privi-
leges granted in Bates failed to grant absolute license to
solicit at will; and combined, Primus and Ohralik help to
define the ends of the solicitation spectrum. As a result of
Ohralik and Primus, commentators understood Bates to
clearly allow advertising, yet continue to prohibit solicita-
tion.It 8 Consequently, the next logical step for the Court
was to determine whether an attorney's use of mailings
constitutes advertising (allowable under Bates) or solicita-
tion (prohibited under Ohralik).
The Supreme Court's most recent statement on the
propriety of attorneys' use of direct mailings came in In re
R.M.J. 119 A Missouri disciplinary committee charged an
attorney with mailing announcement cards 20 to persons
other than "lawyers, clients, former clients, personal
friends, and relatives"1 21 in violation of a disciplinary
rule. 22  The Court held that the absolute prohibition
against mailing announcement cards to persons other
than those listed in the disciplinary rule violated the First
Amendment. 123
117 See supra note 89-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the attorney's
in-person solicitation behavior in Ohralik.
-1 Note, supra note 22, at 1051. See also Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 420 So. 2d
599, 600 (1982) (Ehrlich, J. dissenting) (affirming dismissal of case against attor-
ney engaged in general mail solicitation).
-1 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
121o The attorney mailed cards announcing the opening of a new office which,
under a Missouri disciplinary rule, is prohibited if the cards are mailed to stran-
gers. Id. at 198.
12, 455 U.S. at 196.
1'2 455 U.S. at 193-96. The first charge against the attorney (and the emphasis
of the opinion) dealt with a rule formulated by the Committee on Professional
Ethics and Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Missouri to "strike a midpoint
between prohibition and unlimited advertising." Id. at 193 (quoting Report of
Committee to Chief Justice of Supreme Court of Missouri (September 9, 1977)).
The rule prohibited advertisments of attorneys from deviating from a specific list-
ing of areas of practice which the committee approved for attorneys' advertise-
ments. Id. at 193-94. Although attorneys were allowed to advertise, any deviation
from a standard list of words they could use to describe their practice would con-
stitute a rule's violation. Id. at 191-95.
, 455 U.S. at 206-07. While the Court noted that mailings are more difficult
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In a footnote in R.M.J.,14 the Court set forth a four-
part analysis which the Court had used in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission. 5 to
determine the validity of a regulation of commercial
speech. The four relevant questions were listed as: (1) is
the commercial speech involved outside the scope of the
First Amendment's protection? (i.e., is it misleading or
does it concern an unlawful activity?); (2) do substantial
governmental interests exist which justify retaining the
regulation?; (3) does the regulation advance the govern-
mental interest?; and (4) is there a less restrictive
alternative? 126
In R.M.J., the Court, applying the Central Hudson four-
part analysis, held unconstitutional the ban on the mailing
of professional announcement cards.127 In so holding, the
Court noted that direct mail solicitation has supervisory
problems that are not present in newspaper advertising
cases. 28 However, the Court suggested that by filing the
mailings with an Advisory Committee to the State
Supreme Court these supervision problems could be cir-
cumvented without resorting to absolute prohibition. 29
Additionally, the Court rejected the argument that mem-
bers of the public would be frightened by an attorney's
to supervise than newspapers, it went on to hold that lack of supervision did not
justify absolute prohibition. The Court indicated that a less restrictive alternative,
such as requiring a filing of a copy of all general mailings with the State, should be
exercised. Id.
124 455 U.S. at 203 n.15.
', 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In Central Hudson, the Court disapproved a New York
Public Service Commission regulation which banned an electrical utility from ad-
vertising to promote the use of electricity. Id. at 572 (reversing the judgement of
the New York Court of Appeals). The Court stated that in commercial speech
cases, whether or not a regulation is violative of the First Amendment depends on
how the regulation stands up against a four-part test. See text accompanying infra
note 82a. After applying the test to the regulation banning advertising that pro-
moted the use of electricity, the Court in Central Hudson held the statute unconsi-
tutional. 447 U.S. at 572.
12, 447 U.S. at 566.
27 455 U.S. at 207.
121 Id. at 206. As the court stated: "mailings and handbills may be more diffi-
cult to supervise than newspapers." Id.
121 Id. See also supra note 123.
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solicitation mailing because they were unaccustomed to
receiving such letters from a law office.'M The Court sug-
gested that attorneys can alleviate these fears by stamping
"This is an Advertisement" on the outside of the
envelope. 131
The Court both summarized the relation between com-
mercial speech and advertising for professional services
and presented a new interpretation of the Central Hudson
test. The Court stated:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled
to the protections of the First Amendment. But when the
particular content or method of the advertising suggests
that it is inherently misleading or when experiences prove
that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States
may impose appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertis-
ing may be prohibited entirely. But the States may not place an
absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading infor-
mation, e.g., a listing of areas of practice, if the information also
may be presented in a way that is not deceptive. (Emphasis
added.) 13 2
The emphasized material adds a new element to the first
part of the Central Hudson four-part analysis.' 33 The first
element in Central Hudson withholds First Amendment
protection 34 from misleading commercial speech. The
Court in R.M.J., stated that the inquiry should not focus
only on whether a particular advertisement is potentially
misleading, but also on whether a certain method of adver-
tising is inherently misleading. 5 Thus, a potentially mis-
'-o 455 U.S. at 206 n.20. The Advisory Committee for the State of Missouri
argued that because members of the public were not accustomed to receiving let-
ters from law offices, they would be frightened when mailings began arriving. Id.
1'1 Id.
132 Id. at 203.
-.1 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (discussing the Central Hudson
Test).
,4 447 U.S. at 567. The first line of the Court's analysis in Central Hudson stated
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the
First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at
least must concern a lawful activity and not be misleading." Id. at 566.
1 455 U.S. at 203. See also id. at 202 (where the Court states that "regulation
is permitted if a particular method of advertising is found to be deceptive").
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leading advertisement may be afforded First Amendment
protection under the first element of the Central Hudson
test if the same information can be presented in a manner
that is not misleading - that is, if the method of advertising
is not inherently misleading. 136 This result is far removed
from the days before Virginia Pharmacy when it was as-
sumed that commercial speech was not entitled to First
Amendment Protection. 137
In re R.M.J. affirms an attorney's right to advertise
through general mailings. However, as the final word of
the Supreme Court regarding mail solicitation, the deci-
sion in R.M.J. leaves many open questions 38 - including
the propriety of using a "target" mailing directed toward
a closely defined set of potential clients. Because the
Supreme Court did not address the issue of target mail-
ings, state courts maintain much discretion in deciding
this open question.
B. State Cases Outside of New York
No state other than New York has ruled on the propri-
ety of the use of targeted mailings by attorneys to solicit
mass-accident victims.139 Since R.M.J. ,140 however, three
state cases have addressed the validity of other means of
direct mail solicitation. The first court to do so was the
- 455 U.S. at 203. Although the attorney in R.M.J. deviated from an approved
set of precisely worded areas of practice thereby opening the potential for decep-
tion, the Court found that because the information was presented in a non-mis-
leading manner it deserved First Amendment protection. Id. at 204-06.
-" See supra notes 43-65 and accompanying text.
138 See generally Note, Direct Mail Solicitation by Attorneys: Bates to R.M.J., 33 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 1041 (1982). This Note outlines many of the questions left open by
R.M.J.:
[T]he R.M.J. decision also raises some disturbing questions of its
own: What is a "general mailing?" Does it include targeted mail-
ings? Does it depend on how many letters are sent? Or to whom?
Or what the letters say? And what is required of the state to demon-
strate that direct mailing is misleading and therefore proscribable?
Id. at 1065.
1.1,, See infra note 205.
14,, See supra notes 119-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of R.M.]..
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Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Moses.' 4 1 In Moses, an
attorney mailed 150 letters to homeowners offering his
services as a real estate consultant to assist in setting up
sales of homes "By Owner."1 1 2 The court affirmed the
Board of Discipline's recommendation that the attorney
receive public censure.1 43 In so holding, the court im-
plied that use of direct mailings rests closer to the in-per-
son end of the solicitation spectrum prohibited by
Ohralik144 than it does to the advertising end of the spec-
trum approved of in Bates.' 45 Although the court alluded
to R.M.J., they did not undertake the full analysis which
that decision requires. R.M.J. clearly stated that a state
must show substantial interest before a prohibition of di-
rect-mail advertising is upheld. 46 However, in Moses the
Board of Discipline failed to show any such state inter-
est.' 47 This prompted one commentator to predict that
the United States Supreme Court will have to speak again
in order to clarify conflicting state interpretations result-
ing from R.M.J..t48
The Utah Supreme Court did not address the actions of
a particular attorney but, instead, ruled on a state bar pe-
tition for approval of changes in the disciplinary rules
governing advertising. 49 The proposal stated that solici-
tation by "in-person, direct mail, and similar direct forms
of contact with a prospective client" would be prohib-
14 231 Kan. 243, 642 P.2d 1004 (1982).
142 642 P.2d at 1005-06.
141 Id. at 1007.
144 See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ohralik.
,. See supra notes 66-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bates.
14( 455 U.S. at 203. The Court in R.M.J. used the Central Hudson test which
requires a substantial state interest to be shown before an absolute prohibition of
commercial speech is held constitutional. See supra notes 125-26 and accompany-
ing text.
,47 642 P.2d at 1006-07.
14, See Andrews, The Selling of a Precedent, 10 STUDENT LAW., 12 (Mar. 1982),
where the author predicts that development of advertising regulations among the
states will "undoubtedly continue in a crazy quilt form." Id. at 49.
14.. In re Utah State Bar Petition for Approval of Changes in Disciplinary Rules
on Advertising, 647 P.2d 991 (Utah 1982).
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ited.' 51 In light of R.M.J., the court struck the words "di-
rect mail" from the proposal. 5 1 The court stated that the
state interests involved were not substantial enough to
justify the prohibition of mailing of professional cards or
announcements.1 52  As a result, the court amended the
proposed rule, thereby bringing the rule within the con-
stitutional limits established by R.M.J..'53
The Ohio Supreme Court also had the opportunity to
address the direct mail solicitation question. In Dayton
Bar Association v. Herzog,' 54 the court disbarred an attorney
who mailed more than 500 letters to defendants in mu-
nicipal court cases.' 55 The letters stated that a new fed-
eral law might allow a judgment debtor to forestall
collections and invited the reader to call the attorney for
an appointment.' 56 The court labelled the attorney's ac-
tions "patent solicitation" unprotected by Bates ' 57 and dis-
tinguished R.M.J. on the grounds that it involved a
different disciplinary rule. 5 8 The court noted a state in-
terest in protecting the public from mail solicitation by
professionals, 59 however, the court failed to undergo the
detailed analysis of state interests mandated by R.M.J..160
Although these state cases show a general inconsistency
in the application of R.M.J., no state except New York has
had an opportunity to develop a line of cases dealing with
1,o Id. at 995.
'' Id. at 996.
'52 Id. at 995-96.
-3' Id.
154 70 Ohio St.2d 261, 436 N.E.2d 1037 cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982).
436 N.E.2d at 1038 n.*.
Id.
1.'7 Id.
1 Id. R.M.J. involved Model Disciplinary Rules DR 2-101, limiting the content
of advertisements, and 2-102, limiting the class of people who may receive the
solicitations. See supra note 7. Herzog, on the other hand involved DR 2-103 which
states that an attorney may not recommend his services to a layman who has not
solicited his advice. See Orhalik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n 436 U.S. 447, 453 n.9
(1978).
436 N.E.2d at 1038 n.*.
' See supra notes 119-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of R.1.J.
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direct mail solicitation. 16' The state cases involving direct
mail solicitation since the Supreme Court's ruling in
R.M.J. were all decided in 1982. Since that year, no other
state court of highest jurisdiction has ruled on the permis-
sibility of direct mail solicitation. In re von Wiegen is the
first case to address the use of mailings to targeted victims
since the R.M.J. analysis was established. To better un-
derstand the impact of von Wiegen, relevant New York
cases must be reviewed.
C. New York Cases
In 1980, after Bates, Ohralik, and Primus, but before
R.M.J., the first opportunity for the New York Court of
Appeals to deal with a direct mail solicitation case arose in
Koffter v. Joint Bar Association. 162 In Koffler, the New York
court struck down a disciplinary rule 63 which completely
prohibited direct mail solicitation by attorneys. 164 Two at-
torneys sent out a letter to approximately 7,500 property
owners and to a number of real estate brokers offering
their legal services for any legal matter connected with the
purchase and sale of property. 65 The Joint Bar Associa-
tion Grievance Committee of the Tenth Judicial District of
New York charged the attorneys with violation of DR 2-
103(A). 16 6 The court first refuted the Bar Association's
argument that a fundamental difference existed between
advertising and soliciting. Earlier, the Appellate Division
ruled that Bates extended the right to advertise but that
the attorneys in question were soliciting, which the law
still prohibited. 67 The Court of Appeals rejected this ar-
-16 New York now has three cases which deal with direct mail solicitation by
attorneys. See infra notes 162-242 and accompanying text.
162 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980), cert. den. 450 U.S.
1026 (1981).
-.1 The attorneys were alleged to have violated DR 2-103(A) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. For the text of this provision see supra, note 7.
", 51 N.Y.2d at 151, 412 N.E.2d at 934, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 879 (reversing the
order of the Appellate Division).
51 N.Y.2d at 143, 412 N.E.2d at 929, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 873-74.
116, Id. See supra note 7 for the text of this Code provision.
167 432 N.Y.S.2d at 872, 412 N.E. 2d at 929-30.
1986] CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
gument citing the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Bigelow v. Virginia'68 which, in part, said:
Regardless of the particular label asserted by the state -
whether it calls speech "commercial" or "commercial ad-
vertising" or "solicitation" - a court may not escape the
task of assessing the First Amendment interest at stake
and weighing it against the public interest allegedly served
by the regulation.' 69
The New York court applied this general analysis of the
similarity between the terms "advertising" and "solicita-
tion" to direct mail solicitation by pointing out that
although a mailing not only advertises legal services and
also suggests the employment of the author to carry out
those services, it does not follow that such a mailing
crosses the boundary between advertising and
solicitation. 70
Additionally, the court reiterated the argument ad-
dressing the strong relationship between the free flow of
commercial information and reliable decision making in a
free enterprise economy.' 7 ' After noting that the United
States Supreme Court cases did not speak directly to the
issue in Koffler, 172 the court undertook the four-part Central
Hudson test 73 to determine the validity of the disciplinary
rule prohibiting direct mail solicitation. The court recog-
nized the state interests advanced by the bar association
as "the potentials for deception, for invasion of privacy,
for overcommercialization of the profession and for con-
flict of interest."'' 74 However, the court ruled that these
interests were not particularly advanced by the regulation
"i 421 U.S. 809 (1975). See supra note 45 for the case background.
,o 421 U.S. at 826.
,IM 51 N.Y.2d at 146, 412 N.E.2d at 931, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 875-76.
,71 Id. at 146, 412 N.E.2d at 921, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 875-76.
172 Id. at 147, 412 N.E.2d at 931-32, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 876-77. The court noted
that the decision in Primus, although involving a letter, was decided on the
grounds of political and associational speech and not commercial speech. Id.
,7' See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Cetiral
iudsou test.
,7 , 51 N.Y.2d at 147, 412 N.E.2d at 932, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
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and that less restrictive alternatives were available.
75
Specfically, the court ruled that the regulation did not ad-
vance the interest against invasion of privacy and over-
bearing persuasion since the recipient of an attorney's
letter may simply throw the letter away.' 76 In addition,
the court followed the solution of a sister state1 77 and sug-
gested that the filing of solicitation letters would be a less
restrictive alternative to complete prohibition.' 78
Finally, the court specifically ruled that the disciplinary
rule in question violated the First Amendment regardless
of whether the disciplinary rule was considered a time,
place, and manner restriction or a content restriction.17 9
According to the court in Koffler, if a restriction of com-
mercial speech goes to the content of the speech, for the
restriction to be held valid it must pass the Central Hudson
test.18 0  However, if the restriction goes to the time,
place, or manner of the commercial speech, the restriction
may be upheld if it is reasonable, serves a significant gov-
ernmental interest, and leaves ample alternative channels
175 Id. at 150, 412 N.E.2d at 933, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
176 Id. at 149, 412 N.E.2d at 933, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 878. The Court stated:
As the Supreme Court put it in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm. [citations omitted], a recipient of a lawyer's letter "may
escape exposure to objectionable material simply by transferring
' * ' [it] from envelope to waste basket."
Id.
177 In Kentucky Bar Ass'n. v. Stewart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978), the Supreme
Court of Kentucky held that letters which two lawyers sent out to two real estate
agents merely stating the prices charged for routine legal services in connection
with real estate transactions did not constitute "in-person solicitation" so that the
model disciplinary rule which prohibited them was unconstitutional. Id. at 934.
The Kentucky court's suggestion for avoiding the possible evil of overreaching
and deceptive practices required attorneys to simultaneously mail a copy of direct
mail advertisements to the bar association for their approval. Id.
17s 51 N.Y.2d at 150, 412 N.E.2d at 933, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 878. In a footnote the
court stated "our discussion of a filing requirement is, of course, by way of exam-
ple only and not by way of prescription." Id. at 150 n.6, 412 N.E.2d at 933 n.6,
432 N.Y.S.2d at 878 n.6.
1, Id. at 150-51, 412 N.E.2d at 934, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 878. The courts have
developed a distinction between a content restriction of commercial speech and a
time, place, and manner restriction of commercial speech. Id.
I'l Id. See supra notes 125-26 for a description of the Centlral Hudson test which
determines the validity of state regulations of commercial speech based on the
content of the speech.
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for communication. I"' The court did not state whether
the restriction in question was a "content" restriction or a
"time, place, and manner" restriction, but instead stated
that if the regulation was assumed to be a content restric-
tion, the four-part Central Hudson test held the disciplinary
rule unconstitutional. 8 2 The court also held the discipli-
nary rule unconstitutional as a time, place, and manner
restriction, 8 3 since there was no "ample alternative chan-
nel for communication."'8 4 Because the cost effectiveness
of direct mailings was arguably much greater than that for
newspaper, magazines, telephone directories or televi-
sion, the court reasoned that there was no cost effective
alternative to direct mailings. 8 5 By holding the discipli-
nary rule in question unconstitutional, Koffler cleared the
way for direct mail solicitation in New York.
In Greene v. Grievance Committee for the Ninth Judicial Dis-
trict,8t8 Alan Greene, a New York attorney, sent flyers, in
reliance on Bates,' 8 7 to real estate brokers in New York,
asking them to recommend his services to their clients.'88
The Grievance Committee for the Ninth Judicial District
of New York charged Mr. Greene with violation of DR 2-
103(A) and § 479 of the Judiciary Law.'8 9 Going against
the trend of cases holding disciplinary rules unconstitu-
tional,' 90 the New York Court of Appeals held this disci-
plinary rule constitutional and affirmed the Appellate





,.- 54 N.Y.2d 118, 429 N.E.2d 390, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1981) cert. denied 455
U.S. 1035 (1982).
,87 See supra notes 66-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bates, the
first United States Supreme Court case giving attorneys the right to advertise.
" 54 N.Y.2d at 121, 429 N.E.2d at 391, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 884. For the actual
text of the flyer see id. at 121, 429 N.E.2d at 391, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
.. For the text of both the disciplinary rule and this section of the judiciary law
see 54 N.Y.2d at 121, 429 N.E.2d at 392-93, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 885-86. The discipli-
nary rule which primarily requires an attorney not to solicit business is the same
one construed in Koffler. See supra notes 162-85 and accompanying text.
"", As Bates, Primus, R.'I.J. and Koffler indicate, within a very short period of
time, the United States Supreme Court, as well as the New York Court of Appeals,
689
690 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
Division's finding that Greene acted unprofessionally.' 91
Because the flyers in question were not mailed to the
potential clients directly, but rather to the real estate bro-
kers who were to refer the clients to the attorney,' 92 Greene
contradicted the trend of decisions giving attorneys more
freedom in their modes of advertising. The Appellate Di-
vision1 93 was guided by a footnote in Koffter which stated:
"[T]hird person mailings will, if their ends are to be
achieved, almost always involve in-person solicitation by
the intermediary, and are, therefore, much closer to
speech of the type Ohralik . . .has held can be proscribed
.... 194 Consequently, the Appellate Division con-
cluded that because the real estate brokers who received
these flyers were asked to approach the clients face-to-
face, this solicitation that began as a mailing was con-
verted into an in-person solicitation similar to that pro-
hibited in Ohralik.'95
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate
Division and found that provisions regulating third per-
son mailings are not content restrictions, but rather time,
place, and manner restrictions. 9 6 To be valid, time,
place, and manner restrictions must only be reasonable
and serve a significant governmental interest. 9 7 Using
greatly expanded the range of possibilities for solicitation by lawyers in the State
of New York.
i, 54 N.Y.2d at 136, 429 N.E.2d at 400, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
1"-2 A reading of the case will show that using third party mailings created a
situation that was closer to Ohralik, thereby granting a greater justification for al-
lowing the disciplinary rule to stand. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Ohralik.
.... 78 A.D.2d 131, 433 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1980), aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 118, 429 N.E.2d
390 (1981), 444 N.Y.S.2d 883.
114 Koffler v.joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 145 n.2, 412 N.E.2d 927, 930 n.2,
432 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 n.2 (1980). See supra notes 162-85 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Koffler.
195 Greene, 78 A.D.2d at 433 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
-.. 54 N.Y.2d at 125-26, 429 N.E.2d at 394, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 887. See ilfra note
210 and accompanying text for a discussion of the different standards applied to
content restrictions and time, place, and manner restrictions.
'9 Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-37
(1980).
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the Central Hudson test,' 98 the court found many of the
same state interests existed in third party mailing situa-
tions that were sufficient to prohibit in-person solicitation
in Ohralik.' 9 The court also found a substantial state in-
terest in preventing potential conflicts of interest that
might arise when both real estate brokers and attorneys
share pecuniary interests in the client.200 In addition, the
court noted that the practice suggested in Koffler of filing
mailings with a supervising agency would not adequately
protect against the conflict of interest problems in third
party mailing situations.20 '
Greene contributed to the developing law regarding di-
rect mail solicitation by further limiting the range of per-
missible possibilities for direct mail solicitation. Unlike
Ohralik, a relatively easy case for the United States
Supreme Court to decide because of the ambulance chas-
ing activities involved,20 2 Greene squarely addressed a new
use for direct mailings - third party mailings - and con-
vincingly foreclosed its further exercise. 20 3 With in-per-
son solicitation ruled out by Ohralik and third party
mailings ruled out by Greene, the highest court of the State
of New York readied itself to tackle another possible use
for direct mailings: the use of solicitous mailings directed
toward narrow, targeted audiences with similar legal
claims.
II. IN RE VON WIEGEN
In re von Wiegen20 4 was the first case to address a
targeted mailing by an attorney soliciting the victims of a
mass disaster. In response to the Hyatt Regency disaster,
'" See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Central
Hudson test.
-, 54 N.Y.2d at 127-29, 429 N.E.2d at 394-95, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 887-88.
21"1 Id. at 128, 429 N.E.2d at 395, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
2111 Id. at 129. 429 N.E.2d at 396, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
'-"12 See supra notes 89-92 for a discussion of the attorney's behavior in Oharlik.
2-"1 See 54 N.Y.2d at 128-29, 429 N.E.2d at 395, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 888 holding
the statute which prohibits third party mailings constitutional.
2-"1 See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text (giving the factual background
and specific allegations in the case).
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Eric von Wiegen sent the disaster victims and their fami-
lies notices soliciting their business. Consequently, for
the first time, a court ruled on the constitutionality of di-
rect mail solicitation to a narrow, targeted audience such
as disaster victims. 20 5
The court began its analysis by stating that it could ap-
proach the case either by relying on the Appellate Divi-
sion's analysis 2 6  or by doing its own structured
constitutional analysis under the four-part Central Hudson
test.20 7  The court reviewed and rejected the Appellate
Division's analysis, and instead decided to apply the Cen-
tral Hudson test.2 8
In reviewing the Appellate Division's decision, the court
decided that although the receivers of the notices in ques-
tion were accident victims as opposed to potential real
estate clients, the identity of the receivers failed to make
the situation unique.20 9 The court reasoned that because
the permissibility of solicitous mailings is a question of
commercial speech rights and does not depend on
whether a tort or real estate matter is involved, the deter-
mination should not turn on who is on the receiving
end.21 0  Furthermore, the court stated that allowing the
use of direct mail advertising (as was done in Koffler) for
2 " Prior cases had dodged the narrow issue of direct mail solicitation to a
targeted audience. In In re Teichner, 75 I1l.2d 88, 387 N.E,2d 265 (1979), a local
reverend arranged for an attorney to visit the town where many of the victims of
an accident lived because the reverend believed local counsel failed to adequately
negotiate settlement agreements. 387 N.E.2d at 267. Consequently, the court
held the attorney's activities were related to associational values, thereby making
this case a political speech case, rather than a commercial speech case. Id. at 71-
72. In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981), involved solicitation of clients
with personal injury claims related to the Dalkon Shield. Appert, however, did not
involve an immediate disaster where a great number of people were injured at the
same time, and the court did not address solicitation to a targeted list of victims.
Id.
.2.16 See In re von Wiegen, 101 A.D.2d 627, 474 N.Y.S.2d 147 (N.Y. App. Div.),
Modified, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984).
..,17 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Central
Hlndson test.
2- 63 N.Y.2d at 170, 470 N.E.2d at 841, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
'-" 1(1.
211, Id. at 169-72. 470 N.E.2d at 841-43, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 43-44.
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real estate agents but denying its use for accident victims
would restrict commercial speech on the basis of its con-
tent. 21' The court's labeling of the rule as a content re-
striction is significant because a content regulation is
much more difficult to constitutionally justify than a time,
place or manner regulation.21 2 The State has a much better
chance to justify the regulation of the time, place and
manner of commercial speech. To be constitutional,
time, place and manner regulations must simply be rea-
sonable and rationally related to legitimate state inter-
ests.2 3 Content restrictions, on the other hand, will be
sustained only if substantial state interests are involved,
and the regulation may only go as far as is necessary to
serve that interest. 214 The Appellate Division categorized
the rule in question as a time, place, and manner restric-
tion since it related only to recipients of the solicitations
rather than the content of the letter.21 5 In so ruling, the
Appellate Division relied on Greene v. Grievance Committee
which upheld restrictions against third party mailings as
constitutional time, place, and manner restrictions.21 6
211 Id. The Court labeled the restriction a content restriction using the follow-
ing analysis:
Here, the State seeks to regulate respondent's letter, not because of
the involvement of third parties, but because of the subject matter of
the communication - the fact that respondent seeks to be retained
to represent accident victims and their families. As such, the regula-
tion is plainly content-based. (citations omitted)
Id. at 172, 470 N.E.2d at 841, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
2 2 63 N.Y.2d at 171, 470 N.E.2d at 842, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 44. The court summa-
rized the difference between the two tests as follows:
The State is permitted considerably more latitude in restricting the
time, place, and manner of speech that it is when it attempts to re-
strict content. Time, place and manner restriction [sic] are valid if
reasonable and rationally related to legitimate State interests. Con-
tent or subject matter may be regulated only if substantial State in-
terests are involved and then the regulation may go no further than




21., 474 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
216 Id. See supra notes 186-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Greene.
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The Court of Appeals rejected this argument by saying
the restriction in this case related to the content of the
letter since the letter stated that the attorney wanted to
represent accident victims and their families.2 17 Conse-
quently, the court subjected the restriction in question to
the four-part analysis of content based prohibitions - the
Central Hudson test.21 8
In applying the first part of the Central Hudson test, the
court determined whether the communication in question
fell within the scope of the First Amendment's protec-
tion.2 1 9 As the court put it, "[t]here is no constitutional
right to disseminate false or misleading information or in-
formation about unlawful activity. ' 22 0 Relying on In re
R.M.J. 2 the court stated that the proper inquiry is not
whether the particular letter is misleading but rather
whether the method of advertising involved is mislead-
ing.222 The court disposed of the first part of the test by
holding that the method of advertising, direct mail solici-
tation, is not inherently misleading. 23 The court went on
to state that if a certain method of communication can be
used in a way that is not deceptive, a state may not alto-
gether prohibit that method of communication merely be-
cause it is sometimes used to disseminate misleading
information.22 4
Under the second part of the Central Hudson test, the
court addressed the issue of whether substantial govern-
mental interest existed to justify retention of the regula-
tion.225 The court identified four governmental interests:
217 63 N.Y.2d at 172, 470 N.E.2d at 843, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
218 Id. at 173, 470 N.E.2d at 843, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 45. See supra notes 125-26
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Central Hudson test.
2.. 63 N.Y.2d at 173, 470 N.E.2d at 843, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
220 Id.
221 For an explanation of R.MJ., see supra notes 119-38 and accompanying text.
222 63 N.Y.2d at 173, 470 N.E.2d at 843, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
2. Id. The court stated: "Thus, because information on the availability of legal
services for accident victims may be communicated in a fair and understandable
fashion, through direct mail solicitation absolute prohibition is unwarranted [cita-
tion omitted]." Id.
224 Id. at 173, 470 N.E.2d at 843, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
22. Id. at 173, 470 N.E.2d at 843-44, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
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(1) overcommercialization of the profession and the po-
tential for ambulance chasing; (2) invasion of privacy and
the possibility of undue pressure; (3) stirring up litigation;
and (4) the potential for deception.2 26 The court disal-
lowed the first state interest, noting that Bates227 and Kof-
ier 2 28 recognized the informational purpose of attorney
advertising and found that attorney advertising enjoys
constitutional protection. 229 The court negated the sec-
ond state interest, the invasion of privacy issue, by stating
that mail solicitation does not exert the same potential for
undue pressure that in-person solicitation does. 230  The
court noted that "the simple answer to the claim that [di-
rect mail solicitation] does [constitute a substantial inva-
sion of privacy] is that the recipient of a lawyer's letter
'may escape exposure to objectionable material simply by
transferring [it] from envelope to waste basket.' "231
The court rejected the third state interest, preventing
unnecessary litigation, by simply arguing that in this par-
ticular instance, the victims and their families obviously
needed immediate legal counsel.23 2 Consequently, the
court reasoned that the informational function that the
letter served outweighed the recognized state interest in
preventing unnecessary litigation. 33 Turning to the final
state interest, potential deception, the court recognized
226 Id.
227 See supra notes 66-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bates.
228 For a discussion of Koffler, see supra notes 162-85 and accompanying text.
22i, 63 N.Y.2d at 173-74, 470 N.E.2d at 844, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 46. The court
stated:
While lawyer advertising may appear unseemly to many members of
the profession, particularly where, as here, it is directed at the unfor-
tunate victims of a disaster or their families, it is constitutionally pro-
tected and serves the recognized purpose of informing those in need
of the cost and availability of legal services.
Id. at 174, 470 N.E.2d at 844, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 46 (citations omitted).
2.90 Id. at 174, 470 N.E.2d at 844, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 46 (citations omitted).
231 Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
542 (1980)).
232 63 N.Y.2d at 174-75, 470 N.E.2d at 844, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 16. The court
noted that "it is better to address such wrongs than to suffer in silence." Id. at
175 (citing Bates, 433 U.S. at 364, 376).
2. 63 N.Y.2d at 174-75, 470 N.E.2d at 844, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
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that many people view mail solicitation as having greater
potential for deception because it invites less public scru-
tiny than newsprint or electronic media advertisements.
However, the court concluded that this potential for de-
ception presents no greater danger in mail solicitation
than when solicitation occurs in person.23 4 Consequently,
the court found this state interest inadequate to justify the
particular rule against mail solicitation. 3 5 In addition, the
court noted that the filing requirement first suggested in
Koffler 23 6  would help to alleviate the potential for
deception.2 37
The court dealt with the third and fourth parts of the
Central Hudson test concurrently. The court did not
squarely address the third part of the test: whether the
restriction advances governmental interests.238 Instead,
the court merely argued that under the fourth part, con-
cerning the existence of a less drastic alternative to the
restriction in question, a complete prohibition could not
be justified since a filing requirement 23 9 would be a less
drastic alternative. 240
234 Id. at 175, 470 N.E.2d at 844, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 46. The court in noting the
unique character of mail solicitations, stated:
[T]he potential for deception present in Matter of Koffler is also a gen-
uine concern here because these mailings are not subject to the pub-
lic scrutiny that a newspaper or television advertisement would
receive. Moreover, many people may perceive a potentially greater
incentive for deception in personal injury litigation than in other
types of legal business because greater sums of money may be in-
volved, the nature of the representation may be less routine, contin-
gent fee arrangements may be employed, and because of past abuses
in the area. These are serious concerns, but they are concerns which
must be addressed whether the solicitation is in person or in writing
and the potential for deception is not greater in mail solicitation.
Id. (citations omitted).
2.3. Id.
2.4 In Koffler, the court suggested that potential deception could be minimized
by requiring attorneys using direct mail solicitation to simultaneously mail a copy
of their solicitation to an overseeing agency of the state bar. See supra notes 177-
78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the suggestion in Koffler.
2.17 63 N.Y.2d at 175, 470 N.E.2d at 845, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 47.
24 Id.
2., Id. See also supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
filing requirement.
24o 63 N.Y.2d at 175, 470 N.E.2d at 845, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 47.
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The court concluded its analysis by finding that the
state could not advance any substantial interest sufficient
to override the public's need for information about cost
and availability of legal services. 4' Consequently, the
court held unconstitutional the disciplinary rule which
banned direct mail solicitation to accident victims. 242 For
the first time in the history of the American legal system,
an attorney's direct mail solicitation of a highly visible
targeted audience received judicial approval.
III. PRACTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF IN RE VON WIEGEN
This ground-breaking decision, which one expert be-
lieves will guide future decisions by the Supreme
Court, 243 has wide-ranging practical implications. Be-
cause decisions from the New York Court of Appeals
command respect from other jurisdictions, von Wiegen will
have impact around the country. Primarily, von Wiegen has
two practical implications: (1) it offers guidance for other
courts on how to analyze direct mail solicitation regula-
tions,244 and (2) it provides a groundwork for the first
state bar association that must accommodate the use of
direct mailings to targeted groups such as disaster vic-
tims. 245 How New York deals with these implications may
determine the validity of similar solicitations by attorneys
in other states.
The first practical implication of the von Wiegen decision
is its potential influence on other state court decisions.
The von Weigen court's analysis of the bar association reg-
ulations prohibiting direct mailing will provide guidance
%41 Id.
2 Id. at 170, 470 N.E.2d at 841, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
24,1 Lawroy, Solicitation by Mail, 11:3 A.B.A. Litigation Sec. 51, 63 (Spring, 1985).
Robert P. Lawroy, professor of law at the Case Western Reserve University School
of Law, is of the opinion that In re von Wiegen will be considered a bellwether
decision "not just for the New York courts, but also for the Supreme Court." Id.
at 63.
244 See infra notes 256-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the analysis
the court used.
24.5 See infra notes 260-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the practi-
cal implications targeted mailing will bring.
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for other state courts faced with ruling on the constitu-
tionality of similar regulations.246 Since von Wiegen stands
alone as the only precedent on the subject, other state
courts will refer to it for guidance.
Two distinct tests were available for the von Wiegen
court to analyze the regulation in question.247 Depending
on which test was selected, the resulting burden on the
state would be quite different. The court chose the Central
Hudson test 248 typically used to analyze the constitutional-
ity of rules regulating the content of commercial speech.249
Alternatively, the court could have considered the restric-
tion to be one regulating the time, place, and manner of com-
mercial speech. If the court had taken this approach, the
state would have had an easier time justifying the restric-
tion since "the state is permitted considerably more lati-
tude in restricting the time, place, and manner of
[commercial] speech than it is when it attempts to restrict
content." 25
0
The court seemed to make a logical jump in reasoning
when it determined that the disciplinary rule in question
was content-based rather than a time, place, and manner
restriction. The Appellate Division cited Greene v. Griev-
ance Committee as its authority for holding the rule to be a
time, place, and manner regulation of commercial
speech.25' The Court of Appeals rejected the Appellate
Division's holding on the ground that the rule in Greene
operated only to prohibit the attorney from advertising in
a particular manner - specifically, use of mailings which
2 In the recently decided case of Adams v. Supreme Court of Illinois, No. 84 C
3548, slip. op. (N.D. Ill. 1985), the court noted its approval of the analysis used in
von Wiegen. Id.. However, the court failed to state whether the disciplinary rule in
question (DR 2-103) was a content restriction or a time, place, and manner restriction.
ld.
I247 63 N.Y.2d at 168-69, 470 N.E.2d at 841, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
248 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Central
Hudson test.
241, 63 N.Y.2d at 171, 470 N.E.2d at 843, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
2 Id. at 170, 470 N.E.2d at 842, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (1984).
25 1 In re von Wiegen, 101 A.D.2d 627, 474 N.Y.S.2d 147, 148 (N.Y. App. Div.),
modified, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984).
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asked a third party to solicit the potential client in-per-
son. 252 The court then distinguished Greene, finding that
the regulation in von Wiegen sought to regulate the content
of the letter because the attorney was specifically solicit-
ing accident victims and their families.253
This finding by the Court of Appeals seems questiona-
ble. The court concludes that the state attempt to prevent
solicitation of accident victims goes to the subject matter
of the communication. 54 Consequently, the regulation
receives a "content-based" label and becomes subject to
the tougher Central Hudson test.2
55
Although the court cites some authority for the assump-
tion that a regulation against the solicitation of accident
victims is content-based, the cases fail to bolster this as-
sumption.2 56 Given this lack of authority, the court just as
easily could have concluded that the rule does not restrict
the content of the advertisements but rather the manner of
using accident victims lists to target solicitous mailings.
By assuming that a regulation against targeted mailings is
content-based, the court sets a significant precedent




2.56 Id. The court cites the following: Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60 (1983) (federal statute prohibiting unsolicited advertisements for contra-
ceptives held unconstitutional); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530 (1980) (state utility commission order prohibiting inclusion of pro-
motional material in monthly utility bills held unconstitutional); Erznoznik v. City
of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (invalidating a city ordinance prohibiting
drive-in movie theaters from showing pornographic films because the ordinance
went beyond permissible restratints on obscenity); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965) (reversing convictions of civil rights demonstrators under a peace statute).
However, none of these cases give any support to the theory that a regulation
against solicitation by targeted mailings constitutes a content restriction. In fact,
Erznoznik stands for the proposition that "time, place and manner regulations
[must be] applicable to all speech irrespective of content." 422 U.S. at 209. Con-
sequently, just as Greene operated to prohibit all mailings which solicit through
third parties, see supra notes 186-203, the State's regulation in von IViegen arguably
operates to prohibit all mailings which use a targeted victims list - even if the
State has no objection to the content of the letter in question. Thus, it applies to
all solicitations of this manner "irrespective of content." Erznonzik, 422 U.S. at
209.
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which other states may follow. 257 If other states follow
New York's lead,25 s the restrictions against direct mailings
in those jurisdictions will face a much tougher constitu-
tional test.259 Consequently, more of those jurisdictions'
restrictions likely will fail, thereby allowing a nationwide
increase in direct mail solicitation.
The second practical implication of the von Wiegen deci-
sion is that New York will become the first state which
must design and implement a system for adequately su-
pervising attorney mail solicitations to targeted groups.2 60
Obviously, a number of questions will arise as a result of
the high court's ruling. For example, the adequacy of the
von Wiegen court's suggestion that all mailings be filed with
the bar association will be put to the practical test.2 6 I The
public's unsavory reactions to overbearing solicitations
(which a filing requirement seeks to prevent) may prove
unavoidable if members of the public receiving solicita-
tions are opening their letters and reading them at the
same time the policing powers at the bar association are
opening and reading theirs. Simply requiring the letter to
be filed with the state bar will not prevent the letter from
reaching the hands of the public. From this standpoint
the filing requirement would not protect the public from
direct mail solicitations which later may be found im-
proper. The legal profession consequently may be held in
lower esteem by the public - the precise reaction the re-
quirement is designed to avoid.
Another important question will be whether a minimum
number of potential clients will be required before these
mailings may be used. Since nothing in the decision im-
plies that the number of people on the receiving end af-
27 See supra note 246.
25 Id.
2 5 For a discussion of the justification used by the New York Court of Appeals'
for their choice of the more strenuous Central Hudson test, see supra notes 211-18
and accompanying text.
26 See 63 N.Y.2d at 175, 470 N.E.2d at 845, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 47.
261 See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the filing
requirement.
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fects the propriety of the solicitation, a day may come
when a single obituary or accident report in a newspaper
provokes a barrage of mail solicitation from attorneys ex-
ercising their First Amendment right to commercial
speech. Although some may argue this is the price which
must be paid for free speech, the real solution lies in up-
holding regulations which ban targeted mailings to acci-
dent victims on the ground that such mailings are closer
to the type of solicitation forbidden in Ohralik then they
are to advertising.262 The key distinction between adver-
tising and solicitation is that, in the case of solicitation,
the recipient of the solicitations has recently been victim-
ized. The victims and their families often have become
emotionally distraught and are particularly susceptible to
confusion about their legal rights. A targeted mailing to
accident victims contributes to that confusion in a manner
similar to the way in-person solicitation takes advantage
of accident victims. Therefore, direct mail solicitations,
unlike general mailings, are designed to capitalize on re-
cipients in a particular situation. From this perspective,
direct mailings seem more akin to solicitation than to
advertising.
Finally, in the context of aviation law, the New York
Court of Appeals' decision creates the possibility of direct
mail solicitation of air crash victims. An airliner crash ob-
viously creates a rash of lawsuits much like the Hyatt Re-
gency disaster. New York attorneys may now solicit
potential clients from these disasters by simply mailing a
flyer or letter to the names on a victims list. With this new
avenue of solicitation open to attorneys, the post-accident
solicitation of victims' families may take a new twist. For
example, after the August, 1985, crash of Delta Flight 191
at Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport,263 many of the victims' fami-
212 See Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 420 So.2d 599, 600 (Fla. 1982) (McDonald, J.,
dissenting) (stating that a regulation banning direct solicitation should be upheld
because use of direct mail is an Ohralik-type of solicitation).
263 See Jet Crash at D/FWT Kills 123, Dallas Morning News, Aug. 3, 1985, at IA,
col. 1.
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lies expressed disapproval toward attorneys who set up
consulting offices at hotels near the airport.264 The Texas
Bar Association initiated an investigation,26 5 and the Gov-
ernor of Texas was compelled to issue a warning to over-
anxious attorneys.266 While advocates of direct mail
solicitation may argue that approval of mail solicitation
will result in fewer numbers of on-the-spot solicitors, op-
ponents may counter with the argument that mail solicita-
tion will merely provide another source of aggravation to
bereaved families. The final result probably will depend
on how quickly and efficiently those who abuse the new
privilege are punished. Courts have recognized that
states have a substantial interest in ensuring that their li-
censed professionals are held in high public esteem.267
Successful future application of that interest to justify a
regulation banning targeted mailings may depend on how
responsibly New York and states which follow the von
Wiegen decision exercise the new targeted mailing
privilege.
The decision in von Wiegen will have tremendous impact
on the developing law of direct mail solicitation. Whether
the long term effect of the decision will be beneficial de-
pends on how efficiently the State of New York enforces
the newly granted privilege given to its attorneys. While
recognition of attorneys' direct mail solicitation rights in-
creases the access to information about the cost and avail-
ability of legal services, the improved access to the legal
system is accompanied by potential for greater abuse of
the advertising privilege.
214 See Jet Victim's Families Caught in Damage Claims Tug-of-War, Dallas Morning
News, Aug. 8, 1985, at IA, col. 4.
265 See Texas Bar Making Check on Belli Firm, Dallas Morning News, Aug. 8, 1985
at 23A, col. 2.
26 Lawyers Warned About Soliciting Air-Crash Clients, Dallas Morning News, Aug. 9,
1985 at 14A, col. 4.
2 ;1 See generally Head v. New Mexico Bd., 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608
(1935).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The New York Court of Appeals decision allowing an
attorney to use targeted direct mail solicitations to victims
of a mass disaster fails to justify its result in several re-
spects. In the first place, the court sidestepped the central
question in determining the constitutionality of regula-
tions affecting commercial speech: proper classification of
the regulation as either content-based or a time, place,
and manner regulation of commercial speech. The court
self-servingly placed a content-based label on the regula-
tion without justifying its conclusion and without explain-
ing why it contradicted the Appellate Division's decision
to the contrary. Secondly, the court's conclusion that no
harm results from mail solicitations where the person re-
ceiving the solicitation may simply throw the letter away
fails to recognize that the victim-recipient has been ex-
posed to the harm by simply reading the letter. Given the
sinking esteem of attorneys in the eye of the public, each
letter inflicts substantial harm to the profession when the
accident victim who receives it must read the letter before
deciding to throw it away. Although no great harm may
result to the recipient, each letter which reaches an acci-
dent victim and is thrown away in disgust contributes to
quiet but steady erosion of the state interest in maintain-
ing public confidence in licensed professionals. Finally,
the court has put pressure on other states to follow the
result in von Wiegen. As a result of this decision, New York
attorneys may solicit business from unfortunate mass dis-
aster victims through targeted direct mailings. Although
such activity may diminish the esteem of the profession, as
a practical matter it probably will result in more mass dis-
aster cases going to New York attorneys because of their
advantageous solicitation rules. Other states may be
forced to reluctantly follow suit so that New York attor-
neys may not take undue advantage of the new solicitation
technique. In the end, each mass disaster may bring an
onslaught of targeted mailings by unscrupulous attorneys
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who seek to gain through the misfortune of others under
the guise of free speech and the First Amendment.
James Cramer
CIVIL RIGHTS-AGE DISCRIMINATION-EMPLOYERS MAY
NOT EXTEND TO THEIR EMPLOYEE'S EMPLOYMENT PRIVI-
LEGES WHICH ARE DENIED TO ANY EMPLOYEES ON THE BA-
SIS OF AGE. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 105 S. Ct.
613 (1985).
I. INTRODUCTION
Harold Thurston, Christopher J. Clark, and Clifton A.
Parkhill are former captains for Trans World Airlines, Inc.
(TWA).' Each was involuntarily retired at age sixty pursu-
ant to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulation
prohibiting anyone from serving as a pilot on a commer-
cial carrier past age sixty. Captains and first officers are
"pilots" subject to the FAA regulation; flight engineers,
however, are not.2
In 1978, TWA adopted a new retirement policy in re-
sponse to recent Congressional amendments to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 3 TWA's new
policy allowed cockpit employees to continue working as
flight engineers upon reaching age sixty.4 The policy re-
quired a captain, prior to his sixtieth birthday, to submit a
standing bid" for a flight engineer position.5 If a va-
cancy occured, the most senior captain with a standing bid
was assigned the position.6 If no vacancy occurred prior
I Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 105 S. Ct. 613, 619 (1985).
2 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1984). "No certified holder may use the service of any
person as a pilot on an airplane ... if that person has reached his sixtieth birth-
day. No person may serve as a pilot on an airplane engaged in operations under
this part if that person has reached his sixtieth birthday. Id. Both first officers and
flight engineers are qualified as pilots. Id.
.4 See Thurston, 105 S. Ct. at 619. See also Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1982) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1980)) [hereinafter cited
as ADEA].
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to the captain's sixtieth birthday, he was retired. 7 Cap-
tains displaced for any reason, other than age, did not
have to participate in the bidding procedure.8 Instead,
these captains were allowed to "bump," or automatically
displace, a less senior flight engineer.9
Thurston, Clark, and Parkhill were denied the opportu-
nity to "bump" a less senior flight engineer under the
TWA system.' 0 Thurston was involuntarily retired before
TWA adopted its new policy, Clark was advised that bid-
ding would not affect his chances of obtaining a transfer
so he did not bid, and Parkhill was retired, despite filing a
bid, because no vacancies occurred prior to his sixtieth
birthday." They filed this action against TWA and the Air
Line Pilots Association (ALPA) in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York, arguing
that TWA's transfer policy violated section 623(a) of the
ADEA. They alleged that because the airline allowed cap-
tains displaced because of reasons other than age to
"bump" less senior flight engineers, the airline must af-
ford captains displaced upon reaching age sixty the same
"privilege of employment."' 2 The district court granted a
motion for summary judgment filed by TWA and the
ALPA, ruling that plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima
facie case of age discrimination.' 3
7Id.
8 Id. For example, captains unable to maintain the required first-class medical
certificate and captains whose positions are eliminated due to reduced manpower
are allowed to "bump," or displace, less senior flight engineers. Id.
'1 Id. The displaced captain does have to obtain the second-class medical certifi-
cate required for flight engineer postions. See 14 C.F.R. § 67.15 (1984). TWA's
collective bargaining agreement also provides that if the disabled pilot lacks suffi-
cient seniority he is allowed to go on unpaid medical leave for up to five years,
while retaining and accruing seniority. Id. at n. 9.
Thurston, 105 S. Ct. at 619-20.
Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1221,
1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), afd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Thurston, 105 S. Ct. 613 (1985).
12 Id. at 1225. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commisssion (EEOC) in-
tervened on behalf of ten other age-displaced captains in the proceedings. These
captains had also been discharged due to their inability to "bump" less senior
flight engineers. Id.
1:1 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int 1, 547 F. Supp. at 1221.
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Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, which reversed the district
court's decision, holding that the plaintiffs had presented
direct evidence of discrimination by TWA on the basis of
age.' 4 The court also ruled that the affirmative defenses
available under the ADEA did not justify TWA's discrimi-
natory policy.' 5 The court held TWA liable for double
damages due to its "willful" violation1 6 of the ADEA. 17
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether the ADEA requires airlines to extend
the same privileges of employment to pilots displaced be-
cause of age as it does to pilots displaced for other rea-
sons.I" Held, affirmed in part, reversed in part: Employers
may not extend to their employees employment privileges
which are denied to any employees on the basis of age.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 105 S.Ct. 613 (1985).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History
Congress passed the ADEA in 1967 to promote the em-
14 Airline Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d 940, 949-51
(2d Cir. 1983). Undisputed evidence demonstrated that TWA permitted captains
who were displaced for reasons other than age to "bump" less senior flight engi-
neers. Therefore pursuant to the ADEA, TWA was also required to allow age-
displaced captains to "bump" less senior flight engineers. Id. at 955.
1-5 Id. at 953-54. Employers may assert as affirmative defenses the following:
age is a bona fide occupational qualification; the differentiation in employees is
based on reasonable factors other than age; the employer's conduct is part of the
terms of a bona fide seniority system or employee benefit plan; or the individual
was discharged or disciplined for good cause. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1982).
- Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 713 F.2d at 956. The ADEA is to be enforced in
accordance with the remedies provided in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). Liquidated, or double damages are payable
"only in cases of willful violations" of the ADEA. Id. Cf FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 16(b)
(1982). The FLSA makes the award of liquidated damages mandatory for FLSA
violations. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that "willfulness" is
shown when an employer "either knew or showed reckless disregard for the mat-
ter of whether its conduct is prohibited by the ADEA." Airline Pilots Ass'n, Int ',
713 F.2d at 956. TWA's clear awareness of the 1978 amendments was sufficient to
constitute willful conduct and warrant the imposition of double damages. Id. at
957.
17 Airline Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 723 F.2d at 956-57.
I" Thurston, 105 S. Ct. at 618.
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ployment of older persons based on their ability rather
than their age and to help employers and workers meet
problems caused by the impact of age on employment.' 9
Congress sought to achieve these goals by prohibiting
employment decisions which are based on the age of an
individual. 20  Hiring or termination decisions and deci-
sions regarding terms, conditions, privileges, or compen-
sation are encompassed by the ADEA. 2 1
Congress recognized that a mechanical application of
age discrimination legislation might result in the early re-
tirement of well-qualified older workers. 2 To avoid that
result, Congress provided that the ADEA be administered
so as not to worsen a situation by retiring well-qualified
workers, or to prevent an employer from achieving a rea-
sonable age balance.23 Congress expressed its intention
that the ADEA be applied on a case-by-case basis in such
situations. They felt that the vagaries of employment ob-
ligations required that the ADEA not be strictly applied.24
For instance, it had been recognized that in certain indus-
tries or businesses, such as aviation, fire prevention, or
law enforcement, a concern for public safety exists which
might make it less difficult for an employer to prove that a
ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982). Congress set forth in the ADEA a state-
ment of findings which indicates its primary concerns of age discrimination.
These include older workers' abilities to retain or regain employment, the "deteri-
oration of skill, morale, and employer acceptability" which results from long term
unemployment (a common condition for older workers), and the effects on com-
merce of arbitrary age discrimination. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (1982).
2 ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982). Section 623(a) prohibits an employer to
"fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because of such individual's age." Id.
2 1 Id.
22 H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2220. The House Report stated "[it is enough that the bill outlines a
national policy against discrimination in employment on account of age, provides
a vehicle for enforcement of the policy, and establishes broad guidelines for its
implementation." Id.
2-" Id. The Report cited as an example the railroad industry, whose work force
contains a high number of older workers as a result of declines in employment
and the exercise of seniority rights. Id.
-, Id. The case-by-case method was designated to serve as the underlying rule
in the administration of the ADEA. Id.
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mandatory retirement age is necessary.
Section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA makes lawful an other-
wise unlawful act if age is shown to be a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification (BFOQ) necessary to the operation of
the business.2" Section 623 (f)(1) demonstrates the intent
of Congress that the ADEA not prohibit employment de-
cisions based on factors that may accompany age.2 v Nor
was the ADEA meant to require employers to hire work-
ers who do not otherwise meet the qualifications of em-
ployment .2  However, one commentator has noted that
the use of age as a measure of personal characteristics ig-
nores individual differences.29 Use of age as a general
measure of individual capabilities has confused Congress
in its ongoing attempt to eliminate age discrimination in
the workplace. 0
The ADEA has been amended three times since its pas-
sage in 1967 .3 The 1978 amendments provide that no
25 See, e.g., Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F.2d 743, 755 (7th Cir.
1982) (public safety is a factor which becomes an important legal concern). The
Orzel court noted that a safety related situation does not relieve an employer from
justifying the particular age chosen. Id. See generally, 14 C.F.R. § 121-383(c)
(1984) (FAA regulation requiring captains to retire at age sixty); 5 U.S.C.
§ 8335(b) (1982) (regulation requiring federal firefighters or law enforcement of-
ficers to retire at age fifty-five).
26 ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982). Section 623(f)(1) condones otherwise
unlawful acts under the ADEA if those acts are based on reasonable factors other
than age. Id.
21 See Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1978) (the Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit includes declining health, diminished vigor, and incom-
petence among employment factors related to advancing age).
2M See, H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD NEWS 2219-20. See also Reed, Age Discrimination of Airline Pilots: Effects
of the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification 47J. AIR L. & COM. 383 (1983).
29 Thomas, Mandatory Retirement and Impact Discrimination Under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act: You'll Get Yours When You're 70, 17 AKRON L. REV. 65, 67
(1983).
so See id. at 74. Thomas notes that Congress has yet to define a point at which it
would want to prohibit all stereotypes. For instance, § 623(0(2) of the 1978
ADEA amendments would prohibit discharge or refusal to hire based on age, but
would allow differential retirement plans based on age. Id. at 73 n. 80.
31 See ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(1982)(amending 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(1970)).
This section was amended in 1974 to reduce from twenty-five to twenty the mini-
mum number of employees needed to qualify an individual as an employer under
the ADEA. The amendment also extended the scope of the ADEA to include
federal and state governments in the definition of employer. Id. Congress ex-
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seniority system or employee benefit plan may require or
permit the involuntary retirement of any individual be-
cause of the individual's age.32 Previously, the ADEA had
been held to permit the mandatory retirement of employ-
ees protected under the legislation if such retirement was
included in the terms of an employee benefit plan.3 The
1978 amendments show that such involuntary retirement
of employees covered by the ADEA will no longer be per-
mitted. 4 Congress, in discussing the 1978 amendments,
specifically disagreed with those cases which held that re-
tirement plans which were in effect prior to the date of
enactment of the ADEA were exempt under the amended
section solely because they antedate the ADEA or the
1978 amendments. 5
pected the expanded coverage to remove discriminatory barriers against employ-
ment of older workers in governmentjobs. See H.R. REP. No. 913, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2850. The most recent
amendments to the ADEA, occurring in 1978, required employers to permit any
employee age sixty-five through sixty-nine to participate in the same coverage
under any group health plan offered to employees under the age of sixty-five.
ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(g)(1982) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1974)).
32 See ADEA 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(1982).
- See United Airlines Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977) (United's retirement
plan requiring plaintiffs retirement at age sixty was upheld). See H. CONF. REP.
No. 950, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
504, 528-29 [hereinafter cited as Conference Report]. The Conference Report states:
[t]he conferees agree that the purpose of the amendment to Section
4(f)(2) is to make absolutely clear one of the original purposes of the
provision, namely, that the exception does not authorize an em-
ployer to require or permit involuntary retirement of an employee
within the protected age group on account of age.
Id. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held in United Airlines Inc. v. McMann,
542 F.2d 217 (1976), that a pre-age sixty-five retirement policy falls within the
meaning of "subterfuge" (to evade the ADEA) unless an employer can show that
the early retirement provision has an economic or business purpose other than
arbitrary age discrimination. McMann, 542 F.2d at 221. The Supreme Court [in a
decision rejected by the conferees, see Conference Report supra] reversed the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, finding "nothing to indicate Congress intended whole-
sale invalidation of retirement plans instituted in good faith. . . or intended to
require employers to bear the burden of showing a business or economic purpose
to justify bona fide pre-existing plans." McMann, 434 U.S. at 203.
14 See King, The ADEA and Employee Benefit Plans, 56 N.Y. ST. B.J. 19, 20 (1984).
-. See H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 8, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 528, 529; Age Discrimination in Employee Benefit Plans, 18
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 143 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Age Discrimination].
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) published guidelines which aided the courts in
defining a bona fide benefit plan. 6 The EEOC's action
reflected two of the changes the ADEA underwent in
1978. Through the amendments Congress not only
toughened the requirements for a bona fide benefit plan,
but President Carter also transferred the responsibility
and authority for enforcing the legislation from the De-
partment of Labor to the EEOC. This was done pursuant
to the President's plan to consolidate the government's
equal employment effort. 7 At least one commentator has
noted that the transfer caused some confusion as to
whether the Department of Labor guidelines or the EEOC
guidelines on benefit plans are the principal authority.38
The ADEA's language closely parallels that of Title
VII.3 9 When Congress debated Title VII, it was suggested
that age be included as one of the proscribed criteria. °
The suggestion was rejected in favor of a directive to the
Secretary of Labor to study age discrimination and report
his findings to Congress."' The Secretary's resulting re-
port formed a basis for the ADEA.42 The ADEA shares
31 46 Fed. Reg. 47,724 (1981). The EEOC's interpretations require that the
plan exist, pay actual benefits, and that its terms be accurately described in writing
to employees. 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(b) (1985). See also, Age Discrimination, supra
note 35, at 143. See generally Thomas supra note 29.
-17 Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,307 (May 9, 1978). The
Secretary of Labor was originally responsible for the administration and enforce-
ment of the ADEA. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 625-26 (1982) (amending 29 U.S.C.
§§ 625-26 (1974)). See also King, supra note 34, at 20.
3" See King, supra note 34, at 20.
39 See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (prohibitions of the ADEA
were derived from the same words as Title VII); Laugesen v. Anaconda, 510 F.2d
307, 311 (6th Cir. 1975) (similarity between Title VII and the ADEA hardly acci-
dental); See generally Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: Is a Transplant Appropriate? 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1261 (1983) (exam-
ines applicability of impact analysis used in Title VII litigation to ADEA
litigation).
1o See Player, supra note 39, at 1263.
41 Id.
42 Report of the Secretary of Labor, The Older American Worker: Age Discrim-
ination in Employment (1965).
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the same substantive prohibitions, 43 and the same major
defenses,44 as Title VII.45 Title VII forbids discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.46
The ADEA forbids discrimination based on age.4 7 There-
fore, when ADEA litigation began, 48 Title VII cases were
used as guidelines.4 9
43 Compare Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970
& Supp.) which provides:
(a) Employers. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin; . ..
with ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982) which provides:
(a) Employer practices. It shall be unlawful for an employer - (1)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges or employment,
because of such individual's age. . .
44 Compare Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(e)(1964), which provides:
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title . . .(1) it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex or national
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex or national ori-
gin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business enterprise...
with ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1982), which provides:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer . . . (1) to take any action
otherwise prohibited . . . where age is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business.
4.1 See Player, supra note 39, at 1264. Player also notes the differences between
Title VII and the ADEA: the ADEA provides trial by jury, Title VII does not; the
ADEA allows distinctions based on bona fide benefit plans and on reasonable fac-
tors other than age, Title VII does not. Id.
4,) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
47 ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982).
48 See Levien, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Statutory Requirements and
Recent Developments 13 DuQ. L. REv. 227.(1974). The ADEA was rarely enforced in
its early years. As of December, 1971, there appeared to be only two reported
cases under the ADEA. Levien credits increased public awareness and a more
active government enforcement policy with the eventual increase in ADEA litiga-
tion. Id. at 227.
411 See id. at 249; Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755-56 (1979)
(ADEA requires an employee to commence a proceeding with the appropriate
state agency in order to screen cases for the federal courts just as Title VII does);
Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1981) (substantive
rights arising under ADEA are construed similarly to Title VII substantive rights);
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B. Procedural Development of ADEA Case Law
The ADEA provides the procedure by which an ag-
grieved party may bring suit.5" Congress did not, how-
ever, set forth the methods by which the courts should
proceed in deciding cases brought under the ADEA. 5 1 In
Loeb v. Textron the court borrowed a burden of production
test from Title VII litigation.5 2 The plaintiff, Frank Loeb,
was involuntarily terminated at the age of fifty-four for al-
leged poor job performance. 53  The jury returned a ver-
dict for Loeb pursuant to instructions using a Title VII
test regarding burdens of production. 54  The trial court
instructed the jury that a plaintiff may establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by showing that 1) he was
qualified for ajob from which he was fired or for which he
was denied employment, and 2) that the employer sought
a replacement with qualifications similar to the plain-
tiff's. 55 On appeal, Textron challenged the verdict largely
Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub
nom, Brennan v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 419 U.S. 1122 (1975) (applied burden of
proof standard for determining bona fide occupation qualifications in Title VII
litigation to ADEA litigation); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th
Cir. 1975) (burden of production test used in Title VII litigation may be used in
ADEA cases although not automatically); Wilson v. Sealtest Foods Div. of Kraftco
Corp., 501 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1974) (applied burden of production test developed
in and used for Title VII cases to ADEA cases). See also Reed, supra note 28.
ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1982). The ADEA requires that an individual
give the Secretary of Labor sixty days notice of an intent to file an ADEA action to
avoid stale claims. Id. at § 626(d), (e). This notification must ordinarily be filed
within one hundred eighty days of the alleged unlawful practice. Id. The Secre-
tary of Labor then notifies all prospective defendants and the parties attempt to
solve the problem through reconciliation. Id. There is a two-year statute of limi-
tations on such actions. However, if the violation is willful the limitation period is
three years. Id. See Levien, supra note 48, at 231.
.11 See generally Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 582 for additional discussion of the filing
requirements (Congress intended to incorporate in the ADEA the remedies and
procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
.52 Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1010 (1st Cir. 1978).
ms Id. at 1007. Loeb served as Textron's International Sales Manager prior to
his involuntary retirement. Id.
.54 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See in ra note
66 and accompanying text for discussion of Title VII test developed in McDonnell
Douglas.
.- Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1008. The trial court in Loeb based its instruction on Ak-
Donnell Douglas guidelines. See also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358
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on the ground that the Title VII burden of production
test should not be used for ADEA litigation. 56 The First
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Textron's challenge.5 v
The court cited the suggestion of the United States
Supreme Court that the test used by the trial court "is
merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in
light of common experience as it bears on the critical
question of discrimination. 58
The court also found that the Title VII test "addresses
two problems that exist in most employment discrimina-
tion cases." Those problems involve the unavailability of
direct evidence of discrimination, and the lack of accessi-
bility to documents regarding the employee's dismissal.59
The Title VII burden of production test itself was formu-
lated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,60 a non-jury case
in which a black civil activist employee was fired.6 '
Although the employee qualified for a newly opened posi-
tion, McDonnell Douglas failed to rehire him for the posi-
tion.62 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
employee's right to make a prima facie showing of dis-
crimination by establishing that his rejection did not re-
sult from either lack of qualifications or absence of a job
opening, the two most common reasons for such a rejec-
tion.63 The holding in McDonnell Douglas permitted the
(1976) (prima facie proof required in McDonnell Douglas test not necessarily appli-
cable in all respects to different factual situations).
-56 Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1009. Textron also argued that if the Title VII test applied,
Loeb failed to meet the requirements of the test. Id. at 1010. Textron further
argued that the award of liquidated damages by the trial court was unauthorized
because a specific finding of bad faith was not made. Id. at 1010. See also infra note
150 and accompanying text.
.7 Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1010.
-5 Id. at 1014. See Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978) (when all legitimate reasons for discrimination are rejected as reasons for
the employer's actions, more likely than not employer based his decision on an
impermissible factor).
- Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014.
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
(11 Id. at 796.
62 Id.
,' Id. See infra note 66 and accompanying text for discussion of prima facie
showing of discrimination.
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plaintiff to litigate his claim even though direct evidence
was unavailable.64 Through this procedure, the employee
was also given an explanation from the employer for the
action taken.6 5
The role of the prima facie case in the burden of pro-
duction test is to raise an inference of discrimination be-
cause the employer's acts, unless otherwise explained, are
presumed to be based on impermissible factors.66 Once
the employee established his prima facie case, the court
allocated a burden of production on the employer. The
employer must "articulate some legitimate, nondiscrimi-
- Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014.
65 Id.
66 See generally Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254
(1980) (creates presumption that employer unlawfully discriminates against em-
ployee); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. at 567 (more often than
not people do not act in an arbitrary manner, especially in making business deci-
sions); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
358 n.44 (1976) (employer's decision to reject an applicant who belongs to a mi-
nority does not prove decision was based on the employee's minority status); Loeb,
600 F.2d at 1013.
The phrase 'prima facie case' not only may denote the establishment
of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption, but also may be
used by courts to describe the plaintiffs burden of producing
enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue.
9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2494 (3d ed. 1940). McDonnell Douglas
should have made it apparent that in the Title VII context we use
'prima facie case' in the former sense.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at n. 7. One method by which the United States Supreme Court
determined that an employee may establish a prima facie case is for the employee
to show the following: (1) that he belongs to a minority; (2) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that he
was rejected despite his qualifications; and (4). that the position remained open
after his rejection and the employer still sought applicants with the employee's
qualifications. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals stated in Loeb v. Textron, Inc. that the McDonnell Douglas test is designed to
assure that "plaintiff [has] his day in court despite the unavailability of direct evi-
dence." Therefore, where direct evidence of discrimination is available, the Mc-
Donnell Douglas test is not needed. Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014. See McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802. A complainant may also proceed by offering evidence which
directly indicates a policy or intention of using age as a factor in the process of
selecting those employees who would be hired or fired, or the use of age as a
factor in other employment decisions. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307,
310. For example, an admission by the defendant, or a state of facts so clear that
no reasonable person could disagree, could constitute direct evidence of discrimi-
nation. Id. at 310.
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natory reason for the employee's rejection. '6 7 If the em-
ployer is able to validly assert an exception provided in
the ADEA, 68 the burden of proof shifts to the employee.
The employee then must demonstrate that the reason
given by the defendant was a pretext or subterfuge to
evade the ADEA.69 If the employer fails to produce a
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection,
then the employee prevails.
The McDonnell Douglas test is most helpful if no direct
evidence of discrimination is available.7 0 However, if such
direct evidence is available, the McDonnell Douglas test is
not needed. 7' In Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals applied a modified version of the
the McDonnell Douglas test.72  The defendant Anaconda
11 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. It is possible that age, sex, race, or reli-
gion could be a bona fide occupational qualification for the job which would ex-
cept the discrimination pursuant to the ADEA. See ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)
(1982).
,1, The ADEA provides that acts otherwise prohibited by the ADEA are lawful
where (1) age is a bona fide occupational qualification or where the differentiation
is based on reasonable factors other than age; (2) such acts are done pursuant to a
bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employment benefit plan which is not
a subterfuge to evade the purpose of this chapter; and (3) where the acts are a
discharge or disciplinary acts done for good cause. ADEA 29 U.S.C. § 624(f)
(1982).
11 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805. Firing an employee for illegal activities
may be a pretext for race, sex, or age discrimination. Id.
70 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (employee need not, but if able to may, show that
the discriminatory act was motivated by prohibited reasons) and Loeb, 600 F.2d at
1014 (McDonnell Douglas prima facie case assures plaintiff his day in court despite
the lack of direct evidence).
71 See Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1018. The court stated that the judge should not force
any case into the McDonnell Douglas format. The First Circuit Court of Appeals
reasoned that in cases in which a plaintiffs evidence of discrimination relies heav-
ily upon direct evidence of discriminatory motive, the McDonnell Douglas formula
would not be required for a jury instruction. Id. The formula is also unnecessary
where there is direct or circumstantial evidence that supports an inference of dis-
crimination. Id.
72 Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975). In Laugesen the
court stated "we believe it would be inappropriate simply to borrow and apply
[McDonnell Douglas] guidelines automatically." 510 F.2d at 312. Noting differ-
ences in the criteria of the ADEA (age) and Title VII (race, religion, sex, color,
national origin) the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
"the more strict approach which is evident in the treatment of a Title
VII race discrimination case in McDonnell Douglas v. Green may not be
desirable here. The progression of age is a universal human pro-
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permanently discharged the fifty-six year old plaintiff
from employment as a result of a reorganizing effort.73 At
trial, Laugesen did not offer evidence directly indicating a
policy or intention of using age as a factor in Anaconda's
employment decisions." The jury rendered a verdict in
favor of Anaconda, which raised questions concerning the
extent McDonnell Douglas guidelines may be applied to
ADEA situations. 75 The appellate court reversed and re-
manded. The court approved the use of McDonnell Doug-
las guidelines but ruled that the jury instructions failed to
make clear that Laugesen could recover even if age was
one of many factors which determined whether he would
remain with Anaconda or be fired.76
The McDonnell Douglas guidelines made a smooth transi-
cess. In the very nature of the problem, it is apparent that in the
usual case, absent any discriminatory intent, discharged employees
will more often than not be replaced by those younger than they.
This factor of progression and replacement is not necessarily in-
volved in cases involving the immutable characteristics of race, sex
and national origin."
Id. at 312 n.4.
73 Laugesen, 510 F.2d at 310-11.
74 Id. The basis of the plaintiff's termination in Laugesen, a separation notice,
contained evaluations by the employee's manager. Under a section provided for
the manager's general comments, the manager had noted "too many years in
job." Id.
7-1 Laugesen, 510 F.2d at 310. Anaconda sought to justify the alleged discrimina-
tion as a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) necessary to the normal
operation of the business. Id. The BFOQ defense is provided by § 623(f)(1) of
the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f)(1) (1982).
7,; Laugesen, 510 F.2d at 317. The court reversed and remanded because "it was
essential for the jury to understand . . . that there could be more than one factor
in the decision to discharge and that he was nevertheless entitled to recover if one
such factor was his age and in fact it made a difference in determining whether he
was to be retained or discharged." Id. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that the instructions governing a plaintiffs right to recover state that it is unlawful
to discharge an individual "merely because of his age," and the plaintiff has the
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discharged
because of his age. Id. The instructions do not require that age be the sole or
exclusive cause of discharge. Cf King v. Laborers Int'l Union, 443 F.2d 273 (6th
Cir. 1973) (Title VII cases in which the court stated that where discrimination on
basis of age, race, color, religion, sex or national origin was a causal factor for
refusal to hire or for discharge, the aggrieved party is statutorily entitled to re-
cover). See also ADEA Interpretations 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(c)(1985) (Secretary of
Labor stated in interpreting ADEA regulations that age must be one factor, but
need not be the determining factor, in decision to discharge).
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tion from Title VII cases to ADEA cases. 77 The United
States Supreme Court termed the guidelines an "orderly
way to evaluate evidence of discrimination. ' 78 The First
Circuit Court of Appeals said "we see no inherent reason
why it is any less a 'sensible, orderly way to evaluate the
evidence' in an age discrimination case than in any other.
McDonnell Douglas meets a problem of proof that may be
present in any case where motivation is an issue but does
not alter the traditional burdens of proof. ' 79 Because of
the similarities between the ADEA and Title VII, both in
their aims to eliminate discrimination from the workplace
and in their substantive provisions, it naturally followed
that the methods and burdens of proof used under one
may be used by the other.8 0 As a result, courts hearing
ADEA cases consistently apply the McDonnell Douglas
guidelines where direct evidence of discrimination is not
available.8 '
C. The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ)
1. Age as a BFOQ
The ADEA provides affirmative defenses for its general
77 See also Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 574 F.2d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1978)
(guidelines set forth in McDonnell Douglas generally applicable to ADEA cases);
Kentroti v. Frontier Airlines, 585 F.2d 967, 969 (10th Cir. 1978) (McDonnell Doug-
las rules apply to age discrimination cases); Marshall v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1978) (requiring a defendant to prove differen-
tiating factors other than age were evenly applied to similarly situated employees
is inconsistent with Title VII case law); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239
(3d Cir. 1977) (evidentiary presumptions and burdens of proof used in Title VII
cases will clarify standards for ADEA actions), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978);
Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1010 (operative principles of McDonnell Douglas applicable in age
discrimination cases).
78 Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. at 577. See also supra note 49
and accompanying text.
71, Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1015. See also Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584. The Supreme
Court stated, "[t]here are important similarities between the two statutes [the
ADEA and Title VII] . ..in their aims . . . and in their substantive procedures."
Id.
_ See Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1015 (court ruled nothing in the ADEA or Title VII
precluded the use by either of the same guidelines).
81 See supra notes 66 and 77 and accompanying text for discussion of proof
needed for prima facie case.
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prohibitions of age discrimination to employers involved
in age discrimination litigation. 2 Section 623(0(1) of the
ADEA provides that "where age is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the particular business, or where the differ-
entiation is based on reasonable factors other than age,"
the ADEA prohibitions do not apply.8 3 The BFOQexcep-
tion to the ADEA is narrowly construed, and the burden
of proof required to establish a BFOQ defense is on the
employer. 4
As with the procedural development of the ADEA, the
interpretation of the BFOQ in ADEA cases borrowed
some guidelines from Title VII cases.8 5 In Weeks v. South-
ern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. 8 6 the plaintiff, a female employee of
the defendant, applied for a switchman postion but was
informed by Southern Bell that it would not assign wo-
men to that position.8 1 Mrs. Weeks filed a sex discrimina-
tion suit under Title VIIV 8 Mrs. Weeks alleged that she
8 See ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623 () (1982).
83 ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1982). See Reed, supra note 28, at 385-86;
EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982). The court in St. Paul
stated "[t]he legislative history [of the ADEA] shows a congressional intent to
require employment decisions to be made on the basis of ability rather than age."
Id.
I4 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1985) See also Levien, supra note 48, at 238 (discus-
sion of first use of BFOQ defense in ADEA litigation).
8. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(e)(1). Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act provides that it shall not be unlawful for an employer to hire and
employ persons on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin where
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business. Id.
"- Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). Mrs.
Weeks, the plaintiff, had been employed by defendant for nineteen years when
she applied for a switchman position. Id. at 230.
.7 Id.
" Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 states in pertinent part:
(a) Employer practices.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1)
to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual . . . with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's ... sex . . . or (2) to limit, segre-
gate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive . . .
any individual of employment opportunities . . . because of such in-
dividual's sex . ...
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was denied a position for which she was qualified solely
because she was a woman. 9 Southern Bell's affirmative
defense to Mrs. Week's prima facie case was that the
switchman position fit within the Title VII BFOQ excep-
tion because the job required the lifting equipment and
"strenuous activity." 90 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit-recognized the danger of allowing a broad, stere-
otypical interpretation of the BFOQ exception.9 1 The
court held that in order for Southern Bell to rely on the
BFOQ exception the "employer has the burden of prov-
ing that he had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a fac-
tual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women
would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the du-
ties of the job involved."'9 2 The court rejected Southern
Bell's stereotypical contentions that the "strenuous activ-
ity" accompanying the switchman position justified a
BFOQ exception and denied its affirmative defense. 3
In Smallwood v. United Air Lines,9 4 the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit allocated a similar burden of proof
to the defendant employer.9 5 Smallwood, a forty-eight
year old captain and first officer with ten years of experi-
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a).
- Weeks, 408 F.2d at 230. Southern Bell, in effect, admitted a prima facie viola-
tion of the Civil Rights Act by hiring a man with less seniority than Mrs. Weeks for
the switchman position. Id. at 231. Southern Bell's usual practice is to award the
job to the most senior applicant. Id.
sm, Id. at 234. See supra note 44 and accompanying text for a discussion of Title
VII and ADEA BFOQdefenses.
!" See Veeks, 408 F.2d at 235. The court found that a stereotypical construction
of a BFOQ was inconsistent with the purpose of the ADEA to provide a founda-
tion in law for the principle of nondiscrimination. Id.
1"2 Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235-36.
Id. See also Reed, supra note 28, at 387 (subsequent test requiring employer to
show he had a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all of those dis-
criminated against would be unable to safely and efficiently perform the job).
,14 Smallwood v. United Air Lines, 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 1007 (1982). See Reed, supra note 28, at 395-402. Reed notes that the "all or
substantially all" test as formulated in ll'eeks is not the only test that has been used
in ADEA airline pilot cases. Id. Another test formulated in Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), would require proof that the em-
ployment of older workers would undermine the essence of the business opera-
tion. Id. at 400.
!1r Smallwood, 661 F.2d at 307.
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ence, applied to United for a flight engineer position. 6
United informed Smallwood that it only processed appli-
cations for applicants twenty-one to thirty-five years of
age.97 Smallwood subsequently filed an ADEA claim
against United.9 8 The trial court ruled for United, adopt-
ing its contention that the age limitation was a BFOQbe-
cause hiring older pilots would impede the safe, effective,
and coordinated functioning of the three cockpit of-
ficers. 99 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit re-
versed, holding that United failed to show a relationship
between the age at which pilots are hired and airline
safety.'0 0 Adopting tests from Title VII BFOQ exception
cases, the court set forth the requirements for an ADEA
defendant to meet in order to justify a BFOQ defense.' 0 '
A defendant must show that the job qualifications he in-
vokes to justify his discrimination are reasonably neces-
sary to the essence of his business and that a factual basis
exists for believing that all or substantially all persons
over a certain age could not perform the duties of the job
safely and efficiently.' 0 2 Alternatively, an ADEA defend-
ant may show that it is impossible or impractical to ascer-
tain the difference between older employees who can and
s, Id. at 305-06. United, the defendant, responded to the plaintiffs application
for a flight officer position by sending a form letter to the plaintiff which listed
basic qualifications. Next to the "Age 21 through 29" qualification a pencil mark
appeared. Id. at 306.
1,7 Id. Smallwood wrote United that in view of the national policy against age
discrimination, his application should be reconsidered. Id. Conciliation hearings
between United and Smallwood were unsuccessful. Id.
I8 /d.
'P Id.
loo Id. at 309. The court found that the alleged harm to the "crew concept," the
safe, coordinated functioning of cockpit officers, was a function of prior experi-
ence, not the age of the pilot at the time he is hired. Id. at 308.
.... Id. at 307. See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th
Cir. 1970) (Title VII case of male being denied position as flight cabin attendant),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). The district court found for the defendant, ruling
that females were superior in the non-mechanical aspects of the job. Id. at 387.
The court of appeals reversed, finding that discrimination based on sex is valid
only when the essence of the business operation is undermined by not hiring
members of one sex exclusively. Id. at 388.
102 Snallwood, 661 F.2d at 307.
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cannot perform the job safely. 0 3
One commentator noted that in hearing and deciding
airline pilot age discrimination cases involving BFOQex-
ceptions, triers of fact face a paradox.'0 4 While the Secre-
tary of Transportation requires a high degree of safety in
the transport of passengers, the ADEA prohibits age dis-
crimination in the hiring of those most responsible for
passenger safety.10 5 It has been suggested that the high
risks involved in airline transportation and the concern
for passenger safety should serve to lighten the burden on
the airlines in establishing a BFOQ exception.'0 6
2. Seniority Systems and Retirement Plans: The 1978
ADEA Amendment
The ADEA, prior to the 1978 amendments, prohibited
mandatory retirement of protected workers prior to age
sixty-five, unless pursuant to a "bona fide seniority system
..or benefit plan."'' 0 7 One commentator asserts that
United Airlines v. McMann °8 set the amendment process in
motion.'0 9 United hired McMann in 1944 and in 1973,
just after McMann's sixtieth birthday, retired him pursu-
ant to the mandatory requirements of United's Employee
'll Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 1983). The
"all or substantially all" test was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Harriss v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 676 (9th Cir. 1980). See also Criswell,
709 F.2d at 550-51. In the plaintiff's attempt to downbid from captain to flight
engineer, the court ruled that since the BFOQ defense was raised only for the
position of flight engineer, it was unnecessary to include in the jury's instructions
the rationale of the FAA's Age 60 Rule because that rule has never been applied
to flight engineers. Id. at 551.
104 See Reed, supra note 28, at 404-05.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 405.
,17 See ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623()(2) (1974), amended by 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)
(1978). See also Thomas, supra note 29, at 69 for an analysis of the history of
ADEA mandatory retirement provisions.
'" United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977). The United States
Supreme Court decision in McMann was preceded by indecision of the Secretary
of Labor on the issue and by divergent lower court opinions which created the
need for the amendment. Thomas, supra note 29, at 69.
Il, Thomas, supra note 29, at 69. Thomas states that the Congressional intent
of the amendment to the benefit plan exception was to correct the Supreme
Court's McMann interpretation. Id. at 81.
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Plan.1 10 McMann sought relief under the ADEA. t"' The
district court held that any action required by a plan that
predated the effective date of the ADEA could not be a
subterfuge to evade the ADEA." t2 The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit reversed and required United to
show the mandatory retirement provision of the plan had
some economic or business purpose and was not adopted
or maintained as subterfuge." 3  United appealed to the
United States Supreme Court." 4 The Supreme Court, in
reviewing the case, defined subterfuge as a "scheme, plan,
stratagem, or artifice of evasion.""' 5 The Court reasoned
that no plan adopted prior to the effective date of the
ADEA could be a subterfuge, and therefore, employers
did not need to show that mandatory retirement was due
to a business necessity.'6
In response to the McMann decision, Congress
amended the ADEA for the purpose of expressing ap-
proval of the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals." 7 In hearings before the United States House of
Representatives, a proponent of the 1978 amendment tes-
I'l United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. at 193-94. McMann held various po-
sitions with United during his employment there. Id. at 193.
"I United Air Lines v. McMann, 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 434 U.S.
192 (1977). McMann received a Department of Labor opinion which indicated
United's plan was bona fide and did not appear to be a subterfuge to evade the
ADEA, yet he still filed suit. McMann, 542 F.2d at 219-20.
112 Id. at 218. The district court agreed with United's reliance on Brennan v.
Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974). In Brennan the court con-
cluded that pre-sixty-five retirement as required by a plan which pre-dated the
ADEA was valid, since such a plan could not be subterfuge. Id. But see Zinger v.
Blanchett, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977) (court concluded that involuntary retire-
ment pursuant to bona fide plan would not be subterfuge, but pre-ADEA plans
were not automatically exempted simply because they preceded the legislation).
-' McMann, 542 F.2d at 221.
,,4 United Air Lines v. McMann, 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), petition for cert.filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 2188 (U.S. October 12, 1976)(No. 76-906).
"1 McAMann, 434 U.S. at 203. The Court stated "[i]n the context of this statute
[ADEA], 'subterfuge' must be given its ordinary meaning and we must assume
Congress intended it in that sense." Id.
I- Id. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, argued that if the majority's interpreta-
tion was correct, it could result in employers requiring employees to retire before
age sixty-five, while under another ADEA provision the employer would have to
rehire the same employee if that employee re-applied. Id. at 217.
,,7 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978).
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tified that mandatory retirement ages are arbitrary, 1 8 a
substitute for good personnel policies," 9 and merely an
administrative convenience. 20  A medical authority sug-
gested that declines in physical and mental health often
accompany the enforced idleness caused by involuntary
retirement. 12 1 One opponent of the amendment argued
that passage could cause confusion to those older workers
wanting to retire, 22 and that to change the system would
disrupt many effective retirement plans. 23 He claimed, in
essence, that the solution is more income for older work-
ers, not a longer working life.' 24 After hearing the testi-
mony of various witnesses, Congress enacted the 1978
ADEA amendment. 25 The amendment requires that em-
ployers treat protected workers as any other employee in
any mandatory retirement action.' 26 Employers with col-
lective bargaining agreements were given until January
1980, or until the agreements expired, to comply with the
amendment. 12 7
"" Retirement Age Policies Pts. I & 2: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Aging,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 1 at 3 (1977)(statement of Harriet Miller, Executive Di-
rector, American Assocation of Retired Persons) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
I' Id. at 5.
212 Id.
12, Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1977: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 173,
177 (1977) (testimony of Dr. Albert Gunn,J.D., M.D., Assistant Director for Hos-
pitals, The University of Texas System Cancer Center, M.D. Anderson Hospital,
Hospital and Tumor Institute, Houston, Texas). Dr. Gunn suggests "loss of sta-
tus, lack of meaningful activity, fear of becoming dependent, and .. .isolation"
may contribute to the decline in health of persons who are mandatorily retired.
ld.
Id122 Hearings, supra note 120, Pt. 1 at 64 (testimony of H.J. Lartigue of the Exxon
Co., U.S.A.). In support of Exxon's mandatory retirement policy, Mr. Lartigue
noted that the policy provided equitable treatment for all employees under the
policy, that the policy had an unusually broad scope, and that Exxon employees
continued to demonstrate a willingness to retire before age sixty-five. Id. at 67.
"-.1 Id. at 68.
124 Hearings, supra note 118, at 67. See Thomas, supra note 29, at 82.
12. See supra notes 32-34.
126 See Thomas, supra note 29, at 82.
,27 See ADEA, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1982)).
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D. The ADEA and the Aviation Industry
The 1978 ADEA Amendments directly conflicted with
the then existing FAA regulation that prohibited anyone
over age sixty from serving as a pilot of a commercial car-
rier.1 28 In 1978, authority and responsibility for enforc-
ing the ADEA was transferred from the Department of
Labor to the EEOC.1 29 In setting forth its official inter-
pretations of the ADEA, the EEOC declined to include
specific examples of BFOQs, the FAA Age 60 Rule in
particular, because it wished to avoid the appearance of
expressly approving them. 3 0 Instead, the EEOC clarified
its position on the requirements for establishing a
BFOQ 13  following the standards enunciated by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and including the busi-
ness necessity standard, linking the ADEA and Title VII
yet again.t32
The conflict between the 1978 ADEA Amendments and
128 Age 60 Rule, 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1985). Compulsory age limits on hir-
ing imposed by statutes, regulations, or an employer's rules and which apply re-
gardless of the employee's condition at the time he reaches the age limit appear to
be bona fide occupational qualifications when the age limits are clearly imposed
for the public's safety and convenience. 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(a) (1985).
12 See supra note 37 and accompanying text for discussion of transfer of author-
ity for the ADEA.
13o See Final Interpretations: Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 46 Fed.
Reg. 47,725 §§ 1625, 1625.6 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Final Interpretations]. The
EEOC, in addressing ADEA BFOQs stated "[m]ost notable in this regard is the
controversial Age-60 rule of the FAA." Id.
- Id. at § 1625.6. Anyone asserting a BFOQdefense has the burden to prove
(1) the age limit is reasonably necessary to the essence of the business, and either
(2) all or substantially all individuals excluded are in fact disqualified, or (3) some
of the individuals so excluded possess a disqualifying trait that cannot be ascer-
tained except by reference to age. Id. The EEOC stated "[t]he final interpreta-
tion makes clear that when age is asserted as a BFOQfor reasons for public safety,
those asserting the defense will be held to the same standard as that which is
applied when sex is asserted as a BFOQ for public safety. That standard is one of
business necessity." Id.
132 Id. at § 1625.6. The EEOC cited the "business necessity" standard set forth
in Diaz v. Pan American Airlines, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.) (Title VII sex dis-
crimination case), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). Cf notes 41 (age almost in-
cluded in Title VII), 44 (ADEA prohibitions derived from Title VII), 55
(application to ADEA of burden of production case used in Title VII litigation),
and 86 (application to ADEA of Title VII BFOQ requirements) and accompanying
text.
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the FAA Age 60 Rule for commercial airline pilots has
often been addressed.I" The FAA rule was upheld under
an abuse of discretion standard in Starr v. Federal Aviation
Administration.34 A pilot who filed a petition for exemp-
tion from the FAA Age 60 Rule believed his physical con-
dition warranted the exemption.' The FAA contended
that the rule should allow no exemption, regardless of the
pilot's condition. 36 The Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit agreed with the FAA's argument that just be-
cause the rule can be challenged does not mean
exemptions must be granted.13 7 Reasoning that the FAA
has the discretion to establish a no-exemption policy until
satisfactory medical standards are available to adequately
demonstrate the absence of health related risk factors, the
court held that the FAA's denial of an exemption to Cap-
tain Starr was not an abuse of that discretion.13 8
Two other circuits have heard challenges of the Age 60
Rule on substantive and procedural grounds. Both cir-
cuits upheld the method of enactment and the FAA's deci-
sion to adopt the rule. t 39 However, courts have been
unwilling to uphold bona fide occupational qualifications
solely on the basis that an appropriate federal agency de-
'3 In TWA v. Thurston, for example, the Supreme Court noted that "[iln this
litigation, the respondents have not challenged TWA's claim that the FAA regula-
tion establishes a BFOQ for the position of captain. The EEOC guidelines, how-
ever, do not list the FAA's age 60 rule as an example." Thurston, 105 S.Ct. at 622
n. 17.
134 Starr v. F.A.A., 589 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1978).
1, Id. at 309. The Federal Aviation Act provides "[t]he Secretary of Transpor-
tation from time to time may grant exemptions from the requirements of any rule
or regulation prescribed under this subchapter if he finds that such action would
be in the public interest." 49 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (1982). Doctors who had previ-
ously evaluated Captain Starr testified that he was in excellent health before and
at the time of his filing for exemption. No doctor found evidence of risk factors
which would indicate a potential stroke. Starr, 589 F.2d at 309.
1.- Starr, 589 F.2d at 310.
117 Id. at 312. The court recognized two benefits to the no-exemption policy:
(1) potential petitioners are notified of the administrative hurdle before investing
time and money; and (2) standards are established to prevent ad hoc judgments
based on trivial differences. Id.
Id. at 314.
"' See Air Line l ilots Ass'n v. Quesada, 286 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 962 (1961); O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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termined that age is a BFOQfor the particular job. a0 In-
stead, the employer is required to meet the "reasonably
necessary" criteria set forth for establishing a valid BFOQ
defense in ADEA litigation.'t4
E. Willfulness
1. Legislative History
The ADEA provides that the rights created by the legis-
lation are to be enforced in accordance with the "powers,
remedies, and procedures" of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA).ta2 The original bill imposed criminal liability
for willful violations in accordance with the FLSA. 4 3 In
debating the bill, however, Senator Jacob Javits of New
York suggested that "difficult problems of proof...
140 See Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F.2d 743, 750 (7th Cir. 1983)
(presence of statutorily mandated retirement age for federal firefighters does not
automatically establish valid BFOQ defense); EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d
1162, 1166 (8th Cir. 1982) (general rule in circuit is that employer had burden of
proving that the BFOQ exception applies despite existence of legislative determi-
nation); Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F.2d 842, 845 (6th Cir. 1982) (court ex-
pressly rejected lower court's conclusion that FAA Age 60 Rule preempted
further inquiry into validity of BFOQ defense).
14 See Orzel, 697 F.2d at 750. The court stated "we hold that to avoid liability
.. . the City must still demonstrate, by objective and credible evidence, that its
compulsory retirement rule qualifies as a bona fide occupational qualification rea-
sonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business in question,"
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623()(1)(1976)); EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d at
1166 (burden requires employer to show factual basis for believing that substan-
tially all older employees are unable to perform their duties safely and efficiently,
or that older employees have traits precluding safe and efficient job performance
unascertainable by means other than by knowledge of employee's age); Tuohy v.
Ford Motor Co., 675 F.2d 842, 845. The court found that "the presence of an
overriding safety factor might well lead a court to conclude as a matter of policy
that the level of proof required to establish the reasonable necessity of a BFOQis
relatively low. However, this is quite different from dispensing with the require-
ment of necessity and holding that a BFOQ has been established as a matter of
law because adoption by another body of a rule based on age was reasonable." Id.
142 ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). See also Nosier & Wing, Remedies Under the
Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 62 DEN. U. L. REV. 469 (1985) for a
detailed analysis of remedies available for ADEA violations, including statutory
remedies, back pay, interim earnings, front pay, mitigation, pain and suffering,
liquidated damages, and attorney's fees.
,4 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (1982). Section 216(a) imposes criminal liability under
the FLSA for willful violations. Id. Cf ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 629 (imposing criminal
penalties for interference with the EEOC in its performance and duties).
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would arise under a criminal provision" because subse-
quent employer invocation of the Fifth Amendment could
hinder investigation, conciliation, and enforcement. 44
To avoid such problems, Senator Javits suggested that
double damage liability should replace the FLSA's crimi-
nal provision.1 45  The original ADEA of 1967 included
this amendment. 146
2. Willfulness Under the ADEA
Because the remedies and procedures of the FLSA are
incorporated in the ADEA, several circuits automatically
adopted the definition of "willful violation" used under
the FLSA. 147 That definition finds an employer's conduct
to be willful only if he violated the FLSA in bad faith. 4 '
In Lorillard v. Pons,1 4 9 the United States Supreme Court
had the opportunity to correlate the ADEA and the FLSA
provisions.150 The ADEA House manager, SenatorJavits,
stated that the ADEA "incorporates by reference, to the
greatest extent possible, the provisions of the [FLSA]."' 5'
144 113 CONG. REC. 7076 (1976) (statement of Senator Jacob Javits of New
York).
145 Id. Senator Javit's proposed amendment was adopted with slight modifica-
tion. See ADEA, 29 U.S. C. § 626(b) (1982).
146 ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
'47 See Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d 478, 480 (10th Cir.) cert. denied,
342 U.S. 876 (1951) (court found it sufficient to constitute willfulness if the act
was deliberate, voluntary, and intentional as distinguished from one committed
through inadvertence, accident or by ordinary negligence). Generally, a FLSA
violation is willful if the employer wholly disregards the law without making a
reasonable effort to find out whether his actions constitute a violation of the law.
Id.
48 See Portal-to-Portal Pay Act § 11, 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as PPA]. Section 11 of the PPA states that "if the employer shows to the satisfac-
tion of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good
faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was
not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act." liquidated damages may not be
awarded. Cf Nabob, 190 F.2d at 480. The court recognized that "offenses ordina-
rily involve moral turpitude but . ..such an evil purpose or criminal intent need
not exist." See also Loeb, 600 F.2d 1003, 1020 (specific finding of the employer's
bad faith is not needed before liquidated damages may be awarded).
,41, Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1977).
,o Id. at 580-82.
1.51 113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967) (statement of Senator Jacob Javits of New
York).
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The Court noted the Senator's statement and recognized
that the ADEA does provide for liquidated damages
where willful violations occur. 152 However, the Court also
noted that the ADEA does not refer to section eleven of
the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act, which is incorporated in the
FLSA.'5 ' That section requires that a violation must be
found to have been committed in bad faith before it is
considered willful. 54
In ADEA cases the definition of willful has usually par-
alleled that of FLSA cases that preceded the Portal-to-
Portal Pay Act. 155  Some courts in hearing FLSA cases
have recently attempted to broaden the scope of an ADEA
"willful violation." These courts advocate the imposition
of liquidated damages where an act or omission is such
that the "employer was, or should have been, cognizant of
an appreciable possibility that the employees involved
were covered by the statutory provisions. "156
152 Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 581 n.8. See ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
153 Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 581 n.8. See Fair Labor Standards Act § 11, 29 U.S.C.
§ 260 (1970 & Supp. 1985). Contra Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307,
1311 (5th Cir. 1976) (although liquidated damages are payable only if ADEA vio-
lation is willful, it should not be construed to mean such damages are always paya-
ble if a violation is willful).
1.54 FLSA § 11, 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1974).
1.55 See Hays, 531 F.2d at 1311. See also Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept.,
697 F.2d at 759 (employer knew or reasonably should have known of ADEA re-
quirements, and knew or reasonably should have known its act was inconsistent
with requirements). See supra notes 140-41 for a discussion of Orzel.
15c See EEOC v. Central Kansas Medical Center, 705 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir.
1983) (hospital paid male janitors more than its female janitors although males
and females performed similar tasks). See also Marshal v. Union Pac. Motor
Freight Co., 650 F.2d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 1981) (basic duties of dispatchers do
not directly affect safety of operation of motor vehicles, therefore, employer is
obliged to pay overtime compensation to them and failure to do so is willful where
employer was or should have been cognizant of an appreciable possibility that
employees were covered under statute); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588,
595 (10th Cir. 1980) (reduction in work force resulted in termination of protected
ADEA individuals: knowledge of violation was "in the picture", therefore, viola-
tion was willful); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429, 461-63 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (policy denying female stewardesses equal pay as male flight attendants was
willful violation because employer knew of Equal Pay Act and its contents and
understood prohibitions of different salary levels), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086
(1978); Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1974) (employer's wage and
bookkeeping practices were willful violation because employer knew of existence
of FLSA and heard talk that amendments covered his employees); Coleman v.
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III. TWA v. THURSTON
The United States Supreme Court in TWA v. Thurston
encountered TWA's transfer policy, 157 the FAA Age 60
Rule,' 58 and the 1978 ADEA Amendments' 59 simultane-
ously. 16' The Court first recognized that TWA's transfer
policy was discriminatory on its face, as it allowed captains
displaced for reasons other than age to "bump" less se-
nior flight engineers but did not allow those captains who
were excluded solely due to age to do the same.' 6 ' Be-
cause the plaintiffs were able to show direct proof of dis-
crimination, a prima facie case of age discrimination, the
court found no need to consider the shifting production
burdens of the McDonnell Douglas test.' 6 The Supreme
Court ruled that although TWA is not required to grant
disqualified captains privileges of employment, once it
grants those privileges to some disqualified captains, it
cannot deny them to captains disqualified because of
age. 16 3
Hoping to refute the plaintiffs' prima facie case, TWA
raised two affirmative defenses: (1) the discharge of plain-
tiffs was lawful because age is a BFOQ for the position of
captain; and (2) its retirement policy was part of a bona
fide seniority system and therefore excluded from ADEA
coverage. ' 64 The Court recognized that TWA had two age
related policies: (1) captains, after reaching the age of
sixty, were no longer allowed to serve in that capacity; and
Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139, 1141-42 (5th Cir.) (employer's changed
rate of pay for overtime work was willful because the FLSA "was in the picture"),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
1.17 See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text for discussion of TWA's transfer
policy.
'5' See supra note 2.
See supra notes 26-28 for discussion of the 1978 ADEA Amendments.
Thurston, 105 S.Ct. at 618-20.
Id. at 622.
Id. See also supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text for an explanation of
the McDonnell Douglas test.
I'll Thurston, 105 S.Ct. at 621. Cf Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 74
(1984) (benefit which is part of employment relationship not to be given in dis-
criminatory fashion even if employer is free not to allow privilege at all),
- Thurston, 105 S. Ct. at 622.
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(2) captains displaced for reasons other than age enjoyed
transfer privileges that age-displaced captains did not. 165
Plaintiffs did not contest the FAA Age 60 Rule that
TWA incorporated into its employment policy. 66  In-
stead, the plaintiffs urged the Court to consider only the
job of flight engineer as the job to which plaintiffs were
allegedly discriminatorily refused to transfer. 16 7  Age
under sixty is not a BFOQ for the position of flight engi-
neer, 168 although TWA asserted that the legislative history
of the ADEA amendments supported its BFOQ affirma-
tive defense.' 69 The Court, reviewing the legislative his-
tory, found only that "[it] does not prohibit TWA from
retiring all disqualified captains, including those who are
incapacitated because of age."'170 The Court discovered
no evidence of a congressional intent to allow an em-
ployer to discriminate against an older worker seeking to
transfer to another position on the ground that age was a
BFOQ for his former position. 17
Addressing TWA's second affirmative defense that its
transfer policy was lawful because it was part of a bona
fide seniority system, 72 the Supreme Court ruled that any
seniority system which allowed discrimination on the basis
of age was not "bona fide" under the statute. 73 The
165 Id.
,,i, Id. at 622 n. 17.
167 Id. at 622. See generally Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d at
228 (5th Cir. 1969) (telegraph company failed to meet burden of proof for BFOQ
for switchman's job).
Thurston, 105 S.Ct. at 623 and 623 n. 18.
6, Id. at 622-23. The Court applied the ruling in Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co. that the phrase, "particular business" in section 623(0(1) of the ADEA
refers to the job from which the protected individual is excluded. TWA cited a
Senate proposal to amend that section in order to allow an employer to establish a
mandatory retirment age where age is a BFOQ. S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 11, 24, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWs 5041. The proposal was
withdrawn in the Conference Committee, however, because it was agreed that it
did not change the existing law in any way. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 529.
17, Thurston, 105 S.Ct. at 623.
171 Id.
,72 Id. See also ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1982).
17 Thurston, 105 S.Ct. at 623.
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ADEA provides that for a seniority system to be bona fide,
it may not "require or permit" involuntary retirement of
protected individuals on the basis of age.' 74 The Court
found that, while the FAA Age 60 Rule, as opposed to
TWA's transfer policy, may have caused plaintiffs' retire-
ment, the transfer policy certainly permitted it.17 5
The ADEA states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for an em-
ployer to . . .discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's age."' 176 By
allowing captains displaced by reasons other than age the
privilege of "bumping" less senior flight engineers with-
out participating in the bidding procedures to which age-
displaced captains are required to submit, the United
States Supreme Court found that TWA's transfer policy
violated the ADEA.' 77 In so finding, the Court upheld the
purpose of the ADEA to promote the employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than their age
and to prohibit arbitrary discrimination in employment. 78
Having concluded that TWA's transfer policy violated
the ADEA, the Supreme Court turned to the issue of dam-
ages. The plaintiffs attempted to persuade the Court to
adopt the definition of "willful" that would impose liqui-
dated damages on TWA for knowing that the ADEA was
"in the picture."'' 79 The Court retained its "employer
either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of
whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA" defini-
tion of "willful", 0 reasoning that TWA's asserted in-
trepretation "would result in an award of double damages
in almost every case."'8 1 Because TWA acted reasonably
174 Id. See also ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1982).
17 Thurston, 105 S.Ct. at 623.
17.. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982).
177 Thurston, 105 S. Ct. at 623.
17s ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982).
17!, Thurston, 105 S.Ct. at 625. See supra note 156 and accompanying text for
examples of willful conduct situations and standards.
Thurston, 105 S. Ct. at 625.
Id. The Court reasoned that since employers are required to post ADEA
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and in good faith, the Court found no evidence of "reck-
less disregard" on the part of TWA.' 82
IV. CONCLUSION
In TWA v. Thurston, the United States Supreme Court
adopted the reasoning and procedures used by the lower
courts in similar ADEA cases. 8 3 The case reflects the
growing public awareness of the problem of age discrimi-
nation. In the airline industry in particular, age becomes
a crucial factor in light of the overwhelming interest in
public safety.' 84 The airline industry and the FAA have
recognized that the aging process affects some people
sooner than others and in different ways.' 85 As a result,
both organizations have tried to adjust the airline indus-
try's employment practices accordingly by requiring cap-
tains to stop serving in that capacity at age sixty.' 86
The concern expressed as to whether mandatory retire-
ment policies are discriminatory is evidenced in the cases
that have examined such policies for the purpose of
determing whether discrimination is present.8 7 TWA v.
Thurston goes one step further in analyzing the employer's
treatment of an age-displaced captain after his involuntary
retirement from that position. 88  Employers who ana-
lyzed their policies after the 1978 ADEA amendments
were passed, andmore particularly those who did not, will
notices, it would be almost impossible for an employer to show he was unaware of
the ADEA and its application. Id.
182 Id. at 626.
'1. See supra notes 52, 71, 94, and 155 and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
'~Id.
'; See 14 C.F.R. § 121-382.25(c) (1985). See supra note 2 and accompanying
text. See also Thomas, supra note 29, at 82.
1"I See, e.g., Thurston, 105 S.Ct. 613 (1985);Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, 731 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1984); Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709
F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982);
Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1978); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada,
276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961).
I. Thurston, 105 S.Ct. at 623. See Criswell, 709 F.2d 544 (Western tried to pre-
vent age sixty pilots from downbidding to first officers or flight engineers, unsuc-
cessfully claiming that age was a BFOQ for those positions).
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now have to pay close attention to their transfer policies
as well, maintaining a watchful eye for plans, systems, or
policies which may be discriminatory. The Supreme
Court's decision in TWA v. Thurston will also affect other
industries. Every employer, as that term is defined by the
ADEA, who provides a retirement plan or seniority system
in which participants are subject to mandatory retirement
at an age within the protective limits of the ADEA, will
have to closely scrutinize not only that plan and its effects
on the retirees, but also any transfer policy to which the
employer may subscribe. Every policy that may have a
tendency to discriminate against retired employees on the
basis of age is a target for a lawsuit under the ADEA.' 8 9
However, after the court's decision in regard to liquidated
damages and its preferred definition of willful found in
TWA v. Thurston, it appears that employers who make an
honest attempt to determine the validity of their employ-
ment policies under the ADEA need not worry about the
imposition of double damages if a violation is found.190
Cynthia J. Harkins
-. See ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f(2) (1982). See also supra note 32-34 and 126-
127 and accompanying text.
,!- See supra notes 179-182 and accompanying text.
CIVIL RIGHTS - AIRLINE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE
HANDICAPPED - CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD'S FINAL REG-
ULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE REHABILITATION ACT OF
1973, WHICH PROHIBIT EXCLUSION OF QUALIFIED HANDI-
CAPPED INDIVIDUALS FROM PROGRAMS RECEIVING FEDERAL
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, APPLY TO ALL COMMERCIAL AIR-
LINES. Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Civil Aeronautics Board,
752 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. United
States Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of
America, 106 S. Ct. 244 (1985).
In 1976, President Ford ordered' the Secretary of
Health Education and Welfare (HEW) to coordinate the
implementation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which states:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance . . . . The head of each
agency shall promulgate such regulations as may be neces-
sary to carry out the amendments to this section.2
The Secretary of HEW issued guidelines to other fed-
eral agencies in 1978 directing them to begin rulemaking
proceedings 3 by issuing proposed rules implementing
I Exec. Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 1177 (1976)(revoked by Exec. Order No.
12,250, transferring section 504 responsibility from HEW to Department of Jus-
tice). See infra note 59 for a discussion of Executive Order No. 12,250 and the
department currently responsible for section 504's implementation.
- Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as section 504].
.4 Generally, an agency begins its rulemaking procedures by issuing a proposed
rule for public comment. See infra note 64. The agency will promulgate its final
rule in light of the public comments it receives. Id. This final rule becomes bind-
ing on all entities over which the rulemaking agency asserts jurisdiction. Id.
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section 504.4 In response to HEW's directives,- the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) issued its Proposed Rule in
1979.6 The CAB's Proposed Rule prohibited air "carri-
ers" 7 from providing "different services"" to "qualified
handicapped persons"9 and prohibited denial of services
available to other passengers unless "reasonably neces-
sary." 0 The Proposed Rule also promulgated specific
measures the airlines must take to accommodate the
handicapped" and compliance regulations for enforce-
4 Implementation of Executive Order 11,914, Nondiscrimination on the Basis
of Handicap in Federally Assisted Programs, 43 Fed. Reg. 2132, 2137
(1978)(codified at 45 C.F.R. § 85 (1984)).
See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Part 382, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Handicap, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,401 (1979)(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382)(pro-
posed May 31, 1979).
7 In its Proposed Rule, the CAB defined "carrier" as: "(1) any holder of a certif-
icate of public convenience and necessity issued by the [Civil Aeronautics] Board
authorizing the transportation of passengers, and (2) any air taxi operator using
aircraft seating more than 30 passengers." 44 Fed. Reg. at 32,405. Thus, all ma-
jor commercial airlines were covered by the Proposed Rule. Paralyzed Veterans
of Am. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 752 F.2d 694, 699 n.25 (D.C. Dir. 1985), cert.
granted sub nom. United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 106
S. Ct. 244 (1985).
8 The CAB stated different or separate services should only be provided to a
qualified handicapped person if reasonably necessary to provide that person with
access to the airplane, or such services are requested by that person. 44 Fed Reg.
at 32,406.
1 "Handicapped person" is defined as a person who: "(i) has a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,
(ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an
impairment." Id. at 32,405.
A "qualified handicapped person" is a "handicapped person" that satisfies the
following conditions: "the tender of payment for air transportation, the absence
of any indication that air transportation of the passenger will jeopardize flight
safety, and the absence of any indication that the passenger is unwilling or unable
to comply with reasonable requests of airline personnel." Id. at 32,405.
,, The CAB did not define "reasonably necessary". Id. at 32,406; see Paralyzed
Veterans of America, 752 F.2d at 698-99.
11 44 Fed. Reg. at 32,406. For example, the CAB required carriers to provide
deaf passengers with written material, signs, placards, or flashing signal lights to
give them pertinent information. Id. Airlines were required to print emergency
cards in Braille for blind passengers. Id. The CAB specifically allowed guide dogs
to accompany blind and deaf passengers, and those passengers who needed canes
or crutches could keep them nearby at all times. Id. The CAB also allowed handi-
capped persons to carry folding wheelchairs aboard the airplane. Id. Life support
systems such as oxygen were to be readily available to those qualified handi-
capped persons who complied with the notice requirement. Id. Carriers were
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ment of the specific requirements.1 2
After heated arguments from both the airlines and the
handicapped on the Proposed Rule,' 3 the CAB issued its
Final Rule in 1982,' 4 limiting the regulation's application
to those airlines receiving direct financial assistance from
the federal government.' 5 The CAB's determination to
also to provide personnel and equipment to assist in boarding, deplaning and
moving about the cabin. Id.
2 Id. at 32,407. To ensure compliance, carriers were to maintain a manual de-
tailing the procedures and rules for employees to follow in accommodating handi-
capped passengers. Id. An evaluation system was set up whereby each carrier
would evaluate any complaints it had received and establish a periodical review of
its efforts. Id. In the event the CAB determined that a carrier had violated a re-
quirement, the CAB could terminate the carrier's federal financial assistance after
the carrier had an opportunity for a hearing. Id.
13 Paralyzed Veterans of America, 752 F.2d at 701-02. The airlines contended that
the attempt to require compliance with the regulations contravened the govern-
ment policy of deregulation of the airline industry. Id. at 701. Pacific Southwest
Airlines argued that discrimination against the handicapped was nonexistent. Id.
The handicapped complained that the smaller operators using aircraft with less
than thirty seats would be exempt. Id. at 702.
14 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 25,936
(1982)(codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382 (1985)).
- 14 C.F.R. § 382.2, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,940-41, 25,948. The CAB limited ap-
plication of the Final Rule to smaller carriers because they are the only airlines
receiving subsidies directly from the federal government. See infra notes 18, 74
and accompanying text. The CAB also changed its position on other aspects of
the Proposed Rule. In defining "qualified handicapped person", the CAB im-
posed the additional requirement that the transportation of the individual not vio-
late Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules. 14 C.F.R. § 382.3, 47 Fed. Reg.
at 25,939, 25,948; See also supra note 9 and accompanying text. Generally, the
CAB chose to grant great deference to the airlines to determine if the handi-
capped person is qualified to travel. 14 C.F.R. § 382.3(c), 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,939,
25,948. The CAB dropped the Braille emergency card requirement in favor of a
rule which permits carriers to determine the means to convey this information to
the blind. Id. § 382.12, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,941, 25,949. See supra note 11.
The CAB also clarified many of the regulations. For example, the CAB stated
that an unqualified handicapped person may become qualified by traveling with
another person. 14 C.F.R. § 382.3(c)(3), 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,939, 25,948. The
regulation requiring that airline services be "reasonably accessible" was changed
to "readily accessible" to match the language of HEW's guidelines. Id. § 382.11,
47 Fed. Reg. at 25,940, 25,948-49. The CAB dropped the rule stating that a doc-
tor's medical certificate of the handicapped person's ability to travel on an air-
plane was a prima facie showing that the handicapped person was qualified to
travel. 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,941-42. The Final Rule omitted any reference to medi-
cal certificates because doctors usually do not have enough expertise in air safety
to make those judgments. Id. at 25,942. The CAB also clarified the Final Rule to
ensure that minor assistance with meals was not considered feeding assistance
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restrict its jurisdiction exempted all major airlines from
compliance with the specific regulations of the Final
Rule.' 6 In response, the Paralyzed Veterans of America,
American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities, and
American Council of the Blind sought judicial review of
the CAB order by filing suit in the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.' 7 Petitioners specifically
challenged three aspects of the Final Rule, arguing that:
(1) the CAB wrongfully limited the application of the Fi-
nal Rule to those carriers receiving direct subsidies under
the Federal Aviation Act;' 8 (2) the Final Rule contained
subjective guidelines for defining which handicapped pas-
sengers are qualified; thus forcing selective, arbitrary and
confusing conditions on disabled passengers; 9  and
(3) the requirement of the Final Rule that handicapped
requiring that a personal attendant accompany the passenger or that the passen-
ger forego meals. 14 C.F.R. § 382.13(b), 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,949.
"I See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
.7 Paralyzed Veterans of America, 752 F.2d at 694, 695. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1486(a)
(1982) provided jurisdiction in this case by allowing petition for review:
Any order, affirmative or negative, issued by the Board or Secretary
of Transportation under this chapter, except any order in respect of
any foreign air carrier subject to the approval of the President as
provided in section 1461 of this Appendix, shall be subject to review
by the courts of appeals of the United States or the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upon petition, filed
within sixty days after entry of such order, by any person disclosing a
substantial interest in such order.
Id. The CAB's authority was terminated in 1985 and its duties transferred to the
Department of Transportation, so the petitioners filed an action by authority of
section 1486. See 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1551(a), (b) (1982).
- 752 F.2d at 705. See 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937-38 for the CAB's rationale in
restricting its jurisdiction to those carriers receiving direct subsidies from the fed-
eral government. The CAB had initially applied its Proposed Rule to all certifi-
cated air carriers but decided to restrict the Final Rule's reach to small
commercial carriers, in light of Angel v. Pan American World Airways, discussed
infra notes 120-130, 230-233 and accompanying text. See infra notes 69-75 and
accompanying text for a further discussion of the CAB's decision to limit the Final
Rule's application to small airlines.
w 752 F.2d at 703. One of the requirements to make a handicapped person
qualified is that he or she must not "in the reasonable expectation of carrier per-
sonnel . . . jeopardize the safe completion of the flight or the health or safety of
other persons." 14 C.F.R. § 382.3(c)(2), 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,948. Petitioners ar-
gued that the criteria for determining which handicapped passengers are qualified
should be more objective. 752 F.2d at 720. In upholding the CAB's definition of
"qualified handicapped person", the court commended the CAB's consideration
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passengers needing "extensive special assistance ' 20 notify
the airline 48 hours in advance of their flight was unrea-
sonable.2  Held, so ordered: Civil Aeronautics Board's final
regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
which prohibit exclusion of qualified handicapped individ-
uals from programs receiving federal financial assistance,
apply to all commercial airlines. Paralyzed Veterans of
America v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 752 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir.
1985), cert. granted sub nom. United States Department of Trans-
portation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 106 S. Ct. 244
(1985). This note discusses the question of whether the
CAB wrongfully restricted the application of the Final
Rule to those airlines receiving financial assistance di-
rectly from the federal government (in effect the smaller
airlines).
of the views of the handicapped. Id. at 720-21. The court felt that airline person-
nel are in the best position to judge whether a handicapped individual is qualified:
Because of the unique nature of every individual, because of the infi-
nite variety of disabling conditions and the varying extent to which
they may handicap a particular person the vesting of some discretion
in airline personnel to make case-by-case determinations is unavoid-
able. This is especially so where, just as individuals differ, so do air-
lines and aircraft.
Id. at 722. The court stated that the Final Rule reduced the risk of arbitrary deci-
sions by airline personnel because each airline must designate an employee re-
sponsible for making the decision to refuse service. Id. See 14 C.F.R. § 382.13(b),
47 Fed. Reg. at 25,949.
20 "Extensive special assistance" includes: "(1) Medical oxygen for on-board
use; (2) Boarding and deplaning assistance using mechanical boarding lifts, aisle
chairs, other special equipment, or requiring the presence of more than the usual
complement of personnel; and (3) Ground wheelchairs at facilities where they are
not usually available." 14 C.F.R. § 382.15(c), 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,949.
2 752 F.2d at 704. See also 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,945 for the CAB's disposal of the
handicapped's argument that advance notice of 48 hours is unreasonably long.
Petitioners contend that the forty-eight hour notice requirement allows an airline
to arbitrarily refuse service. 752 F.2d at 724. The Paralyzed Veterans of America
court made the same basic argument for practicality as it made in approving the
CAB's definition of "qualified handicapped person". Id. at 723. See supra note 19.
The court thus felt more comfortable with the CAB's judgment since the CAB
"conscientiously and rationally sought to implement section 504 in a manner
likely to be reasonable and effective." 752 F.2d at 723.
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I. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE HANDICAPPED: THE
HISTORY OF SECTION 504 OF THE
REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
A. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Beginning in 1918, Congress provided steadily increas-
ing funding for state-administered programs designed to
supply the training necessary for employment of the
handicapped. 22 In the 1970's, the emphasis on rehabilita-
22 Until the seventies, the federal government had emphasized rehabilitating
the handicapped by providing jobs, training and counseling. Congress first fo-
cused its attention to the needs of the disabled when it passed the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act of 1918. Pub. L. No. 65-178, 40 Stat. 617 (1918). See also R.
SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL To CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY
POLICY 20 (1984). The purpose of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act was to pro-
vide job training for disabled veterans. Pub. L. No. 65-178, 40 Stat. at 617. See R.
SCOTCH, supra, at 20. The vocational rehabilitation program began for civilians
when President Woodrow Wilson signed the Smith-Fess Act of 1920. Pub. L. No.
66-236, 41 Stat. 735 (1920). See R. SCOTCH, supra, at 20. Initially, the Act pro-
vided for the training, counseling and placement of physically handicapped per-
sons. Pub. L. No. 66-236, § 1,41 Stat. at 735. The Act also established a program
whereby state and federal government would contribute equally to that particular
state's rehabilitation program. Id. § 1, 41 Stat. at 735. This joint contribution will
be referred to as "matching." Until the late seventies, the Rehabilitation Act's
basic goal of vocational rehabilitation remained virtually unchanged throughout
its many amendments. See S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-12, reprinted il
1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076, 2082. The vocational rehabilitation
program became permanent in 1935 when the Social Security Act passed, in
which Congress authorized annual appropriations for vocational rehabilitation.
Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 531(a), 49 Stat. 633, 634 (1935). By 1935, all states had
vocational rehabilitation programs in operation. R. SCOTCH, supra, at 20.
With World War II in full swing, Congress passed amendments in 1943 to the
Vocational Rehabilitation Act. Pub. L. No. 78-113, 57 Stat. 374 (1943). These
amendments were designed to employ disabled workers in war production and to
ready society for the disabled veterans returning to the workforce. Id., 57 Stat. at
374. See also R. SCOTCH, supra, at 22. Congress also for the first time authorized
the provision of medical, surgical, and restorative services for the physically hand-
icapped. Pub. L. No. 78-113, § 3(a)(3), 57 Stat. at 376.
In its next amendments, Congress in 1954 greatly expanded the funding for the
research and training aspects of the vocational rehabilitation program. Pub. L.
No. 83-565, 68 Stat. 652 (1954). Greater support was provided to smaller states
who otherwise would have been unable to provide the services themselves. The
act provided for a minimum funding amount to each state. Id. § 2, 68 Stat. at 653.
In an effort to spur the states to expand rehabilitation services, Congress reduced
the requirement that states match federal contributions dollar for dollar to sev-
enty-five percent federal and twenty-five percent state contributions. id. § 2, 68
Stat. at 653-54.
[he next major set of amendments to the Vocational Rehabilitation Act were
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tion shifted to removing the physical barriers preventing
the handicapped from participating in certain programs.23
Congress realized that trained and qualified handicapped
individuals often could not obtain employment because
physical barriers prevented their access to the
workplace.24
Initially, Congress attempted to reduce handicapped
discrimination in government-supported programs
through proposed amendments to the Vocational Reha-
bilitation Act 25 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.26 Con-
enacted in 1965. Pub. L. No. 89-333, 79 Stat. 1282 (1965). These amendments
were part of President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society Programs during the mid-
1960s. R. SCOTCH, supra, at 23. Congress increased the funding to three hundred
million dollars in order to reach a greater number of handicapped individuals.
Pub. L. No. 89-333, § 1, 79 Stat. at 1282. See also 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2076, 2083. Two years later Congress established the National Center for
Deaf-Blind Youths and Adults. Pub. L. No. 90-99, 81 Stat. 251, 251-52 (1967).
Pursuant to the reorganization of HEW in 1967, the Office of Vocational Rehabili-
tation became the Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA) and was made
one of the program bureaus of the newly established Social and Rehabilitative
Services Administration (SRS). Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 3, 87 Stat. 355, 357-58
(1973). See also R. SCOTCH, supra, at 23. SRS also included the Children's Bureau,
the Administration on Aging, the Public Welfare Assistance Payments Administra-
tion, and the Medical Services Administration. R. SCOTCH, supra, at 23-24.
In 1968, Congress again passed amendments to the Vocational Rehabilitation
Act. Pub. L. No. 90-391, 82 Stat. 297 (1968). Congress increased federal contri-
butions to eighty percent of every dollar spent on handicapped rehabilitation, and
Congress gave authority to increase recruiting of handicapped individuals for
public service employment positions, Id. §§ 7, 10(0, 82 Stat. at 299, 302. Reha-
bilitation services were increased by number and definition to include more activi-
ties than ever before. See id. § 10, 82 Stat. at 301. The Architectural Barriers Act
of 1968 mandated that all new federal construction be accessible to the handi-
capped. Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718 (1968). Between 1920 and 1973, over
three million handicapped individuals were rehabilitated. 1973 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2076, 2084.
24 S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19, reprinted in 1973 U. S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2076, 2092. See also infra note 34 and accompanying text.
24 See R. SCOTCH, supra note 22, at 51-52.
25 H.R. 8395, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 35,141, 35,142 (1972). The
history of the Vocational Rehabilitation Program is discussed supra notes 22-24
and accompanying text.
2o H.R. 12154, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971); S. 3044, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1972). See infra note 48 and accompanying text for a comparison of the Rehabili-
tation Act, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972. The proposal would have amended the Civil Rights Act to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of physical or mental handicap. H.R. 12154,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1971); S. 3044, 92d Cong., 2d Sess 1-2 (1972). Con-
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gress chose the former as the vehicle for reform, and
Congress passed the Rehabilitation Bill in 1972.27 Presi-
dent Nixon pocket vetoed the bill,28 and Congress 29 re-
drafted the vetoed bill3 0 in an atmosphere conducive to
sweeping reforms of civil rights legislation.3 ' After a sec-
ond veto and minor changes, Congress resubmitted the
gress did not hold hearings on the proposal to amend the Civil Rights Act, and
one author has suggested that any expansion of Civil Rights Act coverage was
much too controversial at the time. R. SCOTCH, supra note 22, at 44. Another
possible reason for not broadening the Civil Rights Act to include handicapped
individuals was that expansion of the Civil Rights Act would have weakened en-
forcement of the existing civil rights law. Id. at 45.
27 H.R. 8395, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 35,179 (1972).
28 President's Memorandum of Disapproval of Nine Bills Passed by Congress, 8
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1577, 1579 (Oct. 27, 1972)(President Nixon issued a
Memorandum of Disapproval stating that the bill would change the emphasis of
the Rehabilitation Program from vocational to non-vocational objectives and
would have a prohibitive cost).
29 The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare (now the Labor and
Human Resources Committee) was charged with responsibility for redrafting the
Rehabilitation Act. R. SCOTCH, supra note 22, at 45. The committee was one of
the most liberal and activist in Congress during this period. Id. The Committee
on Education and Labor had similar responsibilities in the House of Representa-
tives. Id. Several provisions in the bill originated in the Senate Subcommittee on
the Handicapped of the Committee of Labor and Public Welfare. Id. at 46. Mem-
bers of the subcommittee included Jennings Randolph, Harrison Williams, Alan
Cranston, Jacob Javits, and Robert Stafford. Id. All of the members and their
staff were moderately liberal. Id. John Brademas and Albert Quie were the re-
spective Congressmen involved with the bill in the House. Id.
.0 S. 7, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 5901 (1973). A Congressional
member usually introduces a bill and hearings are subsequently held to gather
information and expert opinion. R. SCOTCH, supra note 22, at 45. After the hear-
ings, the staff members typically redraft the bill in light of the results of the hear-
ings. Id.
-1 R. SCOTCH, supra note 22, at 46-49. See also supra note 29 for a discussion of
those congressmen involved with the bill. Due to the great conflict between the
Nixon Administration and Congress, "Congress was willing and often eager to
throw down a liberal gauntlet." R. SCOTCH, supra note 22, at 47. Many of the
social and economic costs of such sweeping legislation were deemphasized be-
cause of the great potential for the handicapped to make giant strides in ending
discrimination. Id. at 48. One Congressional staff member responsible for much
of the bill stated:
I'll tell you the frame of mind we all had. We had lived for three
years under Richard Nixon, and under being told no, no, no, no, no,
by an executive branch which was totally unresponsive to the pro-
grams of the sixties, and to the things that were still felt important
during that time of the seventies by a vast majority of the Congress
... . We were angry at the Nixon Administration, and we wanted
to do everything we could to do as much as we could to help people.
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bill to the President in 1973, and the President signed it
into law.3
The stated purpose of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
was to provide equal rights to handicapped people. The
Rehabilitation Act shifted the purposes of the rehabilita-
tion program from training the handicapped for employ-
ment to promoting independent living for those
handicapped individuals who might never work.3 4 Con-
gress expressed its desire that the rehabilitation program
become more responsive to those with severe handi-
caps.3 5 Therefore, the Rehabilitation Act expressly in-
cluded the severely handicapped in its various
programs. 6
Whether it be disabled people, minorities, poor people, you name it.
Even the middle class ....
Id. at 48 (statement of Nik Edes, staff member to Senator Harrison Williams).
After amendment, S. 7, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 5901 (1973), Con-
gress returned the bill to the President, who vetoed the bill again for economic
reasons. S. Doc. No. 10, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076, 2087. President Nixon stated that the program would
cost over one billion dollars at a time when the federal budget was alarmingly
high. Id. at 1-2, 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2088-90. The President
also stated that the regulations would be duplicative and would blur the lines of
authority over vocational rehabilitation. Id. at 1-2, 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 2088-90.
32 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973)(codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as Rehabilitation
Act].
33 S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6373. Estimates of the number of physically and mentally handi-
capped then ranged from twenty-eight to fifty million. Id. at 50, 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6400.
.4 S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076, 2092. The word "vocational" was dropped from the
title "Vocational Rehabilitation Act" to emphasize this change in the statute's pur-
pose. Id. See also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
-1 S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2092.
.- Title I of the Rehabilitation Act provides for vocational rehabilitation serv-
ices. Rehabilitation Act, supra note 32, §§ 100-30, 87 Stat. at 363-74. Each state
must designate an agency primarily concerned with the rehabilitation of handi-
capped individuals. Id. § 101(a), 87 Stat. at 363-64. This title also provides for
other required state actions. Id. § 101, 87 Stat. at 363-68. The scope of voca-
tional rehabilitation services was broadened to include follow-up services and an
individualized written rehabilitation program. Id. § 102, 87 Stat. at 368. Title II
provides for research and training with an emphasis on biomedical engineering
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In 1974, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act, 37
strengthening programs for the blind 38 and providing for
a White House Conference on the problems that handi-
capped individuals face. 9 Most importantly, Congress
changed the definition of "handicapped individual" from
a definition that spoke in terms of employment to a
broader definition not limited to employment.4 °
Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act again in
1978,"t authorizing federal grants to the states for the es-
tablishment of comprehensive rehabilitation centers to
provide information and assistance to those entities re-
quired to comply with the Rehabilitation Act.42 Congress
also provided enforcement mechanisms for the victims of
handicapped discrimination.43
B. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits
discrimination against the handicapped in programs re-
ceiving federal financial assistance. 44 Staff members re-
and technological research. Id. §§ 200-04, 87 Stat. at 374-77. Title III contains
special programs aimed at target groups of handicapped people not carried out by
the states. For example, specific provisions concern migratory agricultural work-
ers, deaf individuals, and individuals with spinal cord injuries. Id. §§ 300-06, 87
Stat. at 377-85. Title IV deals with administration of the act and program and
project evaluation. Id. §§ 400-07, 87 Stat. at 385-90. Title V repealed the existing
Vocational Rehabilitation Act and provided for miscellaneous matters such as the
creation of the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board,
which was created to insure compliance with federal statutes abolishing architec-
tural barriers. Id. §§ 500-04, 87 Stat. at 390-94.
.7 Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617.
" Id. §§ 200-11, 88 Stat. at 1622-31. Congress amended the Randolph-Shep-
pard Act of 1936 by enhancing the ability of blind persons to operate vending
stands. Id. §§ 201-06, 88 Stat. at 1622-28.
.' Id. §§ 300-06, 88 Stat. at 1631-34.
40 Id. § 111, 88 Stat. at 1619. Congress also added language defining "qualified
handicapped individual." See supra note 9.
4 Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities
Amendment of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955.
42 29 U.S.C. § 775(a)(1) (1982).
4-4 Courts were permitted to award attorney's fees in litigation enforcing Title
V. Id. § 794a(a). Remedies afforded under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 were merged into the Rehabilitation Act. Id.
4 Section 504, supra note 2. See supra text accompanying note 2 for precise
language of section 504.
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sponsible for making revisions to the vetoed
Rehabilitation Bill 45 perceived that the Rehabilitation Act
would be ineffective if rehabilitated handicapped individu-
als could not enter "the mainstream of society. ' ' 4 6 The
staff members agreed that the Rehabilitation Act should
contain a provision prohibiting discrimination against the
handicapped in federally assisted programs. 47 Roy Mil-
lenson, a member of Senator Jacob Javits' staff, borrowed
language from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and the
staff members drafting the bill inserted this wording in
section 504.48 Staff members avoided the current practice
of promulgating detailed regulations and instead sought
simplicity in drafting section 504.49
Throughout both presidential vetoes,5 0 section 504 re-
mained virtually untouched by Congressional debate and
Presidential comment.5' Congress did not discuss its im-
45 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the presiden-
tial vetoes of the Rehabilitation Bill. Staff members had a large amount of discre-
tion in making revisions to the bill. See supra note 30.
4r R. SCOTCH, supra note 22, at 51. Staff members were concerned that negative
attitudes and discrimination would block the goal of rehabilitation of providing
the handicapped with a means to enter society. Id.
47 Id. at 52.
48 "Roy Millenson. . .had been involved in the development of the Education
Amendments, and he ran out to his office and brought back language from Title
VI." Id. Title VI states that "no person in the United States shall, on the grounds
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance." Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, Pub. L. No.
88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982)) [hereinafter cited as
Title VII.
Title IX states that "no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901(a), 86
Stat..373 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982)) [hereinafter cited as Title IX].
See supra text accompanying note 2 for similar language of section 504. See also
Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered. Ensuring Equal Opportunity IWithout
Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 401, 403-04 n.5 (1984).
41, R. SCOTCH, supra note 22, at 58.
- See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Presi-
dent's vetoes of the Rehabilitation Act.
.1 R. SCOTCH, supra note 22, at 53. Section 504 had a low political profile, so
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pact; neither did it project any public expenditures.5
One commentator noted, "in short, there was nothing to
indicate what Congress had intended when it had passed
Section 504."1 Either Congress was not aware of section
504's existence, or thought the section merely stated a
broad, idealistic goal. 4 Section 504's low political profile
enabled it to pass Congress and the President unscathed
because Congress and the President would probably not
have passed a controversial, detailed antidiscrimination
provision. 5
C. The CAB's Regulations Implementing Section 504
Unlike Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196456 and
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 57 section
504 did not provide for its implementation.58 In 1976,
the President directed HEW to coordinate the implemen-
tation of section 504 by all federal agencies. 59 A court or-
der spurred HEW into action, and HEW published
Congress probably overlooked its importance. Id. See infra note 54 and accompa-
nying text.
- R. SCOTCH, supra note 22, at 53.
53 Id.
- Id. at 54.
55 See id. at 53-54.
56 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982) for implementation provision of the Civil
Rights Act.
57 See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982) for implementation provision of education an-
tidiscrimination program.
-" Wegner, supra note 48, at 411. Other provisions of the Rehabilitation Act
provide for their own implementation, making this omission a probable oversight
by the original drafters. Id. at 411 n.25; See also R. SCOTCH, supra note 22, at 67.
Also, enforcement by termination of funds was mentioned as in Titles VI and IX.
Wegner, supra note 48, at 411 n.25.
-11 Exec. Order No. 11,914, supra note 1. Congress divided HEW into 2 agen-
cies in 1979, the Department of Education and the Department of Health and
Human Services. Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88,
§ 201, 93 Stat. 668 (1979). The Department of Health and Human Services had
responsibility for section 504's implementation until the Department of Justice
assumed section 504's implementation and enforcement. Exec. Order No.
12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982).
- Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976). The plaintiffs brought
suit to compel HEW to issue regulations implementing section 504. Id. at 923.
HEW argued that section 504 did not imply a duty to promulgate regulations. Id.
The court disagreed with HEW on the basis of legislative history indicating that
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regulations in 1977.61 In 1978, HEW issued guidelines
for the implementation of section 50462 which most fed-
eral agencies have followed in drafting their own rules. 63
The CAB, a governmental agency required to comply
with section 504, initiated its rulemaking proceedings on
June 6, 1979 with the issuance of its Proposed Rule.64
Congress intended that the government implement section 504 swiftly. Id. at 924.
The court did not establish a deadline but retained continuing jurisdiction to en-
sure section 504's swift implementation. Id.
- See 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 (1985). HEW provisions establish regulations in the ar-
eas of employment; program accessibility; preschool, elementary, and secondary
education; post-secondary education; and health, welfare, and social services. See
id. There was a four year span from enactment of the Rehabilition Act until
HEW's regulations took effect.
62 Implementation of Executive Order 11,914, Nondiscrimination on the Basis
of Handicap in Federally Assisted Programs, 43 Fed. Reg. 2132, 2137
(1978)(codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 41 (1985)).
63 Wegner, supra note 48, at 417 n.42 (citing as examples 5 C.F.R. § 900.701
(1985)(Office of Personnel Management); 10 C.F.R. § 4.101 (1985)(Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission); 10 C.F.R. § 1040.61 (1985)(Department of Energy); 13
C.F.R. § 113.1 (1985)(Small Business Administration)).
- Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Part 382, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Handicap, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,401 (1979)(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382). The
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) governs the rulemaking proceedings
for federal administrative agencies. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1982). An administrative
agency may publish an advance notice of proposed rulemaking to alert interested
parties. J. O'REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: STRUCTURING, OPPOSING, AND
DEFENDING FEDERAL AGENCY REGULATIONS 72 (1983). The advance notice is not
required by the APA but helps to expose the agency's ideas to the public with little
commitment by the agency. Id. at 72-73. The advance notice encourages public
input and is kind of a "nebulous request for ideas." Id. at 73-74.
Regardless of whether a federal agency publishes an advance notice of pro-
posed rulemaking, it must publish a proposed rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). Generally,
the proposed rule is published in the Federal Register. Id. The proposed rule is
prefaced by a preamble which explains the rule. Id. The preamble contains de-
tailed facts and data and often the objectives of the proposed rule. J. O'REILLY,
supra, at 77. The text of the proposed rule will normally follow the preamble,
although the exact terms of the new rule are not required to appear in the pro-
posed rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3). SeeJ. O'REILLY, supra, at 75. The purpose of
the proposed rule is to notify potential commenters of the agency's possible ac-
tion. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1946).
Interested parties have a minimum of 30 days after the proposed rule is pub-
lished to file comments. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d). The agency may allow a longer pe-
riod. Id. Interested parties must file comments by letter, brief or other means
generally in the form of a factual presentation rather than a petition of signatures.
J. O'REILLY, supra, at 92, 95-96. The agency drafting the rules must consider all
material facts and issues presented to it, but the agency is not required to respond
to the comments. Id. at 93.
After the deadline for comments passes, the agency composes its final rule.
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The CAB, however, only issued its Proposed Rule after
the National Federation of the Blind filed a petition for
rulemaking,6 5 and HEW66 and the White House 67 pres-
sured the CAB. Additionally, a district court ordered the
CAB to notify all federally-subsidized air carriers that
those carriers must comply with section 504.68
The CAB initially applied its Proposed Rule to all certif-
icated air carriers69 using aircraft having more than thirty
seats. 70 Therefore, all of the larger commercial airlines
were subject to the regulations. The airlines and the
handicapped commented on the Proposed Rule, 7' and the
CAB issued its Final Rule in 1982.72 In promulgating its
The preamble in the final rule must be a concise statement of the basis and pur-
pose of the rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). If the agency has written a preamble that
clearly states the need for the rule and the objectives of the agency, the rule will
be less susceptible to invalidation through judicial review. J. O'REILLY, supra, at
137-138. The statement of the final rule generally contains a subsection on scope,
a subsection on definitions, the actual regulations, plus miscellaneous provisions.
Id. at 142. Only the mandates of the agency are enforceable, not the prefatory
material. Id. at 143. After the final rule is published in the Federal Register, it is
codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, where it is effective as law until modified
or withdrawn by the agency, or invalidated by a federal court. 44 U.S.C. § 1510
(1982); 1 C.F.R. § 8.1 (1985). See alsoJ. O'REILV, supra, at 141.
*' Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Part 382, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Handicap, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,401 (1979)(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382).
66 HEW Secretary Joseph Califano wrote a letter to the CAB in 1979 urging it
to expedite its rulemaking proceedings. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 752 F.2d. at
697 n.12.
67 In 1980, the White House formally requested that the CAB fulfill its section
504 obligations. Id.
- Id. (citing Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Smith, No. 79-1979 (C.D. Cal.
July 2, 1981)). See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, Final Rule, 47
Fed. Reg. 25,936, 25,948 (1982)(codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382 (1985)).
,;I, See infra note 170 for a definition of "exclusive operating certificate."
7' Proposed Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. at 32,402. See supra notes 7-12 for example
provisions of the Proposed Rule.
71 See supra note 13 for sample comments made by the airlines and the
handicapped.
72 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, Final Rule, 47 Reg. 25,936
(1982)(codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382 (1985)). The Final Rule, like the Proposed
Rule, is comprised of three subparts. 14 C.F.R. pt. 382, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,948-
50. Subpart A contains the general provisions of the act such as definitions and a
general prohibition against discrimination. Id. §§ 382.1-382.5, 47 Fed. Reg. at
25,948. Subpart B contains specific guidlines concerning the availability of infor-
mation to the handicapped, refusal of service, guide dogs and personal equip-
ment, and availability of service and equipment. Id. §§ 382.10-382.15, 47 Fed.
Reg. at 25,948-50. See supra note 15 for a discussion of some of the specific guid-
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Final Rule, the CAB reversed its position regarding large
carriers and concluded that the only airlines subject to the
specific requirements of the Final Rule 73 were those
smaller airlines receiving direct federal financial assist-
ance under sections 406 or 419 of the Federal Aviation
Act.7 4 Ironically, the only carriers required to comply
with the specific regulations of the Final Rule were those
smaller carriers exempted by the CAB under the Pro-
posed Rule.75
D. The Application of Section 504-What Constitutes Federal
Financial Assistance
Section 504 applies only to "any program or activity re-
lines. Subpart C, the compliance section, enumerates the procedures taken when
a carrier does not comply with the regulations and states the consequences for
noncompliance. 14 C.F.R. §§ 382.20-382.25, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,950. Noncom-
pliance may result in termination of federal financial assistance. Id. § 382.25, 47
Fed. Reg. at 25,950.
Under the CAB's Final Rule only those carriers receiving direct subsidies under
sections 406 or 419 of the Federal Aviation Act are subject to the requirements of
subparts B and C. 14 C.F.R. §§ 382.10, 382.20, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,948, 25,950.
See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of those carriers af-
fected by subparts B and C. The general provisions of subpart A apply to all
certificated air carriers in addition to those enumerated under subparts B and C.
14 C.F.R. § 382.2, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,948.
73 See supra note 15 for a discussion of some of the specific requirements of the
CAB's Final Rule.
74 See 14 C.F.R. § 382.10, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937-38, 25,948. Under section 406
of the Federal Aviation Act, the federal government pays certain airlines to trans-
port mail. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1376(c) (West Supp. 1985). Section 419 allows subsidies
to small carriers for providing essential air service to small communities. 49
U.S.C.A. §§ 1389(a)(5), (b)(6) (West Supp. 1985).
The large carriers were only subject to the general provisions of the Final Rule,
while the smaller carriers were subject to the strict regulations regarding refusal
of service and availability of service and equipment for the handicapped. 14
C.F.R. § 382.10, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937-38, 25,948-49. The larger carriers were
also not subject to the sanctions for failure to comply with the Final Rule. See id.
§ 382.20, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937-39, 25,950. See supra note 15 for changes in the
substantive aspects of the Final Rule from the Proposed Rule.
, Paralyzed Veterans of America, 752 F.2d at 705-706. Thus, the CAB had made a
one hundred eighty degree turn from its original position because initially the
CAB applied the regulations only to larger airlines. See Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, Part 382, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 44 Fed. Reg.
32,401, 32,402 (1979)(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382). See also Paralyzed 'eter-
ans of America, 752 F.2d at 715.
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ceiving federal financial assistance. ' 76 Federal financial
assistance is defined as:
[A]ny grant, loan, contract (other than a procurement con-
tract or a contract of insurance or guaranty), or any other
arrangement by which the Department [of Transporta-
tion] provides or otherwise makes available assistance in
the form of: (1) Funds; (2) Services of Federal personnel;
or (3) Real or personal property or any interest in, or use
of such property.
77
Direct disbursement to a program or activity automati-
cally brings that program within the scope of section
504.78 Since the government may only regulate the spe-
cific program or activity receiving federal financial assist-
ance, 79 the recurring question is whether an entity
receives federal financial assistance when the government
indirectly provides financial assistance to that entity.80
Courts have discussed several types of such indirect fed-
eral financial assistance including licenses and favorable
tax treatment, as well as indirect grants of federal
monies.
1. Licenses
Government agencies have argued that the great finan-
cial benefit conferred upon recipients of federal licenses
should be considered financial assistance within the pur-
view of section 504, although licenses admittedly do not
constitute direct financial assistance. In Gottfried v. Federal
76 Section 504, supra note 2.
77 49 C.F.R. § 27.5 (1984). See supra text accompanying note 2 for section 504
language conditioning receipt of federal funds upon compliance with section 504.
71 See supra notes 2, 77 and accompanying text.
71, See infra notes 152-155, 163-164 and accompanying text.
Ko Wegner, supra note 48, at 409.
81 Types of direct federal financial assistance, defined supra at text accompany-
ing note 77, may become indirect assistance if the government does not provide
the assistance initially to the activity it seeks to regulate. See infra notes 157-167
and accompanying text. For example, scholarships, although provided directly to
students, indirectly assist the financial aid office of a college. See infra notes 157-
161 and accompanying text.
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Communications Commission (FCC),82 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a govern-
ment-provided broadcast license to a television station
does not constitute federal financial assistance under sec-
tion 504.83 The plaintiff claimed that certain television
stations discriminated against the hearing impaired.84 In
order to bring the television station under section 504's
antidiscrimination regulations, the plaintiff argued that
the government financially assisted broadcasters by giving
the television stations valuable broadcast licenses for
free.8 5 The Gottfried court acknowledged that the great de-
mand for broadcast licenses made them extremely valua-
ble, sometimes exceeding $1.5 million in value.86 The
court also noted Supreme Court Justice Brennan's dissent
in Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Com-
mittee,8 7 where the Justice argued that the government ef-
fectively subsidizes a broadcaster when it gives a radio
station a free license. 88 However, the Gottfried court held
that Congress did not intend broadcast licenses to consti-
tute financial assistance. 9 In examining the relevant con-
gressional hearings and floor debates, the court found no
reference to federal licenses as financial assistance. 90 The
82 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev"d on other grounds sub. nom. Community Tel-
evision v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498 (1983). In the discussion that follows, cases
concerning federal financial assistance under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 are included because of
the virtual identity of Titles VI, IX and section 504. See, e.g., Brown v. Sibley, 650
F.2d 760, 767-68 (5th Cir. 1981)(comparing section 504 to Titles VI and IX);
Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1280-81 (7th Cir. 1977)(compar-
ing section 504 to Title VI). See also supra note 48 for a comparison of the lan-
guage in Titles VI, IX, and section 504.
83 Gottfried, 655 F.2d at 300-01.
94 Id. at 304.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 312 n.55. The court emphasized the fact that the FCC granted a lim-
ited number of licenses. Id. This limited supply of licenses greatly increased the
value of stations who possessed them because a station cannot operate unli-
censed. See id.
"7 412 U.S. 94, 170 (1973)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
s, Id. at 174 n.5.
89' Gottied, 655 F.2d at 312.
s" Id. at 313. The court examined congressional hearings and floor debates,
and none of the speakers had referred to licenses as financial assistance. Id.
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court also noted that the Justice Department excluded re-
cipients of broadcast licenses from its list of programs re-
ceiving federal financial assistance under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act. 9' Furthermore, the court relied on a
statement by the Justice Department that licenses are not
considered federal financial assistance.92 The absence of
any government-issued directives ordering commercial
broadcasters to follow section 504 also indicated that
Congress did not intend broadcasters to follow section
504.93 Based on the foregoing findings, the court con-
cluded that licenses were not regarded as establishing
property rights covered under section 504.94 Thus, re-
ceipt of a license did not constitute receipt of federal fi-
nancial assistance.95
2. Favorable Tax Treatment
In deciding whether certain indirect benefits constitute
federal financial assistance, some courts have defined
favorable tax treatment as federal financial assistance. 96
These courts have reasoned that if the government did
not provide tax deductions for a particular program, the
government would either have to fund the program di-
ll, Id. The Justice Department is the agency that now coordinates the imple-
mentation of section 504. Exec. Order No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1980). See also
supra note 59.
2 Gottfried, 655 F.2d at 314 n.65 (citing Nondiscrimination Based on Handicap
in Federally Assisted Programs-Implementation of Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 and Executive Order 11,914, 45 Fed. Reg. 37,620, 37,632
(1980)).
!,, Gottfried, 655 F.2d at 314.
1,4 Id. See supra text accompanying note 77 for the delineation of property rights
as federal financial assistance.
ws 655 F.2d at 314. Accord Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, 742 F.2d 1202, 1212 (9th
Cir. 1984)(holding that airline's operating certificate is not federal financial
assistance).
:": See e.g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 103 S. Ct. 2017,
2028 (1983)(holding that a private school may not maintain its tax-exempt status
if it has a racially discriminatory policy); Regan v. Taxation With Representation
of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 103 S. Ct. 1997, 2000 (1983)(stating that a tax de-
duction has the same effect as a cash payment); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F.
Supp. 448,462 (D.D.C. 1972)(fraternal society fell within Civil Rights Acts regula-
tions by virtue of certain tax benefits).
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rectly or run the program itself.9 7 Not all tax benefits,
however, constitute federal financial assistance.98 Courts
must determine the relationship of the tax deduction to
the nature of the program or activity receiving financial
aid,99 and favorable tax treatment may constitute federal
financial assistance only if the nature of the deduction is
sufficiently similar to the nature of the activity sought to
be regulated. 00 Therefore, the courts must first deter-
mine whether the tax assistance is fundamental to the op-
eration of the program in question.' 0' This determination
will guide the court in deciding if the tax assistance consti-
tutes federal financial assistance to that program.
In McGlotten v. Connally,10 2 a black man brought suit
claiming that a fraternal, nonprofit organization discrimi-
nated against him by denying him membership. I'0 The
District Court for the District of Columbia held that since
the government allowed taxpayers a deduction for chari-
table contributions, the entities receiving the charitable
contributions received federal financial assistance by vir-
tue of the tax incentives. '0" Thus, the fraternal society fell
within the ambit of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.105 For
purposes of determining whether the entity received fed-
eral financial assistance, the court held that the manner of
distributing the funds was not as important as the purpose
97 See infra notes 98-118 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reason-
ing used in McGlotten, Bob Jones and Regan.
!I See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
Co In the McGlotten court's words, "the deductions provided in the [Internal
Revenue] Code are not all cut from the same cloth. Most relate primarily to the
operation of the tax itself, and thus would not constitute a grant of federal finan-
cial assistance." McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 461 (D.D.C. 1972),
discussed infra notes 102-107 and accompanying text.
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
Id. at 450. The by-laws of the organization expressly limited membership to
white males. Id. at 450 n.I.
1,4 Id. at 461, 462. The court stated that Congress had merely chosen the tax
code as the funding mechanism instead of using direct payments to the organiza-
tion. Id. at 458.
"' Id. at 461.
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of the deduction.' 6 The court carefully noted that most
of the tax deductions or exclusions such as accelerated de-
preciation and the interest deduction are related to the
operation of the tax itself rather than the operation of a
particular program or entity.10 7
Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Bob Jones
University v. United States'0 8 and Regan v. Taxation with Repre-
sentation of Washington'0 9 decided the similar issue of
whether discriminatory nonprofit organizations could
achieve tax-exempt status. Bob Jones involved a university
denied tax-exempt status because of its racially discrimi-
natory admissions policy." ' The Supreme Court affirmed
the Court of Appeals' denial of tax-exempt status, reason-
ing that public policy prohibited government subsidation
of schools that discriminate."' The court determined
that the tax benefits provided to the school had the same
effect as a subsidy; thus, the court denied tax-exempt sta-
tus." 2 The concern for the welfare of the general public
dictated a policy against government subsidation of racial
discrimination.' '3
Regan also involved a nonprofit organization seeking
tax-exempt status."14 The Internal Revenue Service con-
tended that a substantial portion of the plaintiff's activities
constituted attempts to influence legislation, resulting in
non tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue
Code. ' 5 The Supreme Court again emphasized that tax
exemptions and deductions are a type of government sub-
sidy having the same effect as a direct cash payment." 6 In
I()( Id.
'"1 Id. See supra note 100.
461 U.S. 574, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
461 U.S. 540, 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983).
Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2019-20. Bob Jones University denied admission to
applicants "engaged in an interracial marriage or known to advocate interracial
marriage or dating." Id. at 2020.
,, Id. at 2028-29, 2036.
12 Id.
1 Id. at 2028.
11, Regen, 103 S. Ct. at 1999.
Id. See I.R.C. § 162(e) (1982).
Regan, 103 S. Ct. at 2000.
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denying tax-exempt status, the court reasoned that Con-
gress did not intend to subsidize lobbying organizations
as extensively as those nonprofit organizations promoting
the public welfare." t 7  Although the federal financial
assistance issue was not before the Supreme Court in Bob
Jones and Regan, both cases support the general proposi-
tion that tax assistance can be a subsidy to an organization
receiving the tax benefits if directly related to that pro-
gram's purpose."'
3. An Example of Indirect Financial Assistance to Commercial
Airlines-Angel v. Pan American World Airways
Subsequent to section 504's passage, cases arose chal-
lenging its application to commercial airlines.' 19 Angel v.
Pan American World Airways1 20 presented the issue of
whether a commercial air carrier was subject to CAB regu-
lations on the transportation of handicapped individuals
by virtue of its indirect receipt of federal financial
assistance. 121
In Angel, a handicapped plaintiff brought suit against
Pan American World Airways (Pan Am) for wrongfully re-
fusing to provide him with air transportation. 22 Some
time before the plaintiff arrived at the airport, Pan Am as-
sured the plaintiff, who had cerebral palsy, that he could
board their transatlantic flight alone.1 23 At the airport, a
117 Id.
1"8 See supra notes 112,116 and accompanying text. Importantly, the tax exemp-
tions denied the organizations in Bob Jones, Regan and AcGlotten were fundamental
to their operation. BobJones, 103 S. Ct. at 2023; Regan, 103 S. Ct. at 1999; McGlot-
ten, 338 F. Supp. at 450.
'' See, e.g., Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, 742 F.2d 1202, 1211-15 (9th Cir.
1984)(commercial airlines do not receive any indirect federal financial assistance
which would subject them to section 504); Nodelman v. Aero Mexico, 528 F.
Supp. 475, 488-92 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (services of federal air traffic controllers and
federal grants to airports do not constitute federal financial assistance to commer-
cial airlines).
1, 519 F. Supp. 1172 (D.D.C. 1981).
"21 See infra notes 168-236 and accompanying text for further discussion of this
issue.
2"" Angel, 519 F. Supp. at 1175-76.
1'. Id. at 1176.
755
756 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
Pan Am employee informed him that an attendant must
accompany him, even though the plaintiff had a medical
certificate from his doctor stating that he could travel
alone. 12 4 In seeking to bring Pan Am within section 504's
prohibition of discrimination against the handicapped,
the plaintiff argued that the airline received federal finan-
cial assistance through the government's provision of air
traffic controllers and subsidies to airports.1 25
The Angel court rejected both of the plaintiff's argu-
ments.' 26 The court concluded that the definition of fed-
eral financial assistance only contemplates direct
recipients of federal funds and that services of federal air
traffic controllers and federal funding of airports were
both forms of indirect financial assistance not within the
reach of section 504.127 The court relied on Gottfried128
and cases in other districts 29 to reach this direct funding
requirement. Thus, the Angel court's primary considera-
tion in determining whether an activity received financial
assistance is whether the government makes direct pay-
ments to that activity. 130
,2 Id. Under the Proposed Rule, a handicapped passenger with a medical cer-
tificate was to be allowed to board absent compelling evidence to the contrary.
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Part 382, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Handicap, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,401, 32,406 (1979)(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt.
382). The Final Rule dropped this provision. See supra note 15.
12 519 F. Supp. at 1178. Plaintiff contended that the provision of air traffic
controllers was a provision of federal services of federal personnel and that fed-
eral grants to airports were a provision of federal funds to the airlines. Id. See
supra text accompanying note 77 for the definition of "federal financial
assistance."
12,; 519 F. Supp. at 1178.
127 Id.
'12 See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gottfried.
212 519 F. Supp. at 1178 (citing Simpson v. Reynolds Metal Co., 629 F.2d 1226
(7th Cir. 1980)(holding that financial aid to one part of a business does not bring
entire business within scope of section 504); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F.
Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977)(holding that since government contractor had not
received federal financial assistance since effective date of section 504, section 504
does not bind contractor), aff'd, 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 889 (1980). See alsoJacobson v. Delta Airlines, 742 F.2d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir.
1984)(holding that federal airport grants and federal air traffic controllers do not
constitute federal assistance), cert. dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 2129 (1985).
519 F. Supp. at 1178. The court stated its position:
Subsidies to airports to be sure, subject those locales to the broad
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E. Recent Court Decisions Defining the Scope of Federal
Financial Assistance
Though part of a program may come under federal reg-
ulation because it receives federal financial assistance, the
government may not control the remaining portion of the
program that does not receive federal financial assist-
ance.' In other words, the ability of the government to
control activities through the provision of financial assist-
ance extends only to the "program or activity" actually
receiving federal financial assistance.' 32
proscription of Section 504, but this does not translate into binding
law upon the users of the airports, whether they be commercial air-
lines or individual passengers. To hold that commercial airlines fall
within Section 504 merely because of assistance provided to airports
would expand improperly the accepted proposition that Section 504
is limited to direct recipients of federal funds.
Id.
131 See infra notes 148-166 and accompanying text.
132 In addition to restricting the definition of federal financial assistance, consti-
tutional provisions may limit Congress' power to condition disbursement upon
compliance with federal programs. Noting the trend toward increased federal
control over government-subsidized actitivies, one commentator expressed the
fear that Congress may seek the power to control those activities left to state con-
trol by the Constitution. Comment, The Federal Conditional Spending Power: A Search
for Limits, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 293 (1975). The United States Constitution limits
Congress' ability to regulate only those matters named in the Constitution.
U.S. CONST. amend. IX states that "the enumeration in the constitution of cer-
tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 for enumeration of the congressional
taxing power. The states are to regulate all matters other than these "enumerated
powers." U.S. CONST. amend. X states that "the powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people." "[F]or example, Congress could con-
ceivably go so far as to require that grants for highway construction be made only
to states which decriminalize the use of marijuana." Comment, supra, at 294. In
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), the Supreme Court stated that article I,
section 8 did give Congress the right to tax and appropriate money for the gen-
eral welfare. Id. at 65-66. Both the majority and dissent agreed that this "power of
the purse" must be limited to keep Congress from infringing on state powers. Id.
at 87. The dissent argued that the conditions upon which the disbursement rests
should be reasonably related to the purposes of the federal aid. Id. at 85-86.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have expanded Congress' power to condition
disbursement of federal funds upon compliance with federal regulations, so con-
stitutionality does not appear to be an issue in Paralyzed Veterans ofAmerica. See, e.g.,
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)(holding that Social Security
tax did not involve an unconstitutional attempt to coerce the States to adopt un-
employment compensation approved by the federal government); Helvering v.
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Courts have taken various approaches to defining the
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
The various approaches can be classified as the direct
funding approach,133 the institutional approach,1 34 or the
infection theory. 35 The direct funding approach limits
the definition of "program or activity" to those actually
receiving direct disbursement from the federal govern-
ment. 136 The approach is based on a restrictive reading of
the statute prohibiting discrimination in any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance. 3 7 This di-
rect funding view argues also that financial assistance indi-
rectly provided by the federal government will not
constitute federal financial assistance to the program for
the purpose of determining whether the program is sub-
ject to antidiscrimination regulations. 3 8 Thus, under the
Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937)(upholding sections of the Social Security Act dealing
with conditional tax credits and appropriations); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563
(1974)(San Francisco school system ordered to provide English language instruc-
tion to Chinese students or lose federal funding).
1.4 See infra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
'-1 See infra notes 139-144 and accompanying text.
3.5 See infra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., Hillsdale College v. HEW, 696 F.2d 418, 430 (6th Cir. 1982)(receipt
of student aid funds subjected only the student grant and loan progam to Title
IX); University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 332 (E.D. Va. 1982)(the
fact that general budget of school provided funds received from federal govern-
ment to athletic department did not subject athletic department to Title IX);
Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp 1376, 1387, 1389 (E.D. Mich.
1981)(holding that federal government could not terminate funds given to a uni-
versity because of sex discrimination in athletic program since no funds were
earmarked for athletic program), afd on other grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir.
1983); cf. Steward v. New York Univ., 430 F. Supp. 1305, 1314 (S.D.N.Y.
1976)(holding that the federal government may only terminate aid to the particu-
lar program that discriminates). See Note, The Program-Specific Reach of Title IX, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 1210, 1213-15 (1983) for a discussion of the direct funding ap-
proach. See also Angel, discussed supra notes 120-130 and accompanying text, for
delineation of the direct funding theory under the CAB's rules implementing sec-
tion 504.
1-11 See supra text accompanying note 2 for the pertinent language of section 504.
The debate is essentially over the meaning of the phrase "program or activity".
Some suggest that only direct recipients of federal aid must comply with the stat-
ute while others argue that Congress contemplated indirect recipients of federal
aid to be covered by section 504. See supra notes 127-130, 136 and accompanying
text.
'1" Indirect assistance is that aid not provided directly to a program or activity,
but provided to another program which results in a substantial benefit to the indi-
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direct funding approach only those programs receiving
direct aid from the federal government are subject to the
mandates of the antidiscrimination statutes.
Another means for determining the scope of federal fi-
nancial assistance is the institutional approach. 3 9 Under
this approach, any financial aid given to a portion of an
entity subjects the entire entity to coverage.' 40  Propo-
nents of this theory argue that non-earmarked aid (gen-
eral aid to the entire institution) benefits the entire
institution, thus making it a recipient of federal financial
assistance. 41 Indirect aid also qualifies as financial assist-
ance under this approach.' 42 "Program or activity" under
this approach is a broad phrase limited only to those pro-
grams benefiting from the federal assistance.' 4  The only
real question under this approach is "who receives the
benefits, directly or indirectly, of the federal funds?" The
answer to that question constitutes the program or activ-
ity receiving federal financial assistance under the institu-
tional theory. 144
The infection theory contends that the government may
only terminate federally-provided funds if the program
uses those funds in a discriminatory manner or if the
rect recipient. See infra notes 157-166 and accompanying text for an example of
indirect federal financial assistance to a university's financial aid program through
federally-provided scholarships.
1'.9 See Note, supra note 136, at 1212, 1215-17.
140 See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 700 (3d Cir. 1982), rev'd,
104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984), discussed infra notes 157-166 and accompanying text.
14 687 F.2d at 695.
142 Id. at 700.
143 See id at 695-96.
'44 In Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d
14 (3d Cir. 1982), the District Court held that an institution should not be able to
circumvent antidiscrimination laws by transferring money from a program receiv-
ing federal financial assistance to a program that does not receive federal financial
assistance. 524 F. Supp. at 538-39. The court concluded that Congress intended a
broad interpretation of "federal financial assistance." Id. at 536-37. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court, relying heavily on the Third Circuit's decision
in Grove City. 688 F.2d at 16. Since the Supreme Court recently reversed the
Third Circuit's decision in Grove City, see infra notes 157-166 and accompanying
text, the institutional theory is no longer acceptable for determining the scope of
assistance the government provides to a program.
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funds "support a program which is infected by a discrimi-
natory environment."'' 45 One key tenet of this theory is
that the tgovernment may only terminate the aid to the
program that is discriminatory or "infected by a discrimi-
natory environment."'' 46 Thus, the government may not
terminate federal aid to nondiscriminatory activities be-
cause another program in the same institution is discrimi-
natory, unless a discriminatory environment exists. 47 The
infection theory is thus somewhat of a compromise be-
tween the direct funding and institutional theories.
Although courts have not specifically referred to the
aforementioned theories by name, a discussion of them is
helpful to note the wide range of possible definitions for
program or activity.
Two recent decisions by the United States Supreme
Court have addressed the scope of federal financial assist-
ance. In North Haven Board of Education v. Bell,'48 two
school teachers brought actions claiming discrimination
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.'
41
Both school boards received federal funds directly from
the government, but the school boards challenged HEW's
authority to issue regulations governing their employ-
,45 Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). For ex-
ample, "if discriminatory practices in one division, such as admissions, infect the
entire university with a discriminatory environment, then all federal aid should be
terminated." Note, Title VI, Title X, and the Private University: Defining "Recipient"
and "Program or Part Thereof", 78 MIcH. L. REV. 608, 624 (1980).
14(1 Finch, 414 F.2d at 1078. The reason for determining the program actually
engaging in discriminatory practices is that Title VI limits the termination of fed-
eral financial assistance to "the particular program, or part thereof, in which such
noncompliance has been so found." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1982).
147 The court in Finch reasoned that "the purpose of limiting the termination
power to 'activities which are actually discriminatory or segregated' was not for
the protection of the political entity whose funds might be cut off, but for the
protection of the innocent beneficiaries of programs not tainted by discriminatory
practices." 414 F.2d at 1075.
14s 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
14,, Id. at 517-18. One teacher alleged that her employer refused to rehire her
after a one year maternity leave. Id. at 517. The other teacher alleged that her
employer had discriminated against her with respect to job assignments, working
conditions, and the failure to renew her contract. Id. at 518. Title IX is similarly
worded to section 504 and is useful to this discussion of federal financial assist-
ance. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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ment practices. °5 0 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit had held that HEW may promulgate antidis-
crimination regulations not limited to the program or ac-
tivity receiving federal funds.' 5 ' The Supreme Court held
that the government's authority to enforce sanctions
against a federally-funded activity only extended to the
specific program that receives financial aid. 152 The court
concluded that Title IX's legislative history supported this
program-specific finding and further compared Title IX to
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which courts have inter-
preted as requiring program specificity.15 3  In addition,
the court noted HEW's interpretation of Title IX as man-
dating program specificity. 154  The Supreme Court did
not, however, define "program or activity.' 55 Nor did
the court define federal financial assistance; leaving open
the question whether indirect aid could bring a program
under federal regulation. 56
The Supreme Court affirmed North Haven's holding in
Grove City College v. Bell. 157 In Grove City, a private college
refused to sign an assurance of compliance with Title
IX. 158 Grove City College did not receive any direct fed-
eral aid, but a large number of its students received Basic
1-5o North Haven, 456 U.S. at 517-18.
v5, North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 785-86 (2d Cir.
1980), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512
(1982).
,.' North Haven, 456 U.S. at 536-38. See supra note 48. "Although we agree with
the Second Circuit's conclusion that Title IX proscribes employment discrimina-
tion in federally funded education programs, we find that the Court of Appeals
paid insufficient attention to the 'program-specific' nature of the statute." 456
U.S. at 536.
51. Id. at 537-38 (citing Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th
Cir. 1969)). Courts have typically applied case law from Title VI to Title IX and
vice versa. See supra note 48 for a comparison of the two titles.
.54 North Haven, 456 U.S. at 539.
155 Id. at 540.
i- Id.
1-57 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
'." Id. at 1214. See supra note 48 for the applicable language of Title IX. Every
educational institution that applies for federal financial assistance must sign an
"assurance of compliance," which states that the institution will not discriminate
on the basis of sex in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
34 C.F.R. §§ 106.1, 106.4 (1985).
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Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOGs) from the gov-
ernment. 5 9 The Supreme Court first held that awarding
BEOGs to students, although indirectly benefiting the fi-
nancial aid office, constituted federal financial assist-
ance.160  The court rejected Grove City College's
argument that Title IX only covered those activities re-
ceiving direct financial assistance from the government
and concluded indirect assistance could constitute federal
financial assistance.' 6' The court cited North Haven and
limited the scope of federal financial assistance to the col-
lege's financial aid department. 62 Although the entire in-
stitution was affected by the BEOGs, only the financial aid
office met the program specific requirements of Title IX
and North Haven.163 The Supreme Court expressed con-
cern that an overly broad definition of program or activity
would subject the entire school to Title IX regulations
merely because one student received a BEOG or a small
earmarked federal grant. 64 The Supreme Court rejected
-9 104 S. Ct. at 1214. A BEOG is a "basic grant that . . . will meet 70 per
centum of a student's cost of [undergraduate] attendance not in excess of $3700."
20 U.S.C. § 1070(a)(1)(B) (1982).
1- 104 S. Ct. at 1217, 1222.
16, The court noted that "there is no basis in the statute [Title IX] for the view
that only institutions that themselves apply for federal aid directly from the fed-
eral government are subject to regulation . . . . As the Court of Appeals ob-
served, 'by its all inclusive terminology [§ 901(a)] appears to encompass all forms
of federal aid to education, direct or indirect.' " Id. at 526. Thus, the court re-
jected the direct funding theory, discussed supra notes 136-138 and accompanying
text.
162 104 S. Ct. at 1222. The court found "no persuasive evidence suggesting
that congress intended that the Department's [of Education] regulatory authority
follow federally aided students from classroom to classroom, building to building,
or activity to activity." Id.
, Id. at 1221-22. Even though some of the BEOGs might supply funds to the
college's general operating budget, student aid resembles earmarked grants only
affecting part of the institution. Id. A non-earmarked grant would affect the en-
tire institution since it is not reserved for any particular program. See id. at 1222.
"' Id. at 1221. The court cautioned that "the fact that federal funds eventually
reach the College's general operating budget cannot subject Grove City to institu-
tion-wide coverage." Id. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in part and
dissented in part, concluding that Congress intended the federal aid to serve as
financial assistance for the whole college. Id. at 1226, 1235-37. Therefore, the
justices reasoned that the entire institution should be covered by the antidis-
crimination regulations. Id. at 1236-37.
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the Court of Appeals' holding that the college's other
programs received federal financial assistance because
BEOGs allowed the college to divert its own financial aid
funds to other areas in the institution. 65 The court em-
phasized that the BEOGs were similar to earmarked
grants and implied that non-earmarked grants may sub-
ject more programs in the institution to federal regulation
since the grant is not reserved for any particular pro-
gram. 16 6 The court gave no definite rules for defining pro-
gram or activity, so it remains unclear what criteria the
court will use in subsequent cases seeking to define pro-
gram or activity. 1
67
II. PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA V. CAB
At issue in Paralyzed Veterans of America was the limit of
the program or activity receiving federal financial assist-
ance under section 504.168 Since the larger commercial
airlines did not directly receive federal financial assist-
ance, the court had to determine whether the airlines re-
ceived indirect federal financial assistance sufficient to
subject the airlines to section 504 regulation. 69 In deter-
mining whether section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ap-
plied to those commercial airlines receiving indirect
federal financial assistance, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit discussed four possible types
of federal financial assistance indirectly provided to the
airlines: exclusive operating certificates, 70 favorable tax
treatment,' 7' the National Air Traffic Control System (via
' Id. at 1221-22.
c. Id. at 1222. See also supra note 163.
117 See 104 S. Ct. at 1220-22.
- Paralyzed Veterans of America, 752 F.2d at 707.
-. Id. at 707-15.
17) Id. at 707-09. Exclusive operating certificates are discussed infra notes 174-
177 and accompanying text. See generally 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.1-121.9 (1985). Every
domestic carrier is required to procure an operating certificate. Id. § 121.3(a).
The issuance of these certificates gives the FAA the power to regulate the air
transportation industry since a carrier is prohibited from operating without a li-
cense. See id.
17, 752 F.2d. at 708-09, discussed infra notes 178-187 and accompanying text.
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services of federal air traffic controllers),' 72 and federal
subsidies to airports.' 73
The groups representing the handicapped argued
before the CAB that operating certificates give air carriers
exclusive control over valuable air routes and therefore
constitute federal financial assistance.1 74 In determining
that the airlines' operating certificates did not constitute
federal financial assistance, the CAB relied on Gottfried for
its holding that broadcast licenses are not federal financial
assistance. 75 The Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit approved of the CAB's reliance on Gott-
fried. 76 The court added that airline operating certificates
were no longer exclusive, therefore making them of lesser
value than broadcast licenses. 77 Thus, the amount of
assistance given to the airlines through operating certifi-
cates is a small portion of the benefit broadcasters enjoy
from broadcasting licenses.
The court also rejected the handicapped's contention
that the airline's investment tax credit for the purchase of
machinery and equipment constituted federal financial
assistance to the airlines.17 8 The CAB failed to address
this issue in its rulemaking proceedings.' 79 The court dis-
172 Id. at 709-12, discussed infra notes 188-208 and accompanying text.
173 Id. at 712-15, discussed infra notes 208-229 and accompanying text.
'74 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg.
25,936, 25,937 (1982)(codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382 (1985)).
17 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937. See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text for
Gottfrieds rejection of the argument that operating licenses are federal financial
assistance. The court noted briefly that Gottfried, discussed supra notes 82-95 and
accompanying text, states that to require an agency to acquire a license and then
hold that the agency receives federal financial assistance would constitute unrea-
sonable bootstrapping. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 752 F.2d at 712 n.121. The
court distinguished the instant case by noting that licenses and airline operating
certificates were regulatory in nature, while air traffic controllers were a service
provided to the airlines. Id. at 711.
17,1 Paralyzed Veterans of America, 752 F.2d at 709-10.
177 See 752 F.2d at 708. In other words, the value of non-exclusive license is not
bid up by airlines seeking a finite number of routes. See also supra note 170 for a
definition of "operating certificate."
17m 752 F.2d at 709-10.
179 Id. at 709.
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tinguished McGlotten,'"I Regan,'8 t and Bob Jones82 by stat-
ing that the tax breaks in those cases "were of a much
more fundamental nature than the modest incentive to
capital expenditures to which petitioners point here."' 83
The court admitted that accelerated depreciation and in-
vestment tax credits benefited the airlines but stated that
the trilogy of cases discussed above only apply when the
use of the tax benefit is fundamental to the organization's
purpose. 8 4 The court further stated that McGlotten, Bob
Jones, and Regan all involved nonprofit organizations seek-
ing tax-exempt status, while commercial airlines are
profit-seeking enterprises to which the government grants
the tax credit to encourage capital investment.185 In addi-
tion, the court stated that Congress did not intend to sub-
ject the airlines to federal scrutiny merely because of a
subsidy affecting a small portion of an entire industry, rea-
soning that an airline could avoid compliance with the
regulations altogether by foregoing the deductions. 8 6
With the changing nature of the tax laws Congress could
also decide in the future to abolish the deductions, leav-
ing the government powerless to prevent discrimination
against the handicapped. 8 7
Having rejected the handicapped's first two conten-
tions, the court addressed the handicapped organizations'
contention that the national air traffic control system con-
stitutes federal financial assistance because the govern-
ment provides the services of air traffic controllers to the
' See supra notes 102-107 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mcglotten.
'"' See supra notes 114-118 and accompanying text for a discussion of Regan.
2 See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bob Jones.
1- Paralyzed Veterans of America, 752 F.2d at 710.
114 Id. The investment tax credit does not apply exclusively to airlines. It is a
measure, as described in McGlotten, that relates "primarily to the operation of the
tax itself." See McGlotien, 338 F. Supp. at 461.
'" The court stated, "we think.., that Congress did not intend, by granting a
limited tax incentive to a particular industry or group, to thereby encompass every
such industry or group . . . within some ever-widening and potentially almost
limitless definition of 'federal financial assistance.' " Paralyzed Veterans of America,
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airlines.' 88 The CAB rejected this argument in its formu-
lation of the Final Rule and concurred with the position of
the FAA that air traffic control services "are provided to
the public generally to ensure flight safety" instead of to
the airlines. ' 89 The CAB reasoned that the air traffic con-
trol system did not directly provide the airlines with finan-
cial assistance. 190
In determining whether it agreed with the CAB's posi-
tion regarding air traffic controllers, the court analyzed
the impact of air traffic controllers on commercial air-
lines. 1' The air traffic controllers are highly trained indi-
viduals employed in a program that costs over two billion
dollars annually.' 92 The services of these personnel are
essential to the airlines and are a service the airlines
would have to provide themselves in the absence of the
government program. 93 With these findings, the court
concluded that utilization of the air traffic control system
constituted federal financial assistance. 94
The court next attempted to define the program receiv-
ing the financial assistance of the federal air traffic con-
trollers. 95 The CAB argued that the general public,
rather than the airlines, was the recipient of the safety
benefits of the federal air traffic control system. 96 The
ism Id. at 709-712. See supra note 77 and accompanying text for the classification
of services of federal personnel as financial assistance.
, 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,937. Thus, the CAB decided that the general public was
the recipient of "federal financial assistance." See id.
ism) Id. The CAB stated no rationale for its position other than that the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) took a similar position. Id.
11, Paralyzed Veterans of America, 752 F.2d at 710-12.
192 Id. at 709 n.109.
'3 Id. at 712. The services of air traffic controllers are so essential to flight
safety that someone must provide them. Id. at 711-12.
,4 Id. at 711.
1115 Id. at 712-13.
'1m Id. at 710-11. The CAB argued:
The air controllers help to assure 'safe skies'; this 'assists' airlines
more directly than it assists other enterprises; yet it also assists all
enterprises that use the airlines or fly private planes in the course of
their business. It also protects those on the ground from plane
crashes. It does not, however, amount to 'Federal financial
assistance.'
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court, however, agreed with the groups representing the
handicapped that the air traffic control system benefits the
airlines more directly than it benefits the general pub-
lic.' 97 The court stated that to exempt an organization
from compliance with the handicapped regulations merely
because the program incidentally benefits the public
"would be absurd", since virtually all federal programs at-
tempt to benefit society. 98
Although the court decided that the air traffic control
system constituted federal financial assistance, it did not
define the program receiving the assistance of the federal
air traffic controllers. 99 Grove City's program-specific re-
quirement muddied the federal financial assistance waters
by mandating a determination of the limits of the financial
assistance.200 The Paralyzed Veterans of America court recog-
nized that the implications of Grove City "are not com-
pletely clear. ' 2 0 ' The court grew concerned that the
activity of "commercial air transportation" may not con-
stitute the "program or activity" receiving the "federal fi-
nancial assistance" of federal air traffic controllers. 20 2
The emphasis, as dictated by Grove City, is on the activity
or program, not the method of assistance.20 3 The court
did not attempt to define the activity or program receiving
the financial assistance of the air traffic controllers but
mentioned two possible definitions: (1) the federal air
Id. See supra note 189.
197 752 F.2d at 711.
-- Id. The court emphasized that "it would be absurd to exempt a federally-
funded local transit authority or school system from compliance with section 504
on the ground that public transportation benefits passengers as well as transit
systems and, like public education and safe air travel, it is a 'public good.' " Id.
, Id. at 712.
2-'" See supra notes 160-164 and accompanying text.
20, 752 F.2d at 712. The court hesitated to embark on the Grove City mandate
that federal financial assistance reach only the program actually receiving the
funds. Id.
2 2 Id. Even though air traffic controllers are indispensible to the airlines, only
the program receiving the assistance must meet section 504 requirements. Id.
21I3 Id. Thus, the key to determining whether federal air traffic controllers bring
the airlines within the reach of section 504 is defining the limits of the program
receiving the assistance.
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traffic control system, or (2) commercial air transporta-
tion.20 4 If the court defined the program as the federal air
traffic control system, then Grove City mandates that only
the federal air traffic control system be subject to section
504.25 On the other hand, if the court deemed the pro-
gram to be commercial air transportation, then the serv-
ices of air traffic controllers would constitute federal
financial assistance to the airlines6.2 0 Thus, the court's di-
lemma was whether commercial air transportation was de-
fined as the program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance.20 7 The court, however, was able to escape this
dilemma by finding that the federal government's funding
of airports and airways constitutes federal financial assist-
ance to the airlines. 20 8 This made the determination of
whether the airlines receive federal financial assistance via
air traffic controllers unnecessary.20 9
By determining that the federal funding of airports con-
stitutes federal financial assistance, the court concluded
that any certificated air carrier using federally funded air-
ports is subject to section 504 regulation. 10 The Secre-
tary of Transportation has the power to make grants for
airport development and to generally provide for an ade-
quate national airport system. 21 ' The Airport and Airway
Trust Fund provides airports with several billion dollars





208 Id. The court found the relationship of airports and airlines to be much
closer than that of federal air traffic controllers and airlines. Id. at 714-715; See
infra notes 210-229 and accompanying text. Presumably, the court was wary of
Grove Cit-, 'sstatement that the economic ripple effects of freeing funds for use
elsewhere in the organization does not constitutue federal financial assistance.
752 F.2d at 713. See also supra note 165 and accompanying text for Grove Citys
discussion of this contention.
2,m 752 F.2d at 712.
Id. at 715.
21,1,The Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 1714(a) as
amended (1982). The purpose of the statute is "the establishment of a nationwide
system of public airports adequate to meet the present and future needs of civil
aeronautics." Id.
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quate facilities and equipment.21 2 This federal money is
used for research and development, to purchase land and
build runways.21 3
The court stated that the magnitude of this federal aid
subjects all federally funded airports to section 504.214
However, the "critical question" for the court was
whether the scope of section 504 ended with the airports
or extended to the airlines themselves.21 5 The court first
examined the administrative interpretation of civil rights
statutes in order to define the program receiving federal
financial assistance.21 6 The court reasoned that since the
Department of Transportation (DOT), pursuant to its Ti-
tle VI regulations, included businesses providing services
to the public at the airport such as restaurants or car
rental agencies in its list of those airport programs receiv-
ing federal financial assistance, 2 17 "it . . .[would be] non-
sensical to exclude the air carriers themselves, which
surely are businesses 'catering to the public at the air-
port.' ",218 The court noted that DOT intended to extend
its section 504 regulations to in-flight activities; thus sub-
jecting all commercial carriers to section 504, but backed
212 49 U.S.C. § 1742. Grants from the Trust Fund are not earmarked but are
given to the airports generally to assist in paying for "planning, research and de-
velopment, construction or operation and maintenance of (i) air traffic con-
trol,(ii) air navigation, (iii) communications, or (iv) supporting services, for the
airway system." 49 U.S.C. § 1742(f)(l)(B).
211 Id. § 1714. See supra note 212. Other projects include "airport lighting, air-
port access and service roads, electronic and visual approach aids, taxiway con-
struction, obstruction removal, and fire/rescue equipment and buildings." 752
F.2d at 712 (citing National Transportation Policy Study Commission Final Re-
port, National Transportation Policies Through the Year 2000 187-88 (June 1979)).
214 Paralyzed Veterans of America, 752 F.2d at 712.
21. Id. at 713. Thus, the court was faced with the same dilemma as when it tried
to determine whether the services of federal air traffic controllers constituted fed-
eral financial assistance. See supra notes 191-208 and accompanying text.
2 - 752 F.2d at 713. See supra note 48 for the application of the history of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 to section 504.
217 49 C.F.R. pt. 21, app. C (1984). Also listed were snack bars, gift shops,
ticket counters, baggage handlers, taxis franchised by the airport sponsor, and
insurance underwriters. Id.
-s8 752 F.2d at 713.
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off when the CAB formulated its Proposed Rule. 2 ' 9 The
court stated that the CAB's final interpretation was con-
trary to the CAB's, DOT's and HEW's determination of
similar issues.220
The airlines argued that North Haven22 ' and Grove City 2 22
restricted the definition of program or activity to the air-
ports themselves since the airports were the only activity
receiving federal financial assistance.223 In response, the
court stated that "airports and airlines are inextricably in-
tertwined",22 4 and they both comprise the program or ac-
tivity of air transportation, forming a single, functional
unit.225 Airline services and airport services combine to
produce air transportation. 26 The court noted that some
airlines may own their terminal or may control the design
of most of their facilities. 27 The court found the relation-
ship of airlines to airports analogous to the situation in
Grove City, where the court deemed only a part of the col-
lege to be receiving federal financial assistance.2 28 On the
basis of Grove City, the Paralyzed Veterans of America court
stated that only the program or activity of providing com-
mercial air transportation, not the entire airline opera-
tion, receives federal financial assistance.229
219 Id. at 713-14. DOT had wanted to avoid duplicative regulations. Id. at 713.
2o Id. at 713. See also supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 148-156 and accompanying text for a discussion of North
Haven.
222 See supra notes 157-167 and accompanying text for a discussion of Grove City.
223 Paralyzed Veterans of America, 752 F.2d at 714.
24 Id. at 714.
22.5 Id. at 714. The court defined the program or activity receiving the benefits
of federally assisted airports as commercial air transportation. Id. Therefore, any
activity in the program of commercial air transportation receives federal financial
assistance if it uses federally funded airports.
226 Comment, Airline Deregulation and Airport Deregulation, 93 YALE L.J. 319 n.l.
(1983).
227 752 F.2d at 714 n. 142. The airline may also control its passengers' parking
at the airport. Id.
22" 752 F.2d at 714. See supra notes 157-167 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of Grove City.
221 752 F.2d at 714. The court stated that a hotel owned and operated by an
airline would not be covered by section 504 since it is not part of the program of
commercial air transportation. Id.
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Finally, the court discussed the CAB's reliance on An-
gel 23 0 in the CAB's formulation of the Final Rule. 2 ' The
Angel court's holding that federal funding of airports was
not federal financial assistance stood in direct conflict
with the court's finding in Paralyzed Veterans of America.232
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
disapproved of the CAB's reliance on Angel and squarely
overruled Angel on three grounds: (1) Even if airlines do
not receive federal financial assistance on a company-wide
basis, their programs or activities providing air transpor-
tation receive assistance; (2) Grove City expressly states
that coverage under antidiscrimination statutes is not lim-
ited to those programs that are direct recipients of federal
funds; and (3) Angel is too liberal a reading of Gottfried,
which only applies to licenses.2 33 The court remanded the
Final Rule to DOT 234 for further consideration in light of
the court's holding.235 Since the CAB had erroneously
determined to restrict the application of its Final Rule to
smaller carriers, the court instructed DOT to redraft any
rules made specifically with small air carriers in mind to
reflect section 504's application to all commercial air
236carriers.
III. CONCLUSION
Paralyzed Veterans of America should have a significant fu-
ture impact on larger commercial carriers. The Final Rule
does not require the airlines to make structural modifica-
2o See supra notes 120-130 and accompanying text for a discussion of Angel.
-11 Paralyzed Veterans of America, 752 F.2d at 714-15.
232 See id.
2. 752 F.2d at 714-15. The court stated that Gottfried only applied to the li-
cense/operating certificate issue and not to the issue of whether or not funding
provided to airports was federal financial assistance to the airlines. Id. See supra
notes 82-95 for a discussion of Gottfried.
24 The CAB transferred the majority of its duties to DOT on January 1, 1985
and ceased existence. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92
Stat. 1705, 1744-47 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (1982)); see also
Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703.
235 Paralyzed Veterans of America, 752 F.2d at 725-26.
26Id.
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tions to their aircraft.237 Instead, the CAB left much of
the manner of achieving compliance with section 504 to
the airlines themselves. 23 1 Therefore, the greatest impact
will not be on current efforts by the airlines to accommo-
date the handicapped but on the future production of
jetliners.
The purpose of the holding in Paralyzed Veterans of
America was to avoid "the absurd result that handicapped
persons are protected from discrimination in air transpor-
tation only up to the door of the aircraft. '239 Perhaps the
court's ulterior motive was to provide the handicapped
with a uniform means of travel. The court emphasized
that air travel is almost essential to participation in the
modern work force, and accordingly air travel should be
freely accessible to all persons. 240 This finding played an
important role in the court's determination to bring all
major carriers within the ambit of section 504.
The court quickly eliminated the propositions that op-
erating certificates 24 I and tax credits242 constituted federal
financial assistance on the basis that (1) both arguments
contradicted recent case law, and (2) both methods of fi-
nancial assistance were too remotely related to the activity
of commercial air transportation to constitute federal fi-
nancial assistance. 243 The court placed most of its empha-
sis on the contentions of the handicapped that federal air
traffic controllers244 and federal funding of airports24
5
21, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg.
25,936, 25,940-1 (1982)(codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382 (1985)).
2.18 See 47 Fed. Reg. at 25,945 (airlines are free to decide type of boarding
equipment they will use).
2'11 Paralyzed Veterans of America, at 718.
24.. Id. at 716 nn.152-53.
241 See supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text for a discussion of operating
certificates as constituting federal financial assistance.
242 See supra notes 178-187 and accompanying text for a discussion of tax credits
as constituting federal financial assistance.
2" See supra notes 183-187 and accompanying text.
24 See supra notes 188-208 and accompanying text for a discussion of federal air
traffic controllers as constituting federal financial assistance.
245 See supra notes 210-236 and accompanying text for a discussion of federal
funding of airports as constituting federal financial assistance.
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constitute federal financial assistance. The court devoted
much of its opinion to discussion of the argument that
federal air traffic controllers constitute federal financial
assistance, yet declined to decide this issue because it was
unsure of the implications of the recent Supreme Court
decision in Grove City limiting a federal agency's ability to
regulate recipients of federal financial assistance.246
The court, however, did decide a substantially similar
issue when it held that federal funding of airports consti-
tutes federal financial assistance.247 Perhaps the court was
eager to overrule Angel, since the Angel court had errone-
ously based its decision that federal funding of airports
was not federal financial assistance on an overly broad in-
terpretation of Gottfried.2 48 Once the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit had disapproved of Angel,
the court was free to apply the Final Rule to all air
carriers.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari249 to Paralyzed Veterans of America and will hope-
fully resolve the "federal financial assistance" question.
The central issue to be discussed is the scope of "program
or activity. ' 250  As indicated earlier, if the court defines
"program or activity" narrowly, then the Final Rule will
bind only the smaller airlines receiving direct federal
aid. 25 ' The Supreme Court, however, rejected this "direct
24 6 Presumably, the court was concerned that the public, rather than the air-
lines, was the receipient of the safety benefits of federal air traffic controllers. See
supra notes 196-198 and accompanying text.
247 The considerations in defining the program or activity seem to be the same
for federal air traffic controllers and federal funding of airports. Both mecha-
nisms provide an indispensible part of the airport's sustenance. Furthermore,
both relate to the general safety of the public but seem to benefit the airlines to a
greater degree. The only real difference, if any, between the two methods of
assistance is that federal funds provided to the airports are primarily for the bene-
fit of the airports and airlines, while air traffic controllers are more closely related
to air safety.
241 Paralyzed Veterans of America, 752 F.2d at 714-15.
2' United States Dep't ofTransp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 106 S. Ct. 244
(1985).
2- 752 F.2d at 714.
21 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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funding" view of federal financial assistance 252 in Grove
City,25 3 so the definition of program or activity should be
somewhat broader than the position taken by the CAB in
its Final Rule. 54 Therefore, the government cannot limit
the definition of "program or activity" to include only
those airlines receiving direct subsidies from the federal
government. 55
The court could also define "program or activity"
broadly, including all airline activities, but this would
probably contradict Grove City's condemnation of the insti-
tutional approach. 56 Thus, the "program or activity" re-
ceiving federal financial assistance must be somewhat
broader than those carriers receiving direct subsidies and
narrower than the entire operations of the airlines.
The Supreme Court should affirm the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit's holding that the gov-
ernment has the ability to regulate all certificated air carri-
ers' activities at federally funded airports. First, the
airlines are clearly recipients of federal financial assistance
either by virtue of the federally-operated air traffic control
system or the provision of federal grants to airports.257
Even though the government indirectly provides the
assistance, it is assistance vital to the continued survival of
air carriers. 258 Grove City specifically approves of indirect
financial assistance as a means to bring programs within
the reach of governmental antidiscrimination regula-
tion.259 The airlines, as primary recipients, should be dis-
tinguished from the general public. Congress sought to
regulate the former,2 60 and the fact that the public re-
ceives a large benefit from federal assistance to airlines
2,N2 See supra notes 136-138 for a discussion of the direct funding approach to
defining the scope of federal financial assistance.
2,13 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
2,54 Id.
2,5 See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
21 See supra notes 162-165 and accompanying text.
2,1 See supra notes 191-194, 210-214 and accompanying text.
2' See supra notes 193, 211-213 and accompanying text.
2 5' See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
'A, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and Activities
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does not mean that the public is the "recipient."2 6'
Second, the airlines come within the "program or activ-
ity" receiving financial assistance. To define airports as
the only program receiving federal financial assistance
produces anomalous results. Under this restrictive defini-
tion of program, the handicapped would be able to get to
the door of the plane, but no further. This restrictive ap-
proach effectively uses federal funds to subsidize discrimi-
nation, a result Congress sought to avoid by drafting
section 504.262 In addition, airports and commercial car-
riers are a single, functional activity. 263 To subject one to
regulation while exempting the other ignores their inter-
relationship. This relationship is unique to commercial
air transportation. 6 4 Airlines cannot operate without air-
ports and vice versa. One may ask, "Why do we have
large airports?" The answer is to provide facilities for
commercial airlines, contrary to the focus on the general
public with federally funded highways. Indeed, the public
views airports and airlines as a single entity. To bring
them both under section 504 regulation ensures a uni-
form system of granting the handicapped equal
opportunity.
The "program or activity" receiving federal financial
assistance is "commercial air transportation." This definition
of program does not run afoul of Grove City's condemna-
tion of the institutional approach 265 because airline activi-
ties such as hotel operations are not part of the program
of commercial air transportation and thus are not subject
to section 504 regulation. Rather, airline-owned hotels
are a part of the airline "institution." Defining the pro-
gram as commercial air transportation also avoids the er-
Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128
(1975).
261 See supra notes 195-198 and accompanying text.
262 See S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 6373, 6391.
263 See supra notes 224-227 and accompanying text.
264 Paralyzed Veterans of America, 752 F.2d at 714.
2., See supra notes 162-165 and accompanying text.
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roneous positions of the Angel court2 66 and the CAB in its
Final Rule 2 67 that only those airlines receiving direct fed-
eral subsidies are subject to the Final Rule.
In Grove City, the government disbursed funds directly
to students for scholarship purposes. 268 The Supreme
Court held that the aid constituted federal financial assist-
ance to the student financial aid program.2 69 The indirect
aid in Paralyzed Veterans of America is similar to the financial
assistance in Grove City because the government did not
give the aid directly to the program it sought to regu-
late. 270 However, the government aid to airports in Para-
lyzed Veterans of America is different because the assistance is
not earmarked. 27 ' The airports have broad discretion to
spend the federal funds.272 Therefore, the aid in Paralyzed
Veterans of America is more comprehensive than the finan-
cial aid in Grove City.27' Logically, the program receiving
federal financial assistance is larger because of this
broader funding. The Grove City court suggested such a
result where the funds were not earmarked for any partic-
ular use within an institution. 74
Those disagreeing with the holding in Paralyzed Veterans
of America express the legitimate fear that the decision
"would make every commercial enterprise a 'recipient' of
federal aid when it merely makes use of a service or facil-
ity that receives any federal assistance. ' 275 However, the
issue in Paralyzed Veterans of America involves the unique re-
lationship between the government and the program of
commercial air transportation not present in most other
2 6" See supra notes 125-130 and accompanying text.
2 ,7 See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
2- Grove City, 104 S. Ct. at 1214.
2119 Id. at 1222. See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.
270 See supra notes 159, 161, 211-214 and accompanying text.
271 See supra notes 211-214 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 212-214 and accompanying text.
27 . The result in Grove City might have been different if the government had
disbursed funds directly to the College's operating fund. See Grove City, 104 S. Ct.
at 1221-22.
274 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
27" 752 F.2d at 725. This was the view taken by the judges dissenting from the
&ourt's denial of respondent's suggestion for rehearing en banc. Id.
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federal financial assistance situations. The government as-
sumes a proprietary role in investing its money in com-
mercial air transportation. Federal highways and courts
involve different relationships between the recipients. In
those programs, the public is the primary recipient of fed-
eral aid. For example, the public uses the federally-funded
highway system much more extensively than the owner of
a private plane would use a large, federally-funded air-
port.2 76 Therefore, the holding in Paralyzed Veterans of
America will not subject a commercial enterprise to section
504 regulation when that business makes use of a feder-
ally-funded activity, unless that business, not the general
public, is the intended recipient of the benefits of the ac-
tivity. Since all carriers must now follow the same rules,
Paralyzed Veterans of America affirms Congress' intent that
the implementation of section 504 be uniform and consis-
tent.277 Surely Congress did not intend to foster a system
whereby a handicapped individual could get to the door
of the airplane, but no further.278
Robert Randel Kibby
-71 Neither would farmers receive federal financial assistance by virtue of the
government-assisted National Weather Service. The intended recipient of the
benefits of the National Weather Service is the general public, not farmers.
_77 S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, 6373, 6391.
271 See id. at 39, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6390. "[Section [504]
therefore constitutes the establishment of a broad government policy that pro-
grams receiving Federal financial assistance shall be operated without discrimina-
tion on the basis of handicap." Id. at 39, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
6390.
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